Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
41 New York opinions name it 9 courts 1978–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. De Bourgreen2 sentences2020In any event, to the extent that the reasonable suspicion standard applies, the court properly found that the officer had reasonable suspicion as well ( see People v De Bour , 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). 2020In fact, the De Bour Court itself approvingly cited Terry in support of the reasonable suspicion standard ( 40 NY2d at 223 ). | 3 | 5 |
People v. Dunngreen2 sentences2021Considering the context of a vehicle traffic stop and how events unfolded, we conclude that a reasonable suspicion standard should apply, not one of probable cause ( see Terry v Ohio , 392 US 1, 8 [1968]; United States v Reyes , 349 F3d 219, 223-224 [5th Cir 2003], cert denied 540 US 1228 [2004]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]; Tedford v State , 307 So 3d 738, 745-746 [Fla 4th DCA 2020]). 2010While it is true that, generally speaking, an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in a home (see Yancy, 86 NY2d at 245-246 ), this distinction has never affected the standard required to search areas of a vehicle shielded from outside view, and it should not now justify a search of these private spaces based on mere founded suspicion rather than the reasonable suspicion standard applied to residences and their thresholds (see Dunn, 77 NY2d at 26 ). * Indeed, prior to today, the predicate of founded suspicion of criminality adopted by the majority would have permitted n | 2 | 3 |
People v. Koszkogreen2 sentences2025At a Dunaway hearing the People must only show that it was "more probable than not" that the accused "exhibited actual impairment" from the consumption of alcohol ( See People v. Koszko , 57 Misc 3d 47, 49 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2017], [ see also , People v. Vandover , 20 NY3d 235, 239 [2012]). [Therefore, the People should provide evidence that the accused person exhibited "dimensions of actual physical coordination impairment." ( People v. Gullo , 51 Misc 3d 150[A] , at *1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2016]; see also People v. Rich , 25 Misc 3d 126[A] , at * 1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2009]). 2025At a Dunaway hearing the People must only show that it was "more probable than not" that the accused "exhibited actual impairment" from the consumption of alcohol ( See People v. Koszko , 57 Misc 3d 47, 49 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2017], [ see also , People v. Vandover , 20 NY3d 235, 239 [2012]). [Therefore, the People should provide evidence that the accused person exhibited "dimensions of actual physical coordination impairment." ( People v. Gullo , 51 Misc 3d 150[A] , at *1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2016]; see also People v. Rich , 25 Misc 3d 126[A] , at * 1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2009]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Vandovergreen2 sentences2025At a Dunaway hearing the People must only show that it was "more probable than not" that the accused "exhibited actual impairment" from the consumption of alcohol ( See People v. Koszko , 57 Misc 3d 47, 49 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2017], [ see also , People v. Vandover , 20 NY3d 235, 239 [2012]). [Therefore, the People should provide evidence that the accused person exhibited "dimensions of actual physical coordination impairment." ( People v. Gullo , 51 Misc 3d 150[A] , at *1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2016]; see also People v. Rich , 25 Misc 3d 126[A] , at * 1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2009]). 2025At a Dunaway hearing the People must only show that it was "more probable than not" that the accused "exhibited actual impairment" from the consumption of alcohol ( See People v. Koszko , 57 Misc 3d 47, 49 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2017], [ see also , People v. Vandover , 20 NY3d 235, 239 [2012]). [Therefore, the People should provide evidence that the accused person exhibited "dimensions of actual physical coordination impairment." ( People v. Gullo , 51 Misc 3d 150[A] , at *1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2016]; see also People v. Rich , 25 Misc 3d 126[A] , at * 1 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 2009]). | 2 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2021Considering the context of a vehicle traffic stop and how events unfolded, we conclude that a reasonable suspicion standard should apply, not one of probable cause ( see Terry v Ohio , 392 US 1, 8 [1968]; United States v Reyes , 349 F3d 219, 223-224 [5th Cir 2003], cert denied 540 US 1228 [2004]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]; Tedford v State , 307 So 3d 738, 745-746 [Fla 4th DCA 2020]). 1983“We are thus called upon to decide whether the appellant was subjected to an ‘investigatory stop’ governed by the reasonable suspicion test established in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or whether he was subjected to such a degree of force that the stop was in fact an arrest governed by the requirement of probable cause. | 1 | 3 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2026Further, although that "approach involves an analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability and basis of knowledge factors, allowance must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Alabama v White , 496 US 325, 328-329 [1990]). 2025While this approach involves an analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability and basis of knowledge factors, "allowance must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required" to meet the reasonable suspicion standard ( White , 496 US at 328-329 ). [FN3] Here, the totality of the circumstances establishes that there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2024Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question of law and fact, and our review of that issue is limited to whether record support exists for the lower courts' determination ( see People v Harrison , 57 NY2d 470, 477 [1982]). 