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19 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adkins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003) (“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.”); Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (“The police are permitted to take into account their surroundings - and whether a particular location has a reputation for being a ‘known drug’ area -when forming a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”). 2018The Commonwealth points to Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003), where this Court cited nervousness as an appropriate factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. | 3 | 3 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2024Although the Commonwealth contends that the Gant standard is unclear and confusing, numerous jurisdictions have concluded that it is akin to the reasonable suspicion standard required to justify an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L. 2024Although the Commonwealth contends that the Gant standard is unclear and confusing, numerous jurisdictions have concluded that it is akin to the reasonable suspicion standard required to justify an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L. | 2 | 7 |
Brumley v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021As explained in Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky. 2015), “[j]ustification for this type of sweep implicates the well-known reasonable suspicion standard as stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” “Reasonable suspicion must be determined ‘under the totality of the circumstances considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007) and Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 2003)). 2015Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 ; See Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 284 . | 2 | 3 |
Collier v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018I In Commonwealth v. Morgan, we recognized that "an officer's knowledge about a suspect's prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis." 248 S.W.3d.538, 541 (Ky. 2008) (citing Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky; App. 1986)).'- If there are other articulable factors, "a prior record is a legitimate factor to be considered in determining whether there is a sufficient quantum of suspicion to justify a stop." Id. at 541-542 (quoting. 2018I In Commonwealth v. Morgan, we recognized that "an officer's knowledge about a suspect's prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis." 248 S.W.3d.538, 541 (Ky. 2008) (citing Collier v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky; App. 1986)).'- If there are other articulable factors, "a prior record is a legitimate factor to be considered in determining whether there is a sufficient quantum of suspicion to justify a stop." Id. at 541-542 (quoting. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences2021In Smith, we stated that “an officer’s knowledge about a suspect’s prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.”78 However, we noted that the officer’s “knowledge that [Smith] had been convicted of and was then on parole for trafficking in cocaine does not support reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was in possession of cocaine at the time of the stop[.]”79 Even coupled with confidential tips that Smith was known to be trafficking at a nearby bar, the officer’s knowledge of Smith’s drug trafficking history did not “create 75 Id. 76 Id. 77 We assume Officer 2020It is reasonable to assume she may be nervous because she was once again engaged in drug trafficking. “[A]n officer’s knowledge about a suspect’s prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 542 S.W.3d 276, 284 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Morgangreen2 sentences2021“This Court has held previously that an officer’s -9- knowledge about a suspect’s prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Morgan, 248 S.W.3d at 541 . 2021In Smith, we stated that “an officer’s knowledge about a suspect’s prior record can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.”78 However, we noted that the officer’s “knowledge that [Smith] had been convicted of and was then on parole for trafficking in cocaine does not support reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was in possession of cocaine at the time of the stop[.]”79 Even coupled with confidential tips that Smith was known to be trafficking at a nearby bar, the officer’s knowledge of Smith’s drug trafficking history did not “create 75 Id. 76 Id. 77 We assume Officer | 1 | 2 |
Scott v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018An "officer's subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth 5 Amendment." Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ky. 2017). "[T]he -,, fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, ' justify that action." Id. (quoting Scott V; United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (citing United Stat 2017In any event, the officer’s subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Marrgreen1 sentence2024Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Ky. 2003) (“Although nervousness alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it is an important factor in the analysis.”); Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (“The police are permitted to take into account their surroundings - and whether a particular location has a reputation for being a ‘known drug’ area -when forming a reasonable and articulable suspicion.”). | 1 | 1 |
Michael E. Simpson v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen1 sentence2021As explained in Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky. 2015), “[j]ustification for this type of sweep implicates the well-known reasonable suspicion standard as stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” “Reasonable suspicion must be determined ‘under the totality of the circumstances considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007) and Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas L. Feathers Kathleen Feathers v. William Aey J.P. Donohue, City of Akrongreen2 sentences2021As explained in Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky. 2015), “[j]ustification for this type of sweep implicates the well-known reasonable suspicion standard as stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” “Reasonable suspicion must be determined ‘under the totality of the circumstances considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007) and Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 2003)). 2021“However, determinative information must relate to the purpose for which -8- the protective sweep exception was created.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Raymond E. Humphrey v. Duane M. Mabry Kevin George and Kevin Wheelergreen1 sentence2021As explained in Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky. 2015), “[j]ustification for this type of sweep implicates the well-known reasonable suspicion standard as stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).” “Reasonable suspicion must be determined ‘under the totality of the circumstances considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007) and Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 2003)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mario Valdez Christiangreen1 sentence2018To support its argument that Appellant’s behaviors of nervousness, glancing over his shoulder, and blowing cigarette smoke create articulable suspicion, the Commonwealth also cites cases from other jurisdictions: United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 2010) (driver nervous); United States v. Holt, 111 F.3d 1234, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (driver nervous); Green v. State, 256 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2008) (outside vehicle, driver nervously glanced at it); United States v. Christian, 43 F.3d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1994) (driver had freshly lit cigarette); State v. Franzen, 792 N.W.2d 533 (N. