reasonable suspicion standard in Wisconsin

2025In State v. Conaway, 2010 WI App 7 , 323 Wis. 2d 250 , 779 N.W.2d 182 (2009), this court concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard under the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to know with certainty whether a tinted window violates § TRANS 305.32, but instead requires that the police “reasonably suspect that the window violates 7 No. 2024AP931-CR [§ TRANS 305.32].” Conaway, 323 Wis. 2d 250, ¶7 .

2025In State v. Conaway, 2010 WI App 7 , 323 Wis. 2d 250 , 779 N.W.2d 182 (2009), this court concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard under the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to know with certainty whether a tinted window violates § TRANS 305.32, but instead requires that the police “reasonably suspect that the window violates 7 No. 2024AP931-CR [§ TRANS 305.32].” Conaway, 323 Wis. 2d 250, ¶7 .

2024Since this fact was not known to Hougan, a reasonable officer in his position would not have considered it, and we agree with the circuit court that it does not factor into the reasonable suspicion analysis here. 6 At the time of the incident, Hougan was employed by the Village of Muscoda Police Department and had approximately eleven months of experience in that capacity and just under two years of total experience in law enforcement. 11 No. 2024AP791-CR 241 Wis. 2d 631 , 623 N.W.2d 106 (reasonable suspicion can be based on an informant’s tip, provided the tip is sufficiently reliable).

2024Since this fact was not known to Hougan, a reasonable officer in his position would not have considered it, and we agree with the circuit court that it does not factor into the reasonable suspicion analysis here. 6 At the time of the incident, Hougan was employed by the Village of Muscoda Police Department and had approximately eleven months of experience in that capacity and just under two years of total experience in law enforcement. 11 No. 2024AP791-CR 241 Wis. 2d 631 , 623 N.W.2d 106 (reasonable suspicion can be based on an informant’s tip, provided the tip is sufficiently reliable).

2021The court stated that the standard of probable cause for requesting a PBT is “‘a quantum of proof that is greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop.’” Id., ¶25 (quoting County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 317 , 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999)). 5 No. 2020AP1187-CR ¶14 Both parties address the arresting officer’s testimony reflecting that the officer was subjectively not aware, based on his exchange with dispatch, that Hierl was subject to a 0.02 prohibited alcohol concentration.

2021The court stated that the standard of probable cause for requesting a PBT is “‘a quantum of proof that is greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop.’” Id., ¶25 (quoting County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 317 , 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999)). 5 No. 2020AP1187-CR ¶14 Both parties address the arresting officer’s testimony reflecting that the officer was subjectively not aware, based on his exchange with dispatch, that Hierl was subject to a 0.02 prohibited alcohol concentration.

2021Because the reasonable suspicion analysis is the same for extensions of stops as it is for initial stops, see State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 95 , 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), we apply the principles articulated in those cases to the reasonable suspicion assessment here. 32 No. 2019AP447-CR above, the State's proffered foundation for reasonable suspicion here is considerably weaker than those in Betow and Gammons. ¶65 Accordingly, based on the totality of circumstances, Oetzel did not have reasonable suspicion when he returned to VanBeek's truck, retained her driver's license and continued

2021Because the reasonable suspicion analysis is the same for extensions of stops as it is for initial stops, see State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 95 , 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), we apply the principles articulated in those cases to the reasonable suspicion assessment here. 32 No. 2019AP447-CR above, the State's proffered foundation for reasonable suspicion here is considerably weaker than those in Betow and Gammons. ¶65 Accordingly, based on the totality of circumstances, Oetzel did not have reasonable suspicion when he returned to VanBeek's truck, retained her driver's license and continued

2025Id., ¶50 (declining “to adopt a per se rule that in all cases, regardless of other circumstances, a person’s placing his or her hands in his or her pockets after an officer directed that the hands be removed is sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion to effectuate a protective weapons frisk”); State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, ¶15 , 235 Wis. 2d 220 , 613 N.W.2d 186 (ruling that a pat-down search for weapons was unlawful because it “was a general precautionary measure, not based on the conduct or attributes of [the defendant]”). ¶8 Review of a suppression ruling presents a mixed question of

2025Id., ¶50 (declining “to adopt a per se rule that in all cases, regardless of other circumstances, a person’s placing his or her hands in his or her pockets after an officer directed that the hands be removed is sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion to effectuate a protective weapons frisk”); State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, ¶15 , 235 Wis. 2d 220 , 613 N.W.2d 186 (ruling that a pat-down search for weapons was unlawful because it “was a general precautionary measure, not based on the conduct or attributes of [the defendant]”). ¶8 Review of a suppression ruling presents a mixed question of

2025While the legal determination of reasonable suspicion is an objective test, see State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶60 , 341 Wis. 2d 576 , 815 N.W.2d 675 , the deputies’ testimony about the facts known to them at the time Ann was detained would have been highly relevant to a determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed for the detention.

