exacting standard in Texas

2026Disqualification “‘Disqualification is a severe remedy’ and when considering disqualification motions, ‘courts must adhere to an exacting standard . . . to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic.’” In re RSR Corp. (RSR II), 568 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)).

2026“Disqualification is a severe remedy,” and “courts must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify[.]” Spears v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 5 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990).

2026“Accordingly, a trial court evaluating a disqualification motion ‘must strictly adhere to an exacting standard.’” Id. (quoting Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 422 ).

2026“Accordingly, a trial court evaluating a disqualification motion ‘must strictly adhere to an exacting standard.’” Id. (quoting Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 422 ).

2015Because “[d]isqualification is a severe remedy,” courts apply “an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic.” Id. (citing NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398 , 399–400 (Tex. 1989, orig. proceeding)).

1998In view of this severity and to discourage the use of motions to disqualify as a dilatory trial tactic, trial courts are required to "strictly adhere to an exacting standard when considering such motions." Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400 ; see also Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 .

2026Disqualification “‘Disqualification is a severe remedy’ and when considering disqualification motions, ‘courts must adhere to an exacting standard . . . to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic.’” In re RSR Corp. (RSR II), 568 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)).

2022See, e.g., In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Tex. 2019) (disqualification is “a severe remedy” subject to “an exacting standard”) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 10 - 04-22-00173-CV CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conditionally grant Soulsby’s petition for writ of mandamus.

2025“In considering a motion to disqualify, the trial court must strictly adhere to an exacting standard to discourage a party from using the motion as a dilatory trial tactic.” In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); see In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57 (“Disqualification is a measure -3- 04-24-00568-CV that can cause immediate harm by depriving a party of [her] chosen counsel and disrupting court proceedings.”).

2024“The fact that a lawyer serves as both an advocate and a witness does not in itself compel disqualification.” In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

2021App. 1997); see In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) (stating that courts “must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic”). [W]hen a trial court unreasonably or arbitrarily interferes with the defendant’s right to choose counsel, its actions rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

2020App. 1997) (“The rules should not be used as a tactical weapon to disqualify opposing counsel for their alleged disciplinary rule violations . . . .”); In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) (stating that courts “must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic”).

2019“Disqualification is a severe remedy” and when considering disqualification motions, “courts must adhere to an exacting standard . . . to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic.” Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990); see Grant v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 888 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (supp. op. on reh’g) (“The untimely urging of a disqualification motion lends support to any suspicion that the motion is being used as a tactical weapon.”).

2019"Disqualification is a severe remedy" and when considering disqualification motions, "courts must adhere to an exacting standard ... to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic." Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals , 797 S.W.2d 654 , 656 (Tex. 1990) ; see Grant v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals , 888 S.W.2d 466 , 468 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (supp. op. on reh'g) ("The untimely urging of a disqualification motion lends support to any suspicion that the motion is being used as a tactical weapon.").

2022A trial court has the power, “under appropriate circumstances, to disqualify an attorney even though he or she has not violated a specific disciplinary rule.” In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).

2017See In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (op. on reh’g) (explaining that “[e]ven if a lawyer violates a disciplinary rule, the party requesting disqualification must demonstrate that the opposing lawyer’s conduct caused actual prejudice that requires disqualification”); In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) (“The courts must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial

2010Moore , 165 S.W.3d at 102 ; Ender , 30 S.W.3d at 595 (“We refuse to hold handwritten complaints drafted by employees to the same exacting standard we might apply to pleadings drafted by attorneys.”).

2009See Ender , 30 S.W.3d at 595 .

2016See EPIC Holdings, 985 S.W.2d at 52–53 (concluding that the delay in filing the motion to disqualify was not prejudicial because “almost no discovery” had been conducted at the time of filing); Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (holding that “courts must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic”).

2016See EPIC Holdings, 985 S.W.2d at 52-53 (concluding that the delay in filing the motion to disqualify was not prejudicial because “almost no discovery” had been conducted at the time of filing); Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (holding that “courts must adhere to an exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify so as to discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic”).

