reasonable suspicion standard in Connecticut

2017This connection is considered strong enough that our Supreme Court has held that, in narcotics investigations, this link satisfies the reasonable suspicion requirement for an investigatory search specifically for weapons under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2017This connection is considered strong enough that our Supreme Court has held that, in narcotics investigations, this link satisfies the reasonable suspicion requirement for an investigatory search specifically for weapons under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2015In State v. Benton, 304 Conn. 838, 851 , 43 A.3d 619 (2012), our Supreme Court considered a defendant’s challenge as to whether his behavior of uttering an expletive, standing on his pedals to accelerate, and veering his bicycle in a different direction when uniformed police officers stepped into the roadway could be a proper factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.

2015In State v. Benton, 304 Conn. 838, 851 , 43 A.3d 619 (2012), our Supreme Court considered a defendant’s challenge as to whether his behavior of uttering an expletive, standing on his pedals to accelerate, and veering his bicycle in a different direction when uniformed police officers stepped into the roadway could be a proper factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.

2012We do note, however, that the constitutional classification sought by the defendant is at best a double-edged sword, for "our automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to do so. . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195, 202 , 24 A.3d 1218 (2011). [6] As one of the officers testified, the Cincinnati Reds logo, in addition to being red, signals disrespect for another of the Bloods' rival gangs, the Crips. [7] The defendant, in support of his contention that the recent shootings in

2012We do note, however, that the constitutional classification sought by the defendant is at best a double-edged sword, for "our automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to do so. . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195, 202 , 24 A.3d 1218 (2011). [6] As one of the officers testified, the Cincinnati Reds logo, in addition to being red, signals disrespect for another of the Bloods' rival gangs, the Crips. [7] The defendant, in support of his contention that the recent shootings in

2010"The determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists rests on a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, supra, 267 Conn. at 504-505 , 838 A.2d 981 .

2010"The determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists rests on a two part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santos, supra, 267 Conn. at 504-505 , 838 A.2d 981 .

2009“The reasonable suspicion standard requires no more than that the authority acting [here the defendant’s probation officer] be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief . . . that a condition of [probation] has been or is being violated.” (Internal quotation marks *575 omitted.) Id.

2004“Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 496 , 692 A.2d 1233 (1997).

2004“Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 496 , 692 A.2d 1233 (1997).

1999In considering this standard, the Appellate Court stated that, "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable to show probable cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DaEria , 51 Conn. App. 149 , 157 , ___ A.2d ___ (1998), citing State v. Groomes , 232 Conn. 455 , 468 , 656 A.2d 646 (1995).

1999In considering this standard, the Appellate Court stated that, "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable to show probable cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DaEria , 51 Conn. App. 149 , 157 , ___ A.2d ___ (1998), citing State v. Groomes , 232 Conn. 455 , 468 , 656 A.2d 646 (1995).

1999In considering this standard, the Appellate Court stated that, "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable to show probable cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DaEria , 51 Conn. App. 149 , 157 , ___ A.2d ___ (1998), citing State v. Groomes , 232 Conn. 455 , 468 , 656 A.2d 646 (1995).

1988The reasonable suspicion standard requires no more than that “the authority acting [here the defendant’s probation officer] be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief . . . that a condition of [probation] has been or is being violated.” United States v. Scott, supra; 13 see State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 , 1258 n.2 (Utah 1983).

1988The reasonable suspicion standard requires no more than that “the authority acting [here the defendant’s probation officer] be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief . . . that a condition of [probation] has been or is being violated.” United States v. Scott, supra; 13 see State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 , 1258 n.2 (Utah 1983).