reasonable suspicion standard in Maryland

2026To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer “must explain how the observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity[,]” Crosby, 408 Md. at 508 , 970 A.2d at 904 (citations omitted), and the facts and inferences drawn therefrom must reasonably warrant the intrusion at issue, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2026To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer “must explain how the observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity[,]” Crosby, 408 Md. at 508 , 970 A.2d at 904 (citations omitted), and the facts and inferences drawn therefrom must reasonably warrant the intrusion at issue, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2026Our holding stems directly from the holding of the Supreme Court of the United -4- States in Terry, 392 U.S. at 21—that to justify a particular intrusion, a police officer must be able to identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”—and our own myriad of case law holding that “the reasonable suspicion standard requires the police to possess a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing[,]” Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349, 362 , 920 A.2d 1080, 1087 (2007) (citation modified).

2026To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer “must explain how the observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity[,]” Crosby, 408 Md. at 508 , 970 A.2d at 904 (citations omitted), and the facts and inferences drawn therefrom must reasonably warrant the intrusion at issue, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2026Crime in the Area The State contends that the circuit court expressly declined to determine whether the area should be formally classified as a high-crime area under Washington, 482 Md. at 441, 443 , 287 A.3d at 329, 330, and instead, in the reasonable suspicion analysis, “properly took notice of the volume of crime in the [Nancy-1] beat, without labeling it a high-crime area.” Citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000), and Washington, 482 Md. at 453 , 287 A.3d at 336, the State argues that the circuit court’s approach was “entirely consistent with caselaw, which makes clear that th

2022The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000), and this Court’s prior decisions have held that unprovoked flight or presence in a high-crime area are merely factors that may contribute to the reasonable suspicion analysis, rather than a bright-line rule.

2025The Court held that while unprovoked flight in a high crime area does not automatically equal reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, under a totality of circumstances analysis, such flight can be a factor in concluding that there was criminal activity or a factor consistent with innocence, “[j]ust as a bulge in a person’s clothing has different implications for a reasonable suspicion analysis depending on ‘where it is, what it looks like, or the circumstances surrounding its observation.’” Id. at 449–50 (quoting Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 107 (2003)).

2022Just as a bulge in a person’s clothing has different implications for a reasonable suspicion analysis depending on “where it is, what it looks like, or the circumstances surrounding its observation[,]” Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 107 , 816 A.2d 901, 906 (2003), the nature - 53 - and circumstances surrounding flight from police make a difference.

2026Indeed, in Washington, we pointed to Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341 (2008), and Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350 (2017), observing that in both cases we had credited a defendant’s unprovoked flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.

2017The reasonable suspicion standard “ ‘does not allow [a] law enforcement official to simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious to him or her.’ ” Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508 , 970 A.2d 894, 904 (2009) (citing Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 357 , 958 A.2d 356, 365 (2008)).

2015As United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 [ 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1989), explained, however: Terry itself involved “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed separately, but which taken *652 together warranted further investigation.” We noted in [Illinois v.] Gates, [ 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ] that “innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable cause,” and that “[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degr

2015As United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 [ 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1989), explained, however: Terry itself involved “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed separately, but which taken *652 together warranted further investigation.” We noted in [Illinois v.] Gates, [ 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ] that “innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable cause,” and that “[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degr

2026The reasonable suspicion standard “does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).

2015Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), described the reasonable suspicion standard that must be satisfied to justify such restraint: “We have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity!.]” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), was emphatic not only about the Terry standard but about the fact that it applies to all seizures of the person, including those involved in brief investigatory stops.

2026Indeed, in Washington, we pointed to Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341 (2008), and Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350 (2017), observing that in both cases we had credited a defendant’s unprovoked flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.

2022Echoing the majority’s observation that the defendant and group were not “demonstrating behavior consistent with the nature of the crimes that led [police] to conclude that” the Owen Brown Village Center was a high-crime area, id. at 371 , 174 A.3d at 338 , Judge Adkins concluded that, even if the area were high- crime, without a nexus between the other crimes and the activity arousing the officers’ suspicion, the high-crime area was not relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis, see id. at 382 , 174 A.3d at 344-45 (Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting).

2022(Citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 ). - 43 - Washington, a court in another judication discussed the significance of a police officer’s testimony concerning a high-crime area in conducting a reasonable suspicion analysis.

2022(Citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 ). - 43 - Washington, a court in another judication discussed the significance of a police officer’s testimony concerning a high-crime area in conducting a reasonable suspicion analysis.

2021Given the State’s concession that Mr. Trott was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was not consensual and is governed by the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to a Terry stop. 7 v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 , 374 n.5 (1999).

2009Third, the reasonable suspicion standard carries limitations; it “ ‘does not allow [a] law enforcement official to simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious to him or her.’ ” Bost, 406 Md. at 357 , 958 A.2d at 365 (quoting Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 391 , 735 A.2d 491, 510 (1999)).

2026Our holding stems directly from the holding of the Supreme Court of the United -4- States in Terry, 392 U.S. at 21—that to justify a particular intrusion, a police officer must be able to identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”—and our own myriad of case law holding that “the reasonable suspicion standard requires the police to possess a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing[,]” Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349, 362 , 920 A.2d 1080, 1087 (2007) (citation modified).