2010Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 423-24 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), judgm't vacated without reference to the merits due to settlement by the parties, No. 02-0426, 2003 Tex. Lexis 68 (Tex. May 22, 2003) (mem. op.) (Frost, J. concurring in denial of en banc consideration) (denial of en banc consideration "compelled by the exacting standard for en banc review") (Edelman, J. concurring in denial of en banc consideration) (failure to follow en banc standard raises "fundamental" issues of (1) "How important is it to our system of justice that decisions be reached in an

2010Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 423-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), judgm’t vacated without reference to the merits due to settlement by the parties, No. 02-0426, 2003 Tex. Lexis 68 (Tex. May 22, 2003) (mem. op.) (Frost, J. concurring in denial of en banc consideration) (denial of en bane consideration “compelled by the exacting standard for en banc review”) (Edelman, J. concurring in denial of en banc consideration) (failure to follow en banc standard raises “fundamental” issues of (1) “How important is it to our system of justice that decisions be reached in an

2024See Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 360 (setting out five factors to determine whether a statute clearly and unambiguously waives governmental immunity); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (“[A] statute 19 shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”).

2024See Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 360 (setting out five factors to determine whether a statute clearly and unambiguously waives governmental immunity); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (“[A] statute 19 shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”).

2022Thus, when “a record reveals a risk of harm that is so small that it may properly be characterized as not ‘remotely significant,’ or where the risk of harm is “almost infinitesimal,’ 20 any harm resulting from the error is only theoretical harm.” French, 563 S.W.3d at 239 (citations omitted). 1.

2020See id.

2014See Shows, 671 F.2d at 930 (citing U.S. for Use and Benefit of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Const. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir.1970)). .

2014See Shows, 671 F.2d at 930 (citing U.S. for Use and Benefit of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Const. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 1970)). 2 I quibble somewhat with the Majority’s analysis of the jury’s no-negligence response on ExxonMobil as a basis for the new trial.

2014See Shows, 671 F.2d at 930 (citing U.S. for Use and Benefit of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Const. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir.1970)). .

2014See Shows, 671 F.2d at 930 (citing U.S. for Use and Benefit of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Const. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 1970)). 2 I quibble somewhat with the Majority’s analysis of the jury’s no-negligence response on ExxonMobil as a basis for the new trial.

2010Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1990); In re Seven-O Corp., 289 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, orig. proceeding).

2010Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1990); In re Seven-O Corp., 289 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, orig. proceeding).

2025See Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 690 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).

2024See In re RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d at 666 ; In re George, 28 S.W.3d at 513 ; In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d at 52 ; Vaughan, 875 S.W.2d at 690 .

2023The party moving for disqualification bears the burden of proving the attorney should be disqualified “with specificity.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362 , 373–74 (Tex. 2019).

2023Thus, a trial court evaluating a disqualification motion “must strictly adhere to an exacting standard.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).

2013Cimarron, 209 S.W.3d at 201 .

2008Accordingly, trial courts must “adhere to an exacting standard when considering [such] motions.” Id.; Cimarron Agric., Ltd. v. Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 209 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.).

2006Because of its severity, courts must adhere to A an exacting standard so as to discourage the use of a motion to disqualify as a dilatory trial tactic. @ In re Butler , 987 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).

2000See Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1990) (orig.proceeding); Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 399 ; In re Butler, 987 S.W.2d at 224 .

2006Carmouche v. State , 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. Crim.

2004Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 331 .

2026Good intentions fail this exacting standard for the simple reason that “[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.

2024Compare Rivas v. Lake Shore Cmty. Ass’n, No. 01-22-00121-CV, 2023 WL 3063409 , at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the holding in Adams only applied to “the former version of the TCPA, which applied a less exacting standard and included a broader definition of the phrase a ‘matter of public concern’”), with Cobb Dev. v. McCabe, No. 03-21-00524-CV, 2023 WL 4003513 , at *6 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2023, pet. filed) (explaining that, despite the intervening amendments to the TCPA, “Adams remains instructive because the supreme court made