reasonable suspicion standard in Florida

44 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (25)

Case	Followed	Cited
United States v. Anthony Deberrygreen ca7 · 1996 · cited in 3 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1998–2009 2 sentences 2009See United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that evidence is admissible based on mere verification of a presently-occurring innocent detail tip); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir.1992) (same). 2009See United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that evidence is admissible based on mere verification of a presently-occurring innocent detail tip); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir.1992) (same).	3	3
United States v. Sokolowgreen scotus · 1989 · cited in 5 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1996–2023 2 sentences 2013In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, at 243-244, n. 13 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). 2013In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, at 243-244, n. 13 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).	2	5
State v. FWEgreen fladistctapp · 1978 · cited in 5 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1981–1984 2 sentences 1983This court found the Nelson court's reasoning quite persuasive and utilized the reasonable suspicion standard in reaching a determination in State v. F.W.E., 360 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). 1983This court found the Nelson court’s reasoning quite persuasive and utilized the reasonable suspicion standard in reaching a determination in State v. F.W.E., 360 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).	2	5
Illinois v. Gatesgreen scotus · 1983 · cited in 3 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1996–2013 2 sentences 2013In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, at 243-244, n. 13 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). 2013In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, at 243-244, n. 13 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).	2	3
Price v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2013 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2013–2014 2 sentences 2014Price v. State, 120 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). 2013Recently, for example, in Price v. State, 120 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), we explained that the reasonable suspicion standard requires courts to examine the totality of circumstances, or “whole picture,” to determine whether the detaining officers had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.	2	2
State v. DSgreen fladistctapp · 1996 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).	2	2
State v. Whorleygreen fladistctapp · 1998 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).	2	2
State v. JHgreen fladistctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).	2	2
KK v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 1998 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 2011See State v. J.H., 898 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); K.K. v. State, 717 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Whorley, 720 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).	2	2
Terry v. Ohiogreen scotus · 1968 · cited in 6 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1989–2013 2 sentences 2010See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (explaining that the reasonable suspicion standard requires more than a “hunch” of criminal activity). 2010See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (explaining that the reasonable suspicion standard requires more than a “hunch” of criminal activity).	1	6
Reid v. Georgiagreen scotus · 1980 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 1 sentence 2019See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (holding that “there could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot”). 4 We also reject the dissent’s implication that the tip could not factor into the reasonable-suspicion analysis because it did not provide a description of Weakley’s physical characteristics.	1	1
Hunter v. Stategreen fla · 1995 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015The following factors are relevant in assessing whether a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO was supported by a founded suspicion: “(1) the length of time and distance from the offense; (2)[the] route of flight; (3) [the] specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants; and (4) the source of the BOLO information.” Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 249 (Fla.1995).	1	1
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Iveygreen fladistctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015See Ivey, 73 So.3d at 879 .	1	1
Commonwealth v. Hawkinsgreen pa · 1997 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013Id. at 208-09 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 547 Pa. 652 , 692 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa.1997)). 2013Id. at 208-09 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 547 Pa. 652 , 692 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa.1997)).	1	1
Majors v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013	1	1
Brown v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
State v. Webbgreen fla · 1981 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Jackson v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
Mitchell v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
JL v. Stategreen fla · 1998 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
Rivera v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008	1	1
Dennis v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007	1	1
Faunce v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2004 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007	1	1
Williams v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
Goodner v. Stategreen oklacrimapp · 1976 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

