reasonable suspicion standard in California

2025(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 21–23 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ]; United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417–418 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621 ].) The reasonable suspicion standard requires officers to point to “ ‘ “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation” ’ ” that criminal activity is afoot.

2025(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 21–23 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ]; United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417–418 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621 ].) The reasonable suspicion standard requires officers to point to “ ‘ “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation” ’ ” that criminal activity is afoot.

2016(Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(1); Cody S., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 .) This balancing does away with the probable cause and warrant requirements: “searches of students by public school officials must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched have engaged, or are engaging, in a proscribed activity (that is, a violation of a school rule or regulation, or a criminal statute).” (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 563-564; see also T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 324 .) And, the reasonable suspicion standard “requires articulable facts, together wi

2016(Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(1); Cody S., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 .) This balancing does away with the probable cause and warrant requirements: “searches of students by public school officials must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched have engaged, or are engaging, in a proscribed activity (that is, a violation of a school rule or regulation, or a criminal statute).” (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 563-564; see also T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 324 .) And, the reasonable suspicion standard “requires articulable facts, together wi

2023As first established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 , “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 (Sokolow).) The reasonable suspicion standard is not particularly high: While it requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” ’ ” the “level of suspicion is 16 considerably less than p

2016(People v. Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385, 388 .) This reasonable suspicion standard requires only a “minimal level of objective justification.” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 .) When, from an objective standpoint, circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion, an investigation is warranted; that circumstances might also be consistent with innocent activity does not warrant a different result.

2020Legal Principles Although a brief investigatory detention need not be supported by probable cause, it must be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot—i.e., “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” ( Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230−231; see Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393 , 396 12 (Navarette); Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22 .) The reasonable suspicion standard is objective in nature, “based on the facts and

2020Our Division Four colleagues recently discussed the reasonable suspicion standard: “A ‘brief, investigatory stop’ is justified where an officer has ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,’ implicating the suspect. [Citations.] While the more demanding standard of probable cause requires a basis to suspect someone of having committed a particular crime, reasonable suspicion to detain only requires facts connecting the suspect to ‘criminal activity’ more generally. [Citation.] Like the probable cause determination, the applicable test courts use to assess reasonable s

2023As first established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 , “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 (Sokolow).) The reasonable suspicion standard is not particularly high: While it requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” ’ ” the “level of suspicion is 16 considerably less than p

2022(Ibid.) Rather, the officers need only “ ‘articulable facts’ considered together with the rational inferences drawn from those facts, that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to entertain a reasonable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors a person posing a danger to officer safety.” (Id. at pp. 679–680.) In determining whether the reasonable suspicion standard had been met, “courts must evaluate the ‘ “totality of the circumstances” ’ on a case-by-case basis to see whether the officer has ‘ “a particularized and objective basis” ’ for his or her suspicion.” (People v. Ledesma, sup

1987A detention, however, is also *85 governed according to federal law by a variant of the reasonable suspicion test, i.e., whether the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion that the person to be detained has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. ( United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 227 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 675 ]; United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 702-703 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 117-118 , 103 S.Ct. 263 ]; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906-907 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ].) "The touchstone of ... analysis under the Fourth Amendment

1987A detention, however, is also *85 governed according to federal law by a variant of the reasonable suspicion test, i.e., whether the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion that the person to be detained has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. ( United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 227 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 611 , 105 S.Ct. 675 ]; United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 702-703 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 117-118 , 103 S.Ct. 263 ]; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906-907 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ].) "The touchstone of ... analysis under the Fourth Amendment

2024If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.” (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 126 ; accord, Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 985– 986; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233, 235; Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894 .) Writing separately in Wardlow, Justice Stevens discussed potentially innocent reasons that a person might flee from the police, including fear of police violence. ( Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 128–135 (conc. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) But Justice Stevens did not argue that evasive behavior such as f

1994(In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ]; People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 733 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 105 ].) This reasonable suspicion requirement is measured by an objective standard, not by the particular officer’s subjective state of mind at the time of the stop or detention.

2024If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.” (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 126 ; accord, Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 985– 986; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233, 235; Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894 .) Writing separately in Wardlow, Justice Stevens discussed potentially innocent reasons that a person might flee from the police, including fear of police violence. ( Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 128–135 (conc. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) But Justice Stevens did not argue that evasive behavior such as f

2024If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.” (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 126 ; accord, Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 985– 986; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233, 235; Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894 .) Writing separately in Wardlow, Justice Stevens discussed potentially innocent reasons that a person might flee from the police, including fear of police violence. ( Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 128–135 (conc. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) But Justice Stevens did not argue that evasive behavior such as f

2025(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 21–23 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ]; United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417–418 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621 ].) The reasonable suspicion standard requires officers to point to “ ‘ “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation” ’ ” that criminal activity is afoot.

2025(Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 21–23 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ]; United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411 , 417–418 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 621 ].) The reasonable suspicion standard requires officers to point to “ ‘ “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation” ’ ” that criminal activity is afoot.

2017(See, e.g., People v. Werner, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206 [approving and following Ledesma].) Next, McCloud argues the sweep of his bedroom was unlawful because it occurred after he and his cousin had already emerged and thus it was “clear that the bedroom did not harbor any other potentially dangerous persons.” Not so.

2017(See, e.g., People v. Werner, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206 [approving and following Ledesma].) Next, McCloud argues the sweep of his bedroom was unlawful because it occurred after he and his cousin had already emerged and thus it was “clear that the bedroom did not harbor any other potentially dangerous persons.” Not so.