1998In order to approach a stationary vehicle which has not been seized, the police need only an “articulable basis for requesting information.” (People v Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982, 985 [1995]; People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470 [1982]; People v Strong, 234 AD2d 990 [4th Dept 1996]; People v Locano, 209 AD2d 278 [1st Dept 1994].) This articulable basis is supplied “by an objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of criminality’. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Chiltongreen2 sentences2020On appeal, County Court held that “[t]he suppression court erroneously relied upon the probable cause standard” and therefore modified the order to “reflect [that] the legal standard is one of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.” Affirming that decision, this Court determined that “the County Court properly held that -8- -9- No. 46 the legality of the stop”—a stop based on “alleged traffic infractions”—“should be measured against a reasonable suspicion standard” ( 69 NY2d at 929 ).4 Relying on Ingle, Chilton, and their progeny, New York courts routinely held that “[a] police officer may 1991In respect to the several objections presented, the defen dant’s apparent failure to have the correct plates on his vehicle gave the police officers a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was taking place (see, People v Chilton, 69 NY2d 928 [1987]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Cantorgreen2 sentences2008People v Dunn, 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990] [canine sniff search of apartment hallway subject to reasonable suspicion standard because "(i)t does not entail entry into the premises or exposure of one's personal effects to the police"]; see also People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1975] [reasonable suspicion standard applies to authority of police officers to stop and inquire of citizens in public place]). 2008People v Dunn, 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990] [canine sniff search of apartment hallway subject to reasonable suspicion standard because “(i)t does not entail entry into the premises or exposure of one’s personal effects to the police”]; see also People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1975] [reasonable suspicion standard applies to authority of police officers to stop and inquire of citizens in public place]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Chestnutgreen2 sentences2006Here, the gunpoint stop unquestionably constituted a seizure of defendant’s person—De Bour’s level three—and required reasonable suspicion (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14 [1980] [where police draw their firearms and order a suspect to “freeze,” this is a seizure, the propriety of which is measured by the reasonable suspicion standard]; People v Townes, 41 NY2d 97 [1976] [ordering a suspect to “freeze” with guns drawn amounts to a seizure of the suspect by police]). 2006Here, the gunpoint stop unquestionably constituted a seizure of defendant's person — De Bour 's level three — and required reasonable suspicion ( see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14 [1980] [where police draw their firearms and order a suspect to "freeze," this is a seizure, the propriety of which is measured by the reasonable suspicion standard]; People v Townes, 41 NY2d 97 [1976] [ordering a suspect to "freeze" with guns drawn amounts to a seizure of the suspect by police]). | 1 | 2 |
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen2 sentences2026United States v Castle , 825 F3d 625, 629 [DC Cir 2016] ["(I)n the context of a reasonable suspicion analysis, furtive gestures" like flight "are significant only if they were undertaken in response to police presence" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Illinois v Wardlow , 528 US 119, 121, 125 [2000] [flight supported inference of criminal activity when officers "were working (in) uniform( )" as part of a police "caravan"]). 2026United States v Castle , 825 F3d 625, 629 [DC Cir 2016] ["(I)n the context of a reasonable suspicion analysis, furtive gestures" like flight "are significant only if they were undertaken in response to police presence" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Illinois v Wardlow , 528 US 119, 121, 125 [2000] [flight supported inference of criminal activity when officers "were working (in) uniform( )" as part of a police "caravan"]). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harold Castlegreen2 sentences2026United States v Castle , 825 F3d 625, 629 [DC Cir 2016] ["(I)n the context of a reasonable suspicion analysis, furtive gestures" like flight "are significant only if they were undertaken in response to police presence" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Illinois v Wardlow , 528 US 119, 121, 125 [2000] [flight supported inference of criminal activity when officers "were working (in) uniform( )" as part of a police "caravan"]). 