exacting standard in New Jersey

2026Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)).

2026Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)).

2025Indeed, the second prong "is an exacting standard," State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008), and "[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached," Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

2024We find no error, much less plain error, warranting reversal. [Flagler, slip op. 40-41.] A-2180-20 19 If there was no error, then there can be no prejudice to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test because "[t]hat second prong . . . is an exacting standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

2025"A more exacting standard governs our review of the trial court's legal conclusions." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). "'Although a family court's factual findings are entitled to considerable deference, [the appellate court] do[es] not pay special deference to its interpretation of the law.'" Ibid. (quoting D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)).

2024"A more exacting standard governs our review of the trial court's legal conclusions." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). "[W]e do not pay special deference to its interpretation of the law." D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012) (citing N.J.

2025"A more exacting standard governs our review of the trial court's legal conclusions." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). "'Although a family court's factual findings are entitled to considerable deference, [the appellate court] do[es] not pay special deference to its interpretation of the law.'" Ibid. (quoting D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)).

2025"A more exacting standard governs our review of the trial court's legal conclusions." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). "'Although a family court's factual findings are entitled to considerable deference, [the appellate court] do[es] not pay special deference to its interpretation of the law.'" Ibid. (quoting D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)).

2026A-1713-24 19 To establish the prejudice prong in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2024In the specific context of showing prejudice after having entered a guilty plea, a defendant must prove "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [he] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. at 139 (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2001As this Court observed in In re Parole Application of Hawley, 98 N.J. 108 , 484 A.2d 684 (1984): The Board is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the Parole Act of 1979.

2001As this Court observed in In re Parole Application of Hawley, 98 N.J. 108 , 484 A.2d 684 (1984): The Board is the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the Parole Act of 1979.

2025In certain limited circumstances, "such as the '[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether,' prejudice is presumed." State v. A-2703-22 18 Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 597 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 ).

2025In certain limited circumstances, "such as the '[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether,' prejudice is presumed." State v. A-2703-22 18 Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 597 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 ).

2017Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 179 (2015).

2017See, e.g., Dep't of Child. & Fam., Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 179 (2015).

2005See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 , 93 S.Ct. 705, 728 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147, 178 (1973) (requiring compelling state interest); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 , 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 531, 537 (1977).

2005See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 , 93 S.Ct. 705, 728 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147, 178 (1973) (requiring compelling state interest); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 , 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 531, 537 (1977).

2005See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 , 93 S.Ct. 705, 728 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147, 178 (1973) (requiring compelling state interest); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 , 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 531, 537 (1977).

2005See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 , 93 S.Ct. 705, 728 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 147, 178 (1973) (requiring compelling state interest); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 , 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 531, 537 (1977).

2021Pierre, 223 N.J. at 583 .

2020"Important to the prejudice analysis is the strength of the evidence that was before the fact-finder at trial." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 (2015).

2020Nonetheless, the “difficulty in gauging whether a parole determination constitutes an abuse of discretion” does not call for “a more exacting standard of judicial review than [what applies] to other administrative agency decisions.” Trantino v. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19 , 25 (1998); see also State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J.

1998See In re Hawley Parole Application, 98 N.J. 108, 112 , 484 A.2d 684 (1984) (finding “no reason to exempt the Parole Board from the well-established principle” and generally accepted standard of review applicable to administrative agencies); Cestari, supra, 224 N.J.Super. at 548 n. 60, 540 A.2d 1334 (“reject[ing] the contention that a more restrictive standard of judicial review should apply to parole [decisions] than to other administrative agency decisions”); cf. 296 N.J.Super. at 470 , 687 A.2d 274 (stating that court must “not upset [parole decisions] unless it clearly and convincingly app

2020Nonetheless, the “difficulty in gauging whether a parole determination constitutes an abuse of discretion” does not call for “a more exacting standard of judicial review than [what applies] to other administrative agency decisions.” Trantino v. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19 , 25 (1998); see also State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J.

2001Although in Trantino IV, supra, we acknowledged “the inherent difficulty in gauging whether a parole determination constitutes an abuse of discretion,” 154 N.J. at 25 , 711 A.2d 260 , we emphasized that the judicial review of Parole Board determinations “does not engender a more exacting standard of judicial review than that applicable to other administrative agency decisions.” Ibid.

2024In the specific context of showing prejudice after having entered a guilty plea, a defendant must prove "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [he] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. at 139 (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2024A defendant seeking to set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel must show "(i) counsel's assistance was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (ii) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would A-3101-21 9 not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez- Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

2012Finally, as Matthews observed, while the exorbitant filing fees in Bullock “affected voters in ways ‘neither incidental nor remote’ and thus burdened voters ‘according to their economic status,’ ” the United States Supreme Court used “a more exacting standard of review than the ‘rational basis’ standard,” while still “Mejecting traditional strict scrutiny.” Id. at 158-59 , 417 A.2d 1011 (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 144, 92 S.Ct. at 856 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 100 ); see also id. at 169, 417 A.2d 1011 (“We do not agree with the dissent’s view that Bullock v. Carter applied strict scrutiny”).

2012Finally, as Matthews observed, while the exorbitant filing fees in Bullock “affected voters in ways ‘neither incidental nor remote’ and thus burdened voters ‘according to their economic status,’ ” the United States Supreme Court used “a more exacting standard of review than the ‘rational basis’ standard,” while still “Mejecting traditional strict scrutiny.” Id. at 158-59 , 417 A.2d 1011 (quoting Bullock, supra, 405 U.S. at 144, 92 S.Ct. at 856 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 100 ); see also id. at 169, 417 A.2d 1011 (“We do not agree with the dissent’s view that Bullock v. Carter applied strict scrutiny”).

2026A-1713-24 19 To establish the prejudice prong in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2025This exacting standard requires reversal only where the possibility of an injustice is "real," or "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [the error] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)).

2025"The 'high standard' used in plain error analysis 'provides a strong incentive for counsel to interpose a timely objection, enabling the trial court to forestall or correct a A-2082-22 24 potential error.'" State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (quoting State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193, 203 (2016)).

2025"The 'high standard' used in plain error analysis 'provides a strong incentive for counsel to interpose a timely objection, enabling the trial court to forestall or correct a A-2082-22 24 potential error.'" State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (quoting State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193, 203 (2016)).

2025An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be established "when counsel fails to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 352 (2013). "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.