reasonable suspicion requirement in Indiana

2017Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

2015Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied; see also Gipson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind. 1984).

2023It “entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “[A] set of individually innocent facts, when observed in conjunction, can be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2003).

2017See Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2003) (“The reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly fact-sensitive and is reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence standard.

2016“The reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer,, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). [Stops initiated pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ] (1968) ] are limited in scope and purpose.

2013The reasonable-suspicion requirement is met “where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh’g denied.

2016Id. [13] Here, Officer Watson testified that he saw Hancock driving a maroon Kia the day before the arrest.

2016J.B. v. State, 30 N.E.3d 51, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). [17] Before applying the reasonable suspicion requirement to the facts of this case, we must first address Mullen’s claim that Terry does not apply to private property.

2013Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh’g on other grounds, 685 N.E.2d 698 .

2006Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind.1997), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 685 N.E.2d 698 .

2015Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied; see also Gipson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind. 1984).

2013Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied; see also Gipson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind. 1984).

2012“The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

2010"The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity." Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1128 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008).

2002Carter v. State, 692 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).

2002Carter v. State, 692 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).

2009In State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied, another panel of this court held: Initially, we note that the reasonable suspicion analysis first articulated in Terry does not apply to this case.

2009In State v. Atkins, 834 N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied, another panel of this court held: Initially, we note that the reasonable suspicion analysis first articulated in Terry does not apply to this case.

2013Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

2006Id.

2023The reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied when “the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

2023The reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied when “the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

2015Moultry v. State, 808 N.E.2d 168, 171 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). [14] In this case, Officer Wallace saw J.B. discard what he believed to be a firearm in a yard as J.B. walked along a sidewalk.

2012Moultry v. State, 808 N.E.2d 168, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 9 2004).

2007State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla.Ct.App.1996) (holding that school police officers are always subject to the reasonable suspicion standard for school searches "since the school police officer is a school official who is employed by the district School Board") (emphasis in original).

2007State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla.Ct.App.1996) (holding that school police officers are always subject to the reasonable suspicion standard for school searches “since the school police officer is a school official who is employed by the district School Board”) (emphasis in original).

2000Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Price, 184 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir.1999) found that an anonymous tip that an amount of cocaine would be in a particular car, a description of the defendant and those traveling with him, where the trip originated, and where it would conclude, provided reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.

2000Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Price, 184 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir.1999) found that an anonymous tip that an amount of cocaine would be in a particular car, a description of the defendant and those traveling with him, where the trip originated, and where it would conclude, provided reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.

2026Ct. App. 2004)). [14] The Nevada court also recognized that many jurisdictions have concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied where the motorist is driving well below the speed limit and is engaged in another unusual driving behavior 2 indicative of intoxication, such as swerving in the travel lane, driving on the 3 4 5 shoulder of the road, straddling the lane, crossing the center line, or weaving 2 Wells v. State, 772 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 3 U.S. v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003). 4 U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995).

2026Ct. App. 2004)). [14] The Nevada court also recognized that many jurisdictions have concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied where the motorist is driving well below the speed limit and is engaged in another unusual driving behavior 2 indicative of intoxication, such as swerving in the travel lane, driving on the 3 4 5 shoulder of the road, straddling the lane, crossing the center line, or weaving 2 Wells v. State, 772 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 3 U.S. v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003). 4 U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995).

2026Ct. App. 2004)). [14] The Nevada court also recognized that many jurisdictions have concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied where the motorist is driving well below the speed limit and is engaged in another unusual driving behavior 2 indicative of intoxication, such as swerving in the travel lane, driving on the 3 4 5 shoulder of the road, straddling the lane, crossing the center line, or weaving 2 Wells v. State, 772 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 3 U.S. v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003). 4 U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995).

2026Ct. App. 2004)). [14] The Nevada court also recognized that many jurisdictions have concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied where the motorist is driving well below the speed limit and is engaged in another unusual driving behavior 2 indicative of intoxication, such as swerving in the travel lane, driving on the 3 4 5 shoulder of the road, straddling the lane, crossing the center line, or weaving 2 Wells v. State, 772 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 3 U.S. v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003). 4 U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995).

2024Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 261 (Ind. 2013).