2026United States v Castle , 825 F3d 625, 629 [DC Cir 2016] ["(I)n the context of a reasonable suspicion analysis, furtive gestures" like flight "are significant only if they were undertaken in response to police presence" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Illinois v Wardlow , 528 US 119, 121, 125 [2000] [flight supported inference of criminal activity when officers "were working (in) uniform( )" as part of a police "caravan"]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ingramgreen1 sentence2024Because neither the suppression court nor the Appellate Division applied the reasonable suspicion standard to the facts, we are precluded from reaching that issue here ( see CPL 470.15 [1]; 470.35 [1]; People v Ingram , 18 NY3d 948, 949 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Allengreen1 sentence2022The Court of Appeals has rejected the notion that "the application of handcuffs will [*3]always be dispositive of whether the detention of a suspect on reasonable suspicion has been elevated into a full-blown arrest" ( People v Allen , 73 NY2d 378, 380 [1989]; see People v Gray , 143 AD3d 909, 909 [2016]; People v Santiago , 41 AD3d 1172 , 1174 [2007]; People v Galloway , 40 AD3d 240, 240 [2007]; People v McCarthy , 64 Misc 3d 20 , 23-24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gallowaygreen1 sentence2022The Court of Appeals has rejected the notion that "the application of handcuffs will [*3]always be dispositive of whether the detention of a suspect on reasonable suspicion has been elevated into a full-blown arrest" ( People v Allen , 73 NY2d 378, 380 [1989]; see People v Gray , 143 AD3d 909, 909 [2016]; People v Santiago , 41 AD3d 1172 , 1174 [2007]; People v Galloway , 40 AD3d 240, 240 [2007]; People v McCarthy , 64 Misc 3d 20 , 23-24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Graygreen1 sentence2022The Court of Appeals has rejected the notion that "the application of handcuffs will [*3]always be dispositive of whether the detention of a suspect on reasonable suspicion has been elevated into a full-blown arrest" ( People v Allen , 73 NY2d 378, 380 [1989]; see People v Gray , 143 AD3d 909, 909 [2016]; People v Santiago , 41 AD3d 1172 , 1174 [2007]; People v Galloway , 40 AD3d 240, 240 [2007]; People v McCarthy , 64 Misc 3d 20 , 23-24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Reyesgreen1 sentence2021Considering the context of a vehicle traffic stop and how events unfolded, we conclude that a reasonable suspicion standard should apply, not one of probable cause ( see Terry v Ohio , 392 US 1, 8 [1968]; United States v Reyes , 349 F3d 219, 223-224 [5th Cir 2003], cert denied 540 US 1228 [2004]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]; Tedford v State , 307 So 3d 738, 745-746 [Fla 4th DCA 2020]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millangreen1 sentence2020On appeal, County Court held that “[t]he suppression court erroneously relied upon the probable cause standard” and therefore modified the order to “reflect [that] the legal standard is one of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.” Affirming that decision, this Court determined that “the County Court properly held that -8- -9- No. 46 the legality of the stop”—a stop based on “alleged traffic infractions”—“should be measured against a reasonable suspicion standard” ( 69 NY2d at 929 ).4 Relying on Ingle, Chilton, and their progeny, New York courts routinely held that “[a] police officer may | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riggiogreen1 sentence2020On appeal, County Court held that “[t]he suppression court erroneously relied upon the probable cause standard” and therefore modified the order to “reflect [that] the legal standard is one of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.” Affirming that decision, this Court determined that “the County Court properly held that -8- -9- No. 46 the legality of the stop”—a stop based on “alleged traffic infractions”—“should be measured against a reasonable suspicion standard” ( 69 NY2d at 929 ).4 Relying on Ingle, Chilton, and their progeny, New York courts routinely held that “[a] police officer may | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Valentinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hollmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Yancygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Zimmermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Classgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swain v. Spinneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. P. J. Video, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taverasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Martinez-Fuertegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ocasiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Cortezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Torresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hicksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shoemaker v. Handelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Tratchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
green
2 sentences2003We conclude that the actions of the school safety agent, a civilian employee of the Police Department assigned exclusively to school security, were subject to the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to searches and seizures by school officials (see New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325 [1985]; Matter of Gregory M., 82 NY2d 588 [1993]; People v Scott D., 34 NY2d 483 [1974]). 1996The reasonable suspicion standard applies to searches by school authorities of the persons and belongings of students under both the Fourth Amendment (New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325 ) and New York Constitution, article I, § 12 (Matter of Gregory M., 82 NY2d 588 ), although in the latter case, decided one year after the rendering of the Family Court suppression order, the Court held that a "less rigorous premonition” concerning the contents of a bag will justify a "minimally intrusive” investigative touching of the bag (82 NY2d, supra, at 591). | 4 | 1993–2004 |
Matter of Gregory M.
green
2 sentences2004In the case of Matter of Gregory M. , ( 82 NY2d 588 ), the Court of Appeals held that an investigative touching of the outer surface of a book bag fell within a [*4] class of searches which are "far less intrusive" than searches which would require the application of the reasonable suspicion standard. 2003We conclude that the actions of the school safety agent, a civilian employee of the Police Department assigned exclusively to school security, were subject to the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to searches and seizures by school officials (see New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325 [1985]; Matter of Gregory M., 82 NY2d 588 [1993]; People v Scott D., 34 NY2d 483 [1974]). | 3 | 1996–2004 |
People v. Scott D.
