15 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stuartgreen2 sentences2015The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. at 432 , 452 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 2015The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. at 432 , 452 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). | 2 | 7 |
Muscatell v. Clinegreen2 sentences2024Indeed, Justice Workman agreed with the objective standard adopted from Whren: “the trooper’s conduct was equally justified under the reasonable suspicion standard if the stop of the vehicle was precipitated by the trooper’s observation of a traffic violation.” Muscatell, 196 W. 2024Indeed, Justice Workman agreed with the objective standard adopted from Whren: “the trooper’s conduct was equally justified under the reasonable suspicion standard if the stop of the vehicle was precipitated by the trooper’s observation of a traffic violation.” Muscatell, 196 W. | 1 | 7 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2015The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. at 432 , 452 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 1994To the extent State v. Meadows holds otherwise, it is overruled. 7 More recently, the Supreme Court in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), addressed the reasonable-suspicion standard in the context of stopping a vehicle upon information ascertained, in part, by an anonymous tip. | 1 | 2 |
Pauley v. Kellygreen1 sentence2014Va. 672 , 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) (“The provisions of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia may, in certain instances, require higher standards of protection than afforded by the Federal Constitution.”). 6 justify the investigatory stop under the reasonable-suspicion standard.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Norman Delano Mooregreen2 sentences1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be “certain” that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). 1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be "certain" that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). | 1 | 1 |
Peacock v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be “certain” that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). 1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be "certain" that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). | 1 | 1 |
Hensley v. Stanleygreen2 sentences1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be “certain” that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). 1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be "certain" that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United States Merit Systems Protection Boardgreen2 sentences1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be “certain” that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). 1996See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (finding that call by dispatcher suggests existence of reasonable suspicion, and finding that police officer is not constitutionally required to be "certain" that a crime has occurred when he makes a stop). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences1994The Supreme Court then went on to state that when evaluating whether or not particular facts establish reasonable suspicion, one must examine the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” which includes both the “quantity and quality” of the information known by the police. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 , quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 621, 629 (1981). 1994The Supreme Court then went on to state that when evaluating whether or not particular facts establish reasonable suspicion, one must examine the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” which includes both the “quantity and quality” of the information known by the police. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 , quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 621, 629 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKinnongreen2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1 |
Interest of L. L. v. Circuit Court of Washington Countygreen2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1 |
State v. DTWgreen2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have “power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband ... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articula-ble facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present.” See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring “articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search”); T.A.O’B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1 |
Bellnier v. Lundgreen2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have “power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband ... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articula-ble facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present.” See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring “articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search”); T.A.O’B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Stategreen2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
green
2 sentences1985The United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. ___ , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), which framed the general standards adopted by the majority, made it clear that the reasonable suspicion standard must be based on the belief "that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." 469 U.S. at ___ , 105 S.Ct. at 744 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 735 . 1985The United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. ___ , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), which framed the general standards adopted by the majority, made it clear that the reasonable suspicion standard must be based on the belief "that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." 469 U.S. at ___ , 105 S.Ct. at 744 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 735 . | 2 | 1985–1991 |
Prado Navarette v. California
green
2 sentences2015This standard recently was observed in Navarette v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683 , 188 L. 2015This standard recently was observed in Navarette v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683 , 188 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Toler
neutral
1 sentence2014Because I believe reasonable suspicion to justify a stop requires more than what was found by the majority in this case, I dissent.5 5 As I said in my dissent in Miller v. Toler, 229 W. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hill v. Cline
green
2 sentences1996The proper standard for determining the propriety of Trooper Brown's stop of the appellee is the reasonable suspicion standard [7] *526 adopted in State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), and Hill v. Cline, 193 W.Va. 436 , 457 S.E.2d 113 (1995). 1996The proper standard for determining the propriety of Trooper Brown's stop of the appellee is the reasonable suspicion standard [7] *526 adopted in State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), and Hill v. Cline, 193 W.Va. 436 , 457 S.E.2d 113 (1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1994In determining that the police had sufficient information to make the stop, the Supreme Court put the case in the context of a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and applied a reasonable-suspicion standard. 8 The Supreme Court characterized reasonable suspicion as “a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informati 1994In determining that the police had sufficient information to make the stop, the Supreme Court put the case in the context of a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and applied a reasonable-suspicion standard. 8 The Supreme Court characterized reasonable suspicion as “a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informati | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
green
2 sentences1994The Supreme Court stated “a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interference.” 422 U.S. at 883 , 95 S.Ct. at 2581 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 617 . 7 . 1994The Supreme Court stated “a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interference.” 422 U.S. at 883 , 95 S.Ct. at 2581 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 617 . 7 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Casse v. Louisiana General Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence1991Serv., Inc., 531 So.2d 554 (La.Ct.App.1988) (court upheld drug testing program where company had a legitimate safety concern since it was in the business of distributing volatile natural gas). [8] The United States Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the reasonable suspicion standard in the following cases. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
green
2 sentences1991Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). 1991Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.
green
2 sentences1991Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). 1991Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
O'CONNOR v. Ortega
green
2 sentences1991Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). 1991Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 109 S.Ct. 1384 , 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Rone Ex Rel. Payne v. Daviess County Board of Education
green
2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have “power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband ... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articula-ble facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present.” See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring “articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search”); T.A.O’B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1985–1985 |
O'B. v. State
green
2 sentences1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have “power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband ... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articula-ble facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present.” See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring “articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search”); T.A.O’B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); 1985In State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the court said school officials have "power to make an immediate, limited search, for contraband... when a reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect that these items are present." See also Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (requiring "articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search"); T.A.O'B v. State, 459 So.2d 1106 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983); Do | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.