2014(Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 397 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 456 ].) Thus, the circumstances known or apparent to the officer “must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his [or her] training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 , fn. omitted.) Defendant claims he was detained when ordered to sit down or stand up by Officer Adams, and also when he was subjected to the patdown.

2014(Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 397 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 456 ].) Thus, the circumstances known or apparent to the officer “must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his [or her] training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 , fn. omitted.) Defendant claims he was detained when ordered to sit down or stand up by Officer Adams, and also when he was subjected to the patdown.

2014(See also People v. Boyd (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 736, 746 [identifying the “appearance of the object searched” as “but one of many factors to consider in assessing whether the reasonable suspicion standard was satisfied”].) With this framework in mind, we turn to the facts of this case to determine whether Deputy Griffin-Bagno reasonably could have believed that Vomvolakis had joint control over the backpack.

2002(People v. Boyd, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 750 [“The reasonable suspicion standard should also be used to determine whether a particular object is within the scope of the parole search being conducted.”].) Under these facts, we find no reason to take issue with the scope of the search or with the fruits of that search.

2011O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 351 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 720 , 105 S.Ct. 733 ] (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.)); (2) the regulations in the particular area could not be effectively enforced if public officials could conduct inspections only when the officials have a reasonable suspicion that a violation has occurred (see, e.g., Donovan, supra, 452 U.S. at pp. 602-603; Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 710 ); and (3) the persons or businesses subjected to the inspection are engaged in a particular category of activity that reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy of those engaged in such activities in relation t

1998(Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, at p. 873 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 3168 ]; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 619 [ 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 ] [stating that in Griffin the court “balance[d] the governmental and privacy interests to assess the' practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements”].) The Griffin court was not called upon to decide whether a probation search can be conducted on less than reasonable suspicion. 1 Applying the balancing test that the high court articulated in Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, 433 U.S. 868 , most state co

2024If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.” (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 126 ; accord, Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 985– 986; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233, 235; Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894 .) Writing separately in Wardlow, Justice Stevens discussed potentially innocent reasons that a person might flee from the police, including fear of police violence. ( Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at pp. 128–135 (conc. & dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) But Justice Stevens did not argue that evasive behavior such as f

2023As first established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 , “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 (Sokolow).) The reasonable suspicion standard is not particularly high: While it requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” ’ ” the “level of suspicion is 16 considerably less than p

2004Balancing these interests of the parolee against the societal interest in public safety leads us to conclude that warrantless searches of parolees are not per se unreasonable if conducted for a purpose properly related to parole supervision." ( Id. at p. 532, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 .) The court continued that society's interest in public safety permits parole searches on a reasonable suspicion standard, a standard that would not rise to the level of probable cause in the typical criminal context. ( Id. at p. 534, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 .) This standard must be based on ar

2004Balancing these interests of the parolee against the societal interest in public safety leads us to conclude that warrantless searches of parolees are not per se unreasonable if conducted for a purpose properly related to parole supervision." ( Id. at p. 532, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 .) The court continued that society's interest in public safety permits parole searches on a reasonable suspicion standard, a standard that would not rise to the level of probable cause in the typical criminal context. ( Id. at p. 534, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 .) This standard must be based on ar

2010Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 187-188 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 292 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 ].) This court has recognized that "[t]he level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than [an] `embarrassing police search' on a public street," and that "`in light of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1087 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8

2010Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 187-188 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 292 , 124 S.Ct. 2451 ].) This court has recognized that "[t]he level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than [an] `embarrassing police search' on a public street," and that "`in light of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1087 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8

2023As first established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30 , “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 (Sokolow).) The reasonable suspicion standard is not particularly high: While it requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” ’ ” the “level of suspicion is 16 considerably less than p

2010Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." ( Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 [ 145 L.Ed.2d 570 , 120 S.Ct. 673 ].) Further, as the high court repeatedly has explained, the possibility of innocent explanations for the factors relied upon by a police officer does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. ( United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274 [ 151 L.Ed.2d 740 , 122 S.Ct. 744 ] ( Arvizu ) ["Although each of the series of acts [in Terry ] wa

2022(In re Edgerrin J. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 752 , 762; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 (Letner and Tobin); Sokolow, at p. 8.) 3 Here, appellant’s initial detention was justified based on the officers’ observations that appellant, along with seven other individuals, was unlawfully standing in the middle of the street blocking a vehicle on the roadway.

2021The detention was lawful “‘“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.”’” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 .) “Even in a general sense, the reasonable suspicion standard . . . is not a particularly demanding one, but is, instead, ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘. . . . [T]he

2019Similarly, in general "[a]n area's reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." ( Souza, supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 240 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 885 P.2d 982 .) But "[a]n individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime." 4 ( Wardlow, supra , 528 U.S. at p. 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , see also Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47 , 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 [

2019Similarly, in general "[a]n area's reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." ( Souza, supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 240 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 885 P.2d 982 .) But "[a]n individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime." 4 ( Wardlow, supra , 528 U.S. at p. 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , see also Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47 , 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 [

2003“On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court’s legal conclusions.” (In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1738-1739 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 ].) A. The reasonable suspicion standard applicable to school officials applied to Officer Johannes as a school resource officer.

2003“On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court’s legal conclusions.” (In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1738-1739 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 ].) A. The reasonable suspicion standard applicable to school officials applied to Officer Johannes as a school resource officer.