Case	Cited	Years
Nelson v. State green fladistctapp · 1975 2 sentences 1983In Nelson v. State, 319 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), this court adopted the reasonable suspicion standard to be applied to searches and seizures by school officials at a public school. 1983Initially, we note that in Nelson v. State, 319 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975), our sister court adopted the reasonable suspicion standard for a search and seizure on a public school campus.	5	1983–1984
United States v. Scotty Lee Hudson green ca6 · 2005 2 sentences 2014The warrant supplies the officers with probable cause to arrest the person it names and describes, not a license to duck the reasonable suspicion requirement and stop someone they only have a subjective hunch is that person.” Id. at 491 (quoting U.S. v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425 , 439 n. 9 (6th Cir.2005)) (emphasis added). 2007The warrant supplies the officers with probable cause to arrest the person it names and describes, not a license to duck the reasonable suspicion requirement and stop someone they only have a subjective hunch is that person." United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425 , 439 n. 9 (6th Cir.2005).	3	2006–2014
United States v. Ronald T. Clipper green cadc · 1992 2 sentences 2009See United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that evidence is admissible based on mere verification of a presently-occurring innocent detail tip); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir.1992) (same). 2009See United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that evidence is admissible based on mere verification of a presently-occurring innocent detail tip); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir.1992) (same).	3	1998–2009
State v. DTW green fladistctapp · 1983 2 sentences 1984Nelson v. State, 319 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); State v. F.W.E., 360 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); § 232.256, Fla.Stat. (1983). 1983In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the First District Court of Appeal outlined a number of factors which can be considered in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to search exists under those circumstances.	3	1983–1984
United States v. Cortez green scotus · 1981 2 sentences 2017The reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops “takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture.’ Navarette v. Califor 704 nia, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 , 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 2017The reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops “takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture.’ Navarette v. Califor 704 nia, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 , 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).	2	2015–2017
Illinois v. Wardlow green scotus · 2000 2 sentences 2010The officer must have “ ‘a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’ In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, ‘[t]he officer must be able to articulate more than an” inchoate and unparticularlized suspicion or ‘hunch’ “of criminal activity.’ ” Mitchell v. State, 955 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 2010The officer must have “ ‘a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’ In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, ‘[t]he officer must be able to articulate more than an” inchoate and unparticularlized suspicion or ‘hunch’ “of criminal activity.’ ” Mitchell v. State, 955 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).	2	2007–2010
People v. Dilworth green ill · 1996 2 sentences 1998As was held in People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195 , 214 Ill.Dec. 456 , 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996), quoted with approval in D.S.: “Where school officials initiate the search or police involvement is minimal, most courts have held that the reasonable suspicion test obtains. 1998As was held in People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195 , 214 Ill.Dec. 456 , 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996), quoted with approval in D.S.: “Where school officials initiate the search or police involvement is minimal, most courts have held that the reasonable suspicion test obtains.	2	1998–1998
New Jersey v. T. L. O. green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1989T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. at 742-743 . 1989T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 , 105 S.Ct. at 742-743 .	2	1989–1989
WJS v. State green fladistctapp · 1982 2 sentences 1983W.J.S. v. State, 409 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); M.J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 1983W.J.S. v. State, 409 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); M.J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).	2	1983–1983
MJ v. State green fladistctapp · 1981 2 sentences 1983W.J.S. v. State, 409 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); M.J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 1983W.J.S. v. State, 409 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); M.J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).	2	1983–1983
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Roberts green fladistctapp · 2006 1 sentence 2025While we agree with the trial court that the officer’s reason for stopping Howard for speeding is not well-founded based on the lack of specific and articulable facts provided to support a basis for the infraction, see Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. 5 Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the officer did have reasonable suspicion to believe that Howard failed to maintain a single lane in violation of section 316.089(1), Florida Statutes (2023).	1	2025–2025
R.R. v. State green fladistctapp · 2014 2 sentences 2018Id. at 539 . 2 during flight from police is not properly suppressed as the fruit of a seizure. 2018Id. at 539 . 2 during flight from police is not properly suppressed as the fruit of a seizure.	1	2018–2018
Alabama v. White green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 2017“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify such a stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). 2017“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify such a stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)).	1	2017–2017
Prado Navarette v. California green scotus · 2014 2 sentences 2017The reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops “takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture.’ Navarette v. Califor 704 nia, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 , 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 2017The reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops “takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture.’ Navarette v. Califor 704 nia, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 , 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).	1	2017–2017
Rios v. State green fladistctapp · 2007 1 sentence 2014The warrant supplies the officers with probable cause to arrest the person it names and describes, not a license to duck the reasonable suspicion requirement and stop someone they only have a subjective hunch is that person.” Id. at 491 (quoting U.S. v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425 , 439 n. 9 (6th Cir.2005)) (emphasis added).	1	2014–2014
United States v. Appelbaum green ca4 · 2013 2 sentences 2014Section 2703 (d), 707 F.3d at 287 . 2014Section 2703 (d), 707 F.3d at 287 .	1	2014–2014
DeLorenzo v. State green fladistctapp · 2006	1	2010–2010
RE v. State green fladistctapp · 1988	1	2010–2010
Florida v. JL green scotus · 2000	1	2009–2009
Berkemer v. McCarty green scotus · 1984	1	2001–2001
State in Interest of TLO green njsuperctappdiv · 1980	1	1983–1983
United States v. Auviene D'antignac, A/K/A Jack D'antignac, Patrick Glen Knight, Thomas Olden Thornton, Timothy David Cahill and Robert Wheeler Welch green ca5 · 1980	1	1982–1982

Statutes the citing opinions construe

FL § 901.151 (10) FL § 790.01 (3) FL § 790.06 (3) FL § 790.22 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 230 (1988–2026) PA 147 (1983–2026) ID 145 (1994–2026) MN 86 (1980–2026) CA 82 (1962–2026) OH 80 (1990–2026) IN 80 (1993–2026) NC 73 (1981–2026) MA 59 (1990–2026) OR 53 (1978–2026) NM 51 (1993–2024) NJ 50 (1986–2026) WI 50 (1987–2026) VA 50 (1987–2026) IL 47 (1990–2025) FL 44 (1981–2025) MD 43 (1974–2026) NY 41 (1978–2026) UT 29 (1983–2020) IA 27 (1997–2025) ND 27 (1986–2024) CO 27 (1983–2026) KS 24 (2000–2026) SD 23 (1983–2026) WA 21 (1989–2021) KY 19 (1991–2024) MO 19 (1989–2021) ME 18 (1987–2022) TN 18 (1992–2019) LA 17 (1993–2025) AZ 16 (2004–2025) WV 15 (1985–2024) DE 14 (2001–2024) MI 13 (1980–2025) DC 13 (2000–2025) WY 12 (2007–2025) GA 12 (1998–2020) CT 9 (1988–2017) VT 9 (1998–2020) SC 8 (2000–2025) AK 7 (1988–2025) HI 6 (1994–2009) NE 6 (1978–2023) NH 4 (2004–2020) MS 4 (2005–2011) RI 4 (1980–2024) NV 4 (2015–2019) AL 3 (1993–2026) AR 3 (2000–2015) MT 2 (2000–2006) OK 2 (2019–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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