reasonable suspicion standard in Washington

2015Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2015The reasonable suspicion standard,. under either constitutional analysis, . ' ; requires thatthe si1spicion be grounded in "specific and articulable facts." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ; State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841 , 613 P.2d 525 (1980).

2019State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-80 , 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Creed, 179 Wn.

2019State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-80 , 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Creed, 179 Wn.

2019State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-80 , 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Creed, 179 Wn.

2019State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-80 , 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Creed, 179 Wn.

2019State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-80 , 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Creed, 179 Wn.

2019State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179-80 , 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Creed, 179 Wn.

2015Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 747 . ¶14 The reasonable suspicion standard, under either constitutional analysis, requires that the suspicion be grounded in “specific and articulable facts.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841 , 613 P.2d 525 (1980).

2015Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 747 . ¶14 The reasonable suspicion standard, under either constitutional analysis, requires that the suspicion be grounded in “specific and articulable facts.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841 , 613 P.2d 525 (1980).

2011As the parties acknowledge, Washington courts have not decided whether SROs are school officials for purposes of conducting student searches, but we find guidance in decisions from other jurisdictions. ¶ 11 The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195 , 214 Ill.Dec. 456 , 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996), held that the search of a student by a "liaison officer," a police officer employed by the police department and assigned full-time to an alternate high school, was governed by the reasonable suspicion standard rather than probable cause.

2011As the parties acknowledge, Washington courts have not decided whether SROs are school officials for purposes of conducting student searches, but we find guidance in decisions from other jurisdictions. ¶ 11 The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195 , 214 Ill.Dec. 456 , 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996), held that the search of a student by a "liaison officer," a police officer employed by the police department and assigned full-time to an alternate high school, was governed by the reasonable suspicion standard rather than probable cause.

2011The court held that the reasonable suspicion standard applied where the case was “best characterized as involving a liaison police officer conducting a search on his own initiative and authority, in furtherance of the school’s attempt to maintain a proper educational environment.” Id. at 208 . ¶12 Similarly, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. 2009), rejected the argument that the school search standard did not apply to the search of a high school student’s book bag because

2011The court held that the reasonable suspicion standard applied where the case was "best characterized as involving a liaison police officer conducting a search on his own initiative and authority, in furtherance of the school's attempt to maintain a proper educational environment." Id. at 208 , 214 Ill.Dec. 456 , 661 N.E.2d 310 . ¶ 12 Similarly, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ( overruled on other grounds, Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind.2009)), rejected the argument that the school search standard did not apply to the search of a high

2010Probable Cause Standard ¶ 27 The trial court applied the reasonable suspicion standard we set forth in State v. Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev'd, 167 Wash.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev’d, 167 Wn.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 , 122 S.Ct. 587 .

2010Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 .

2010Probable Cause Standard ¶ 27 The trial court applied the reasonable suspicion standard we set forth in State v. Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev'd, 167 Wash.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev’d, 167 Wn.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010Probable Cause Standard ¶ 27 The trial court applied the reasonable suspicion standard we set forth in State v. Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev'd, 167 Wash.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev’d, 167 Wn.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010Probable Cause Standard ¶ 27 The trial court applied the reasonable suspicion standard we set forth in State v. Winterstein, 140 Wash.App. 676 , 166 P.3d 1242 (2007), rev'd, 167 Wash.2d 620 , 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).

2010Probable Cause Standard ¶27 The trial court applied the reasonable suspicion standard we set forth in State v. Winterstein, 140 Wn.

2010Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26 ; State v. Dorey, 145 Wn.

2010Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; State v. Dorey, 145 Wash.App. 423, 429 , 186 P.3d 363 (2008).

2008Also, before the United States Supreme Court decided Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 , 110 L.Ed.2d 412 , we held sobriety checkpoints violated both the federal and state constitutions.

2008Also, before the United States Supreme Court decided Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 , we held sobriety checkpoints violated both the federal and state constitutions.

2008This is a higher reasonable suspicion standard than that articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 .

2008This is a higher reasonable suspicion standard than that articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 .

2021Although the reasonable suspicion standard requires that the suspicion be grounded in specific and articulable facts under either constitutional analysis, the state constitution “generally requires a stronger showing by the State.” State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610 , 617–18, 352 P.3d 796 (2015).

2021Although the reasonable suspicion standard requires that the suspicion be grounded in specific and articulable facts under either constitutional analysis, the state constitution “generally requires a stronger showing by the State.” State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610 , 617–18, 352 P.3d 796 (2015).

2021“The available facts must substantiate more than a mere generalized suspicion that the person detained is ‘up to no good’; the facts must connect the particular person to the particular crime that the officer seeks to investigate.” Id. at 618 (quoting State v. Bliss, 153 Wn.

2019Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). "[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2019Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). "[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2019Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). "[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2019Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). "[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2019Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ; State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514 , 806 P.2d 760 (1991). "[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2019State v. Lee, 147 Wn.

2019Parris, 163 Wn.

2015Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 747 . ¶14 The reasonable suspicion standard, under either constitutional analysis, requires that the suspicion be grounded in “specific and articulable facts.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841 , 613 P.2d 525 (1980).

2015But it held that a “caller’s use of the 911 emergency system” is relevant to reliability — and hence to the reasonable suspicion analysis — because “a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system.” Id. at 1689-90 . ¶38 Notably, the Navarette Court was careful to limit its holding on the 911 call to ongoing crimes.

2015Id. at 1690 n.2 (“Because we conclude that the 911 call created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime, we need not address under what circumstances a stop is justified by the need to investigate completed criminal activity.”). ¶39 The Navarette dissent adopted a different approach. 7 The dissent applied a “totality of the circumstances” test but described it as requiring more assurances of veracity and reliability than those provided by a single, uncorroborated 911 call.

2012Because the parties have neither invoked greater protections under our state constitution nor provided a Gunwall analysis, the majority has no basis for charting a new path. ¶32 Instead, the analysis should begin with the recognition that under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, the reasonable suspicion standard applies to searches “carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.

2012The Court in T.L.O. explicitly left unanswered the question of whether this standard also applies to “searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.” Id. ¶33 In T.L.O.’s wake, courts in other jurisdictions have considered the proper standard to apply to law enforcement authorities searching a student at school.

2010Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; State v. Dorey, 145 Wash.App. 423, 429 , 186 P.3d 363 (2008).

1989App. 864 , 696 P.2d 41 (1985), in which the court held that a balancing of competing interests rather than the reasonable suspicion test applies when police stop a vehicle for the purpose of assisting its occupants.

1989App. 864 , 696 P.2d 41 (1985), in which the court held that a balancing of competing interests rather than the reasonable suspicion test applies when police stop a vehicle for the purpose of assisting its occupants.