green
2 sentences2004The Court applied the balancing process set forth in People v. Scott D. ( 34 NY2d 483 ) and New Jersey v. T.L.O. , ( 469 US 325 ), and held that the respondent "had only a minimal expectation of privacy regarding the outer touching of his school bag by school security personnel, even for the purposes of learning something about its contents" ( Id. , at 592-593). 2003We conclude that the actions of the school safety agent, a civilian employee of the Police Department assigned exclusively to school security, were subject to the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to searches and seizures by school officials (see New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325 [1985]; Matter of Gregory M., 82 NY2d 588 [1993]; People v Scott D., 34 NY2d 483 [1974]). | 3 | 1993–2004 |
People v. Ingle
green
2 sentences1995In considering this roadblock argument, it is clear that our State courts, before Delaware v Prouse (supra), regarded even a "routine” traffic check as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, justified only by a reasonable suspicion of violation of the traffic laws or by highway safety reasons which permitted inspections in a nonarbitrary, uniform and systematic way (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 ). 1987On appeal, the County Court properly held that the legality of the stop should be measured against a reasonable suspicion standard (see, People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 ; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 ). | 3 | 1987–1995 |
People v. Sobotker
green
2 sentences1987On appeal, the County Court properly held that the legality of the stop should be measured against a reasonable suspicion standard (see, People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 ; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 ). 1978In testing the bona ñdes of "a founded suspicion” of criminal activity, it should be borne in mind that "[m]ere 'hunch’ or 'gut reaction’ will not do.” (People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559, 564 .) It has been held that a sincere, good faith belief by police officers that a crime is about to be committed, without objective evidence of criminal activity, is insufficient to support the reasonable suspicion standard. | 2 | 1978–1987 |
People v. Leighton R.
green
2 sentences2026Further, although that "approach involves an analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability and basis of knowledge factors, allowance must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Alabama v White , 496 US 325, 328-329 [1990]). 2026In other words, strict adherence to Aguilar-Spinelli is mandatory only in the probable cause context and is not required to establish reasonable suspicion ( see Leighton R. , — NY3d at —, 2025 NY Slip Op 06534, *3-4 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2022Under the circumstances presented, we find that, after defendant told Sergeant Battaglia that he had been "involved with the altercation outside," Battaglia had the "quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity [was] at hand," which was sufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard required for him to detain defendant for an investigation ( Woods , 98 NY2d at 628 ; Williams , 73 AD3d at 1098 ) and to handcuff defendant. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Woods
green
1 sentence2022Under the circumstances presented, we find that, after defendant told Sergeant Battaglia that he had been "involved with the altercation outside," Battaglia had the "quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity [was] at hand," which was sufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard required for him to detain defendant for an investigation ( Woods , 98 NY2d at 628 ; Williams , 73 AD3d at 1098 ) and to handcuff defendant. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cotto
green
1 sentence2022The Court of Appeals has rejected the notion that "the application of handcuffs will [*3]always be dispositive of whether the detention of a suspect on reasonable suspicion has been elevated into a full-blown arrest" ( People v Allen , 73 NY2d 378, 380 [1989]; see People v Gray , 143 AD3d 909, 909 [2016]; People v Santiago , 41 AD3d 1172 , 1174 [2007]; People v Galloway , 40 AD3d 240, 240 [2007]; People v McCarthy , 64 Misc 3d 20 , 23-24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Martinez-Garcia v. United States
green
1 sentence2021Considering the context of a vehicle traffic stop and how events unfolded, we conclude that a reasonable suspicion standard should apply, not one of probable cause ( see Terry v Ohio , 392 US 1, 8 [1968]; United States v Reyes , 349 F3d 219, 223-224 [5th Cir 2003], cert denied 540 US 1228 [2004]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]; Tedford v State , 307 So 3d 738, 745-746 [Fla 4th DCA 2020]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wyandotte Tribe v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission
green
1 sentence2021Considering the context of a vehicle traffic stop and how events unfolded, we conclude that a reasonable suspicion standard should apply, not one of probable cause ( see Terry v Ohio , 392 US 1, 8 [1968]; United States v Reyes , 349 F3d 219, 223-224 [5th Cir 2003], cert denied 540 US 1228 [2004]; People v Dunn , 77 NY2d 19, 26 [1990], cert denied 501 US 1219 [1991]; Tedford v State , 307 So 3d 738, 745-746 [Fla 4th DCA 2020]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Whren v. United States green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Robinson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Hoffman green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Hines green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Ghee green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Colon neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Bell v. Wolfish green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. WILLIAM II green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Florida v. JL green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Warden of Anna M. Cross Center neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Warden of Anna M. Cross Center green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Saylor green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Moore neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. McRay green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Bora green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Locano green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Strong neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Garrett v. Goodwin green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. McCray green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Delaware v. Prouse green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. John BB. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Dunaway v. New York green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Meola green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Caruso v. Ward neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Capua v. City of Plainfield green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| American Federation of Government Employees v. Weinberger green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.