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145 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 48 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ferreiragreen2 sentences2020Both the State’s argument and the court’s analysis, however, are inconsistent with the well-established rule that “the reasonable suspicion standard requires . . . more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.” Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483 , 988 P.2d at 709 . 2020Both the State’s argument and the court’s analysis, however, are inconsistent with the well-established rule that “the reasonable suspicion standard requires . . . more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.” Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483 , 988 P.2d at 709 . | 11 | 117 |
State v. Emorygreen2 sentences2001As this court has noted on numerous occasions: "This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12 , 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 , 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct.App.1991). 2001As this court has noted on numerous occasions: "This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12 , 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 , 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct.App.1991). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2022Specifically, the State argues the district court improperly discounted the presumed reliability of the CI’s tips as required by State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 , 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) and incorrectly applied the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard. 2022Specifically, the State argues the district court improperly discounted the presumed reliability of the CI’s tips as required by State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 , 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) and incorrectly applied the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard. | 3 | 6 |
State v. Naccaratogreen2 sentences2001As this court has noted on numerous occasions: "This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12 , 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 , 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct.App.1991). 2001As this court has noted on numerous occasions: "This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12 , 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 , 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct.App.1991). | 3 | 6 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2024Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811 , 203 P.3d at 1210 . 2020The reasonable suspicion standard was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Brian Ellis Nealgreen2 sentences2024While mere nervousness is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion, see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924 , 367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016), extreme nervousness is relevant in the reasonable suspicion analysis, see United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “extraordinary and prolonged nervousness can weigh significantly in the assessment of reasonable suspicion”). 2024While mere nervousness is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion, see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924 , 367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016), extreme nervousness is relevant in the reasonable suspicion analysis, see United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “extraordinary and prolonged nervousness can weigh significantly in the assessment of reasonable suspicion”). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Arvizugreen2 sentences2022The reasonable suspicion inquiry “falls considerably short” of 51% accuracy, see United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002), for, as we have explained, “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 , 60 (2014). 2020As previously noted, while “an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Santosgreen1 sentence2024While mere nervousness is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion, see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924 , 367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016), extreme nervousness is relevant in the reasonable suspicion analysis, see United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “extraordinary and prolonged nervousness can weigh significantly in the assessment of reasonable suspicion”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perez, Jr.green2 sentences2021An officer’s suspicion “is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 629 , 434 P.3d 801, 804 (2009). 2021An officer’s suspicion “is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 629 , 434 P.3d 801, 804 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Montaguegreen2 sentences2020State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483 , 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). “[A]n officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts, and those inferences may be informed by the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.” State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321 , 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). 2020State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483 , 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). “[A]n officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts, and those inferences may be informed by the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.” State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321 , 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Tarango DeForest Padilla v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189-90 , 345 P.3d at 248-49 (citations omitted). 2016Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189-90 , 345 P.3d at 248-49 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Flowersgreen2 sentences2015Such conduct can hardly be described as suspicious.”); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209 , 953 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct.App.1998) (upholding the magistrate court’s conclusion that “While any one of the factors identified ... may not have given rise to a reasonable suspicion standard, all of them taken together do so. 2015Such conduct can hardly be described as suspicious.”); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209 , 953 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct.App.1998) (upholding the magistrate court’s conclusion that “While any one of the factors identified ... may not have given rise to a reasonable suspicion standard, all of them taken together do so. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grigggreen2 sentences2014Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 ; Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 , 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 ; State v. Grigg, 149 Idaho 361, 363 , 233 P.3d 1283, 1285 (Ct.App.2010). 2014Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 ; Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 , 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 ; State v. Grigg, 149 Idaho 361, 363 , 233 P.3d 1283, 1285 (Ct.App.2010). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014The Iowa Supreme Court summarized its understanding of the applicability of flight in the reasonable suspicion analysis by noting that “the circumstances surrounding the suspect’s efforts to avoid the police must be such as to allow a rational conclusion that flight indicat *190 ed a consciousness of guilt.” Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 644 (citing Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C.1989)). 2014According to the Iowa Supreme Court, “the key is that the relationship between the police presence and the suspect’s flight was causal rather than coincidental.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Justice v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610 , 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Justice, 119 Idaho 158, 159 , 804 P.2d 331, 332 (Ct. App. 1990). 2 Therefore, the district court correctly denied Lewis’s suppression motion. 2012See State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610 , 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Justice, 119 Idaho 158, 159 , 804 P.2d 331, 332 (Ct. App. 1990). 2 Therefore, the district court correctly denied Lewis’s suppression motion. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gallegosgreen2 sentences2012State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896 , 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). 2012State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896 , 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Myersgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610 , 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Justice, 119 Idaho 158, 159 , 804 P.2d 331, 332 (Ct. App. 1990). 2 Therefore, the district court correctly denied Lewis’s suppression motion. 2012See State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610 , 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Justice, 119 Idaho 158, 159 , 804 P.2d 331, 332 (Ct. App. 1990). 2 Therefore, the district court correctly denied Lewis’s suppression motion. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Tuckergreen1 sentence2009See id. at 1201 n. 10 (stating that "[blecause we are applying general Fourth Amendment principles ... we look to the federal standard of reasonable suspicion”). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cerinogreen2 sentences2005State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 , 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct.App.2005). 2005State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 , 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct.App.2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Knights
green
2 sentences2019U.S. v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 2019U.S. v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). | 3 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Sonnie Davis v. Kevin Davis, United States of America v. Kevin Davis
green
2 sentences2019The reasonable suspicion standard used in Barker was gleaned from the 9th Circuit case United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991). 2019The Davis court held that “[t]he 5 permissible bounds of a probation search are governed by a reasonable suspicion standard.” Id. at 758 . | 3 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Chad Lee Williams
green
2 sentences2018State v. Williams , 162 Idaho 56 , 64, 394 P.3d 99 , 107 (Ct. App. 2016). 2018State v. Williams , 162 Idaho 56 , 64, 394 P.3d 99 , 107 (Ct. App. 2016). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Sheldon
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kansas v. Glover
green
1 sentence2022Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Kreps
green
1 sentence2014The Iowa Supreme Court summarized its understanding of the applicability of flight in the reasonable suspicion analysis by noting that “the circumstances surrounding the suspect’s efforts to avoid the police must be such as to allow a rational conclusion that flight indicat *190 ed a consciousness of guilt.” Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 644 (citing Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C.1989)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences1998There must be “some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 1998There must be “some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.