2025While the legal determination of reasonable suspicion is an objective test, see State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶60 , 341 Wis. 2d 576 , 815 N.W.2d 675 , the deputies’ testimony about the facts known to them at the time Ann was detained would have been highly relevant to a determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed for the detention.

2025Sec. 5.05(2m)(c)4. (“If the [C]ommission reviews a complaint and fails to find that there is a reasonable suspicion that a violation … has occurred or is occurring, the [C]ommission shall dismiss the complaint.”); State v. Cox, 2018 WI 67, ¶11 , 382 Wis. 2d 338 , 913 N.W.2d 780 (“The general rule is that the word ‘shall’ is presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute.” (citation omitted)).

2025Sec. 5.05(2m)(c)4. (“If the [C]ommission reviews a complaint and fails to find that there is a reasonable suspicion that a violation … has occurred or is occurring, the [C]ommission shall dismiss the complaint.”); State v. Cox, 2018 WI 67, ¶11 , 382 Wis. 2d 338 , 913 N.W.2d 780 (“The general rule is that the word ‘shall’ is presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute.” (citation omitted)).

2025See State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶8 , 260 Wis. 2d 406 , 659 N.W.2d 394 (“Before initiating a brief stop, an officer is not required to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior.”); State v. Moore, 2023 WI 50 , ¶15, 408 Wis. 2d 16 , 991 N.W.2d 412 (“It is black letter law that ‘an officer is not required to draw a reasonable inference that favors innocence when there also is a reasonable inference that favors probable cause.’” (citation omitted)); see also Glover, 589 U.S. at 381 (“The reasonable suspicion inquiry 10 No. 2023AP2311-CR ‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy … for, a

2025See, e.g., id., ¶36 (noting that although officer’s observation of vehicle weaving in lane occurred at 9:30 p.m. was “not as significant as when poor driving takes place at or around ‘bar time,’” the time gave “further credence” to officer’s suspicion of OWI); State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶32 , 317 Wis. 2d 383 , 766 N.W.2d 551 (time of night of traffic stop is relevant factor in OWI investigation).

2025See, e.g., id., ¶36 (noting that although officer’s observation of vehicle weaving in lane occurred at 9:30 p.m. was “not as significant as when poor driving takes place at or around ‘bar time,’” the time gave “further credence” to officer’s suspicion of OWI); State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶32 , 317 Wis. 2d 383 , 766 N.W.2d 551 (time of night of traffic stop is relevant factor in OWI investigation).

2024State v. Pugh, 2013 WI App 12, ¶11 , 345 Wis. 2d 832 , 826 N.W.2d 418 .

2024State v. Pugh, 2013 WI App 12, ¶11 , 345 Wis. 2d 832 , 826 N.W.2d 418 .

2024I now turn to the question of whether the vehicle search was supported by reasonable suspicion. ¶20 Reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, sufficient to lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Amos, 220 Wis. 2d 793, 798 , 584 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

2024I now turn to the question of whether the vehicle search was supported by reasonable suspicion. ¶20 Reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, sufficient to lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Amos, 220 Wis. 2d 793, 798 , 584 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

2024“In assessing the reliability of a tip, due weight must be given to: (1) the informant’s veracity; and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶18 , 241 Wis. 2d 729 , 623 N.W.2d 516 .

2024“In assessing the reliability of a tip, due weight must be given to: (1) the informant’s veracity; and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶18 , 241 Wis. 2d 729 , 623 N.W.2d 516 .

2024State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶37 , 364 Wis. 2d 167 , 868 N.W.2d 124 . ¶42 Reichert contends that Solberg lacked reasonable suspicion that she was impaired when he “concluded his community caretaker function,” but that is not the proper point at which to ground the reasonable suspicion analysis.

2024State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶37 , 364 Wis. 2d 167 , 868 N.W.2d 124 . ¶42 Reichert contends that Solberg lacked reasonable suspicion that she was impaired when he “concluded his community caretaker function,” but that is not the proper point at which to ground the reasonable suspicion analysis.

2023The Court further noted that the reasonable suspicion inquiry “‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy” and that “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect.” Id. (alteration in original; citations omitted).