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Masongreen1 sentence2018To support its argument that Appellant’s behaviors of nervousness, glancing over his shoulder, and blowing cigarette smoke create articulable suspicion, the Commonwealth also cites cases from other jurisdictions: United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 2010) (driver nervous); United States v. Holt, 111 F.3d 1234, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (driver nervous); Green v. State, 256 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2008) (outside vehicle, driver nervously glanced at it); United States v. Christian, 43 F.3d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1994) (driver had freshly lit cigarette); State v. Franzen, 792 N.W.2d 533 (N. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Randall E. Neumanngreen1 sentence2018To support its argument that Appellant’s behaviors of nervousness, glancing over his shoulder, and blowing cigarette smoke create articulable suspicion, the Commonwealth also cites cases from other jurisdictions: United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 2010) (driver nervous); United States v. Holt, 111 F.3d 1234, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (driver nervous); Green v. State, 256 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2008) (outside vehicle, driver nervously glanced at it); United States v. Christian, 43 F.3d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1994) (driver had freshly lit cigarette); State v. Franzen, 792 N.W.2d 533 (N. | 1 | 1 |
Lamb v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018An "officer's subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth 5 Amendment." Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ky. 2017). "[T]he -,, fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, ' justify that action." Id. (quoting Scott V; United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (citing United Stat 2018An "officer's subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth 5 Amendment." Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ky. 2017). "[T]he -,, fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, ' justify that action." Id. (quoting Scott V; United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (citing United Stat | 1 | 1 |
Southers v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2013See Southers v. Commonwealth, 210 S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Ky.App.2006). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2018An "officer's subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth 5 Amendment." Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ky. 2017). "[T]he -,, fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, ' justify that action." Id. (quoting Scott V; United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (citing United Stat 2017In any event, the officer’s subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Maryland v. Buie
green
2 sentences2015Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 ; See Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 284 . 2015Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 ; See Brumley, 413 S.W.3d at 284 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Sampson v. United States
green
1 sentence2023To be clear, the reasonable suspicion standard is generally the minimum standard imposed by courts to uphold a warrantless search in the absence of a factual showing that a state’s need to perform a suspicionless search outweighs a parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.28 Samson, 547 U.S. at 851 ; Sharp, 40 F.4th at 753 . parole and related background law informs the Fourth Amendment analysis involving Gasaway’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the degree of necessity for the search to promote the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Ronald Sharp
green
1 sentence2023To be clear, the reasonable suspicion standard is generally the minimum standard imposed by courts to uphold a warrantless search in the absence of a factual showing that a state’s need to perform a suspicionless search outweighs a parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.28 Samson, 547 U.S. at 851 ; Sharp, 40 F.4th at 753 . parole and related background law informs the Fourth Amendment analysis involving Gasaway’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the degree of necessity for the search to promote the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Prado Navarette v. California
green
2 sentences2023The reasonable suspicion analysis is a lesser standard than probable cause and requires only “‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped’ of breaking the law.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 , 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-88 , 188 L. 2023The reasonable suspicion analysis is a lesser standard than probable cause and requires only “‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped’ of breaking the law.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 , 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-88 , 188 L. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Heien v. North Carolina
green
1 sentence2023The reasonable suspicion analysis is a lesser standard than probable cause and requires only “‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped’ of breaking the law.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 , 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-88 , 188 L. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Alabama v. White
green
1 sentence2020“What was important was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information—a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs.” Id. (emphasis in original). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Green v. State
green
1 sentence2018To support its argument that Appellant’s behaviors of nervousness, glancing over his shoulder, and blowing cigarette smoke create articulable suspicion, the Commonwealth also cites cases from other jurisdictions: United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 2010) (driver nervous); United States v. Holt, 111 F.3d 1234, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (driver nervous); Green v. State, 256 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2008) (outside vehicle, driver nervously glanced at it); United States v. Christian, 43 F.3d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1994) (driver had freshly lit cigarette); State v. Franzen, 792 N.W.2d 533 (N. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Franzen
green
1 sentence2018To support its argument that Appellant’s behaviors of nervousness, glancing over his shoulder, and blowing cigarette smoke create articulable suspicion, the Commonwealth also cites cases from other jurisdictions: United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 2010) (driver nervous); United States v. Holt, 111 F.3d 1234, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (driver nervous); Green v. State, 256 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2008) (outside vehicle, driver nervously glanced at it); United States v. Christian, 43 F.3d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1994) (driver had freshly lit cigarette); State v. Franzen, 792 N.W.2d 533 (N. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences1991Id. at 664 , 99 S.Ct. at 1401 ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 1991Id. at 664 , 99 S.Ct. at 1401 ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.