2026Our holding stems directly from the holding of the Supreme Court of the United -4- States in Terry, 392 U.S. at 21—that to justify a particular intrusion, a police officer must be able to identify “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”—and our own myriad of case law holding that “the reasonable suspicion standard requires the police to possess a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing[,]” Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349, 362 , 920 A.2d 1080, 1087 (2007) (citation modified).

2022See Glover, ___ U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90 (noting that the reasonable suspicion analysis accounts for “information that is accessible to people generally”).

2022See Glover, ___ U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90 (noting that the reasonable suspicion analysis accounts for “information that is accessible to people generally”).

2022Our cases involving police stops of individuals in high-crime areas have usually been more like Bost, 406 Md. at 359-60 , 958 A.2d at 367 ,10 in which we held that police 10 For example, in Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 359, 361, 383-84 , 987 A.2d 72 , 78- 79, 93 (2010), a case in which the trial court “gave ‘great weight’ to the fact that the petitioner was standing in a high drug crime area, where the police had received ‘a number of complaints from citizens’” based on the testimony of the apprehending police officer, we acknowledged “the fact that activity is taking place in a high drug cri

2022Our cases involving police stops of individuals in high-crime areas have usually been more like Bost, 406 Md. at 359-60 , 958 A.2d at 367 ,10 in which we held that police 10 For example, in Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 359, 361, 383-84 , 987 A.2d 72 , 78- 79, 93 (2010), a case in which the trial court “gave ‘great weight’ to the fact that the petitioner was standing in a high drug crime area, where the police had received ‘a number of complaints from citizens’” based on the testimony of the apprehending police officer, we acknowledged “the fact that activity is taking place in a high drug cri

2022We have explained that “the level of suspicion necessary to constitute reasonable, articulable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 408 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022We have explained that “the level of suspicion necessary to constitute reasonable, articulable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 408 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022The Court reaffirmed “flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis[,]” but concluded that, given this reality, “a judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.” Id.

2022The Court reaffirmed “flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis[,]” but concluded that, given this reality, “a judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.” Id.

2022In United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.

2022Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , and citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

2021The reasonable suspicion standard “is a common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act.” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 286 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695–96).

2005To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, the above factors, considered together, “must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.” Cartnail, supra, 359 Md. at 291 , 753 A.2d 519 (citations and quotations omitted). *218 In Stokes, supra, the Court of Appeals applied the above factors to the totality of the circumstances in the case and concluded that the Terry stop of the defendant was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

2021The reasonable suspicion standard “is a common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act.” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 286 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695–96).

2015Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), described the reasonable suspicion standard that must be satisfied to justify such restraint: “We have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity!.]” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), was emphatic not only about the Terry standard but about the fact that it applies to all seizures of the person, including those involved in brief investigatory stops.

2026We stated that ‘a particular circumstance or set of circumstances may satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard but fall short of probable cause.’” Stone, 493 Md. at 129-30 (quoting D.D., 479 Md. at 231).

2022Thus, “a particular circumstance or set of circumstances” may “fall short of probable cause” but “satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.” Id. at 231 .

2022“While there is no litmus test to define the reasonable suspicion standard,” law enforcement officers must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 60 (2014) (reasonable suspicion means “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022“While there is no litmus test to define the reasonable suspicion standard,” law enforcement officers must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 60 (2014) (reasonable suspicion means “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2013This Court has concluded “that the reasonable suspicion standard requires the police to possess ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Lewis, 398 Md. at 362 , 920 A.2d at 1087 (quoting Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 281 , 909 A.2d 1048, 1060 (2006)).

2013This Court has concluded “that the reasonable suspicion standard requires the police to possess ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Lewis, 398 Md. at 362 , 920 A.2d at 1087 (quoting Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 281 , 909 A.2d 1048, 1060 (2006)).

2026Crime in the Area The State contends that the circuit court expressly declined to determine whether the area should be formally classified as a high-crime area under Washington, 482 Md. at 441, 443 , 287 A.3d at 329, 330, and instead, in the reasonable suspicion analysis, “properly took notice of the volume of crime in the [Nancy-1] beat, without labeling it a high-crime area.” Citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000), and Washington, 482 Md. at 453 , 287 A.3d at 336, the State argues that the circuit court’s approach was “entirely consistent with caselaw, which makes clear that th

2026Crime in the Area The State contends that the circuit court expressly declined to determine whether the area should be formally classified as a high-crime area under Washington, 482 Md. at 441, 443 , 287 A.3d at 329, 330, and instead, in the reasonable suspicion analysis, “properly took notice of the volume of crime in the [Nancy-1] beat, without labeling it a high-crime area.” Citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000), and Washington, 482 Md. at 453 , 287 A.3d at 336, the State argues that the circuit court’s approach was “entirely consistent with caselaw, which makes clear that th

2020Although such a belief “must be based on more than an inchoate and 9 unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , the reasonable suspicion standard “does not require an officer to be absolutely certain that an individual is armed and dangerous[,]” Thornton, 465 Md. at 142 (citing Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 541 (2016)).

2017Id. at 1049 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). *280 The Court of Appeals recently discussed the nature of the reasonable suspicion requirement to justify a frisk, stating as follows: When reviewing whether reasonable suspicion exists, "[t]he test is the 'totality of the circumstances,' viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent, police officer." The test is objective: "the validity of the stop or the frisk is not determined by the subjective or articulated reasons of the officer; rather, the validity of the stop or frisk is determined by whether the record

2026Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 409 (2017), in D.D. the Court was required to address, similar to this case, the impact of a change in the law on the reasonable suspicion analysis.