reasonable suspicion standard in Michigan

2017In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Emphasis added.] See also United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1 , 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (analogizing Gates and other probable-cause cases to the reasonable-suspicion standard and recognizing that "[a]ny one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel.

2017In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Emphasis added.] See also United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1 , 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (analogizing Gates and other probable-cause cases to the reasonable-suspicion standard and recognizing that "[a]ny one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel.

2022Yet in granting reconsideration the trial court articulated an incorrect standard, indicating that it was “reviewing this evidence, from, at least, a probable cause standard.” But as the Champion Court held, 452 Mich at 98 , “[r]easonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Thus, as far as we can discern from the trial courts on the record ruling, it applied an incorrect—and higher—burden when evaluating the evidence on reconsideration.

2022Yet in granting reconsideration the trial court articulated an incorrect standard, indicating that it was “reviewing this evidence, from, at least, a probable cause standard.” But as the Champion Court held, 452 Mich at 98 , “[r]easonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Thus, as far as we can discern from the trial courts on the record ruling, it applied an incorrect—and higher—burden when evaluating the evidence on reconsideration.

2017But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion"); State v. Sisco , 239 Ariz. 532 , 536, 373 P.3d 549 (2016) (quoting Gates 462 U.S. at 243 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 and holding that "[p]robable cause, however, does not turn on the 'innocence' or 'guilt' of particular conduct, but instead on the 'degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts' ").

2017But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion"); State v. Sisco , 239 Ariz. 532 , 536, 373 P.3d 549 (2016) (quoting Gates 462 U.S. at 243 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 and holding that "[p]robable cause, however, does not turn on the 'innocence' or 'guilt' of particular conduct, but instead on the 'degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts' ").

2025A “strong odor of intoxicants on a motorist’s breath, standing alone, can provide a police officer with a reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion that the motorist was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” People v Rizzo, 243 Mich App 151, 158 ; 622 NW2d 319 (2000).

2025A “strong odor of intoxicants on a motorist’s breath, standing alone, can provide a police officer with a reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion that the motorist was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” People v Rizzo, 243 Mich App 151, 158 ; 622 NW2d 319 (2000).

2025The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the reasonable suspicion inquiry falls considerably short of 51% accuracy, for, as we have explained, to be reasonable is not to be perfect . . . .” Kansas v Glover, 589 US 376, 381 ; 140 S Ct 1183 ; 206 L Ed 2d 412 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -4- This Court has described what constitutes reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated.

2025The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the reasonable suspicion inquiry falls considerably short of 51% accuracy, for, as we have explained, to be reasonable is not to be perfect . . . .” Kansas v Glover, 589 US 376, 381 ; 140 S Ct 1183 ; 206 L Ed 2d 412 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -4- This Court has described what constitutes reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated.

2025The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the reasonable suspicion inquiry falls considerably short of 51% accuracy, for, as we have explained, to be reasonable is not to be perfect . . . .” Kansas v Glover, 589 US 376, 381 ; 140 S Ct 1183 ; 206 L Ed 2d 412 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -4- This Court has described what constitutes reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated.

2025In a case involving reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a “commonsense inference that [the registered owner] was likely the driver of the vehicle[.]” Glover, 589 US at 381 . -6-

2017But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion"); State v. Sisco , 239 Ariz. 532 , 536, 373 P.3d 549 (2016) (quoting Gates 462 U.S. at 243 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 and holding that "[p]robable cause, however, does not turn on the 'innocence' or 'guilt' of particular conduct, but instead on the 'degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts' ").

2017But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion"); State v. Sisco , 239 Ariz. 532 , 536, 373 P.3d 549 (2016) (quoting Gates 462 U.S. at 243 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 and holding that "[p]robable cause, however, does not turn on the 'innocence' or 'guilt' of particular conduct, but instead on the 'degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts' ").

2001Terry, supra. To the extent that the lead opinion could be read as overlooking the particularity requirement inherent in a reasonable suspicion inquiry, I disagree with it. 5 There is no bright-line test for determining whether articulable and particularized reasonable suspicion exists under the circumstances of an individual case.

1984See, e.g., People v Lillis, 64 Mich App 64 ; 235 NW2d 65 (1975); People v Terrell, 77 Mich App 676 ; 259 NW2d 187 (1977); People v Grimmett, 97 Mich App 212 ; 293 NW2d 768 (1980).

1984See, e.g., People v Lillis, 64 Mich App 64 ; 235 NW2d 65 (1975); People v Terrell, 77 Mich App 676 ; 259 NW2d 187 (1977); People v Grimmett, 97 Mich App 212 ; 293 NW2d 768 (1980).

1984See, e.g., People v Lillis, 64 Mich App 64 ; 235 NW2d 65 (1975); People v Terrell, 77 Mich App 676 ; 259 NW2d 187 (1977); People v Grimmett, 97 Mich App 212 ; 293 NW2d 768 (1980).

1984See, e.g., People v Lillis, 64 Mich App 64 ; 235 NW2d 65 (1975); People v Terrell, 77 Mich App 676 ; 259 NW2d 187 (1977); People v Grimmett, 97 Mich App 212 ; 293 NW2d 768 (1980).

1980Ms. Bolden’s suspicion that defendant was carrying a concealed weapon on that particular occasion was at least as reasonable as the suspicion of the principal in People v Ward, supra. Thus the search of defendant’s briefcase satisfied the reasonable suspicion test adopted in People v Ward; therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to exclude the evidence of the gun from the trial.