6 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2003–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chenault v. Walkergreen2 sentences2013The crux of the rule is that upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[a] trial court must take as true all the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint and supporting papers, if any, and must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiffs favor.” Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 644 ; see also Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 56 (Tenn.2001) (stating that when adjudicating Rule 12.02(2) motions, trial courts “should not credit eonclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences”). 1 My initial fear is that the major ity not only implies a more exacting standard than req 2013The crux of the rule is that upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[a] trial court must take as true all the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting papers, if any, and must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 644 ; see also Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 56 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that when adjudicating Rule 12.02(2) motions, trial courts “should not credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences”).1 My initial fear is that the majority not only implies a more exacting standard than re | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Willbanksgreen1 sentence2021As these cases demonstrate, the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress “is an exacting standard.” Miller v. Willbanks, 8 S.W.3d 607, 614 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Curtis Myers v. Amisub (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Hospitalgreen1 sentence2014See Hawkins v. Martin, No. W2011-02318-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3007680 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2012) (noting that the plaintiff had not shown good cause, “much less, unique, extraordinary circumstances, that would excuse compliance”); see also Myers, 382 S.W.3d at 310–11 (“‘Extraordinary’ is commonly defined as ‘going far beyond the ordinary degree, measure, limit, etc.; very unusual; exceptional; remarkable.’”) (quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, 516 (1966)). | 1 | 1 |
Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp.green1 sentence2013“In considering a motion to dismiss, courts ‘must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Id. (quoting Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc.green2 sentences2013The crux of the rule is that upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[a] trial court must take as true all the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting papers, if any, and must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 644 ; see also Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 56 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that when adjudicating Rule 12.02(2) motions, trial courts “should not credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences”).1 My initial fear is that the majority not only implies a more exacting standard than re 2013“In considering a motion to dismiss, courts ‘must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Id. (quoting Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2003See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S. Ct. at 370 ; Hicks, 983 S.W.2d at 246 . 2003See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S. Ct. at 370 ; Hicks, 983 S.W.2d at 246 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gordon v. Greenview Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013The crux of the rule is that upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[a] trial court must take as true all the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint and supporting papers, if any, and must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiffs favor.” Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 644 ; see also Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 56 (Tenn.2001) (stating that when adjudicating Rule 12.02(2) motions, trial courts “should not credit eonclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences”). 1 My initial fear is that the major ity not only implies a more exacting standard than req 2013The crux of the rule is that upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[a] trial court must take as true all the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting papers, if any, and must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 644 ; see also Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45, 56 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that when adjudicating Rule 12.02(2) motions, trial courts “should not credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences”).1 My initial fear is that the majority not only implies a more exacting standard than re | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Progressive Building & Loan Ass'n v. McIntyre
green
1 sentence2010Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 35-5 - 101 - 35-5-116 (2001 & Supp. 2006)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hicks v. State
green
1 sentence2003See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S. Ct. at 370 ; Hicks, 983 S.W.2d at 246 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.