exacting standard in Pennsylvania

2014I, 52 A.3d at 444 . 7 In addition, these cases present oth er evidentiary challenges.

2014I, 52 A.3d at 444 . 5 In addition, these cases present other evidentiary challenges.

2026“Accordingly,” in the concurrence’s view, the Packer Court did not have “any intention of applying a more exacting standard for malice as stated by the [d]issent here.” Id.

2024Instead, the Court has time and again equated malice with reckless conduct that “might cause a death or serious bodily injury.” See Packer, 168 A.3d at 172 .2 I see as the Dissent’s second error its statement that Appellant’s life- threatening decisions leading up to the accident were irrelevant to the issue of malice.

2017The court suggested that to hold law enforcement to a more exacting standard than reasonable belief in the truth of the third- party’s information could “result in a Catch-22 situation” where the police “would be required to conduct virtually a complete investigation and present the magistrate with a confirmed, absolutely true affidavit before a valid warrant could be issued, but such a complete investigation would be nearly impossible without a warrant.” Id.

2017The court suggested that to hold law enforcement to a more exacting standard than reasonable belief in the truth of the third-party’s information could “result in a Catch-22 situation” where the police “would be required to conduct virtually a complete investigation and present the magistrate with a confirmed, absolutely true affidavit before a valid warrant could be issued, but such a complete investigation would be nearly impossible without a warrant.” Id.

1999In United States v. Nelson, 931 F.Supp. 194 (W.D.N.Y.1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997), the court held that police not only had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, but also possessed probable cause to arrest him where an officer received a radio report that fellow officers were chasing an individual a few blocks away. 3 The officer drove to the scene and was informed that the fugitive was a black male wearing dark clothing and that he had run down a certain alleyway.

1999In United States v. Nelson, 931 F.Supp. 194 (W.D.N.Y.1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.1997), the court held that police not only had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, but also possessed probable cause to arrest him where an officer received a radio report that fellow officers were chasing an individual a few blocks away. [3] The officer drove to the scene and was informed that the fugitive was a black male wearing dark clothing and that he had run down a certain alleyway.

1897The subject was carefully considered in the recent case of Jackson Township v. Wagner, 127 Pa. 184 .” In the latter case, the governing principles were thus laid down by Mr. Justice Williams : “ Township officers are bound to anticipate and provide against the ordinary needs of travel conducted in the ordinary manner, and to remove obstructions and defects which would naturally or probably cause .injury to the traveler along the highways; but the township is not an insurer against all possible accidents, nor is it bound to anticipate the danger to which a broken wagon or a frightened horse may

1892The subject was carefully considered in the recent case of Jackson Tp. v. Wagner, 127 Pa. 184 , where our Brother Williams said: “ Township officers are bound to anticipate and provide against the ordinary needs of travel conducted in the ordinary manner,.....but are not bound to anticipate the danger to which a broken wagon or a frightened horse may expose the driver.” And again: “ It is necessary to inquire whether the accident was the natural or probable result of any act or omission of the township officers, which rendered the highway unsafe for the purposes of travel, conducted in the ord

2024Absent this exacting standard, “piecemeal hearings prompted by the wisdom of hindsight would become the rule rather than the exception.” Martell, 707 A.2d at 244 .

2020The Court, in an opinion authored by then-Justice (now-Chief Justice) Saylor and joined in full by former Chief Justice Castille and former Justices Eakin and McCaffery,12 noted the Commonwealth did not contest that the second investigation failed to meet the Melendez requirement of “true independence,” but nevertheless “advocate[d] the application of a less exacting standard to circumstances that do not involve a knowing circumvention of a suspect’s constitutional rights through intentional police misconduct.” Id. at 802 .

2019Gribble, supra at 676 , 863 A.2d at 472 .

2019Gribble, supra at 676 , 863 A.2d at 472 .

2012The Commonwealth, for its part, does not contend that Detective Evans’ investigation meets the Melendez requirement of “true independence.” Rather, it advocates the application of a less exacting standard to circumstances that do not involve a knowing circumvention of a suspect’s constitutional rights through intentional police misconduct. 9 The Commonwealth explains that this is, at least in substance, the approach taken by the Superior Court in a series of decisions involving illegal acquisitions of blood-related evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ruey, 854 A.2d 560 (Pa.Super.2004), affd on other

2012The Commonwealth, for its part, does not contend that Detective Evans’ investigation meets the Melendez requirement of “true independence.” Rather, it advocates the application of a less exacting standard to circumstances that do not involve a knowing circumvention of a suspect’s constitutional rights through intentional police misconduct. 9 The Commonwealth explains that this is, at least in substance, the approach taken by the Superior Court in a series of decisions involving illegal acquisitions of blood-related evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ruey, 854 A.2d 560 (Pa.Super.2004), affd on other

2012The Commonwealth, for its part, does not contend that Detective Evans’ investigation meets the Melendez requirement of “true independence.” Rather, it advocates the application of a less exacting standard to circumstances that do not involve a knowing circumvention of a suspect’s constitutional rights through intentional police misconduct. 9 The Commonwealth explains that this is, at least in substance, the approach taken by the Superior Court in a series of decisions involving illegal acquisitions of blood-related evidence, see Commonwealth v. Ruey, 854 A.2d 560 (Pa.Super.2004), affd on other

2011The more exacting analysis of the class certification requirements in [Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex.App.2002)], Basco [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.La.2002)], Petty [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 Ohio App.3d 348 , 773 N.E.2d 576 (2002)], Harrison [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C.App. 545 , 613 S.E.2d 322 (2005)] is more closely aligned with the Court of Appeals's interpretation of Md.

2011The more exacting analysis of the class certification requirements in [Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex.App.2002)], Basco [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.La.2002)], Petty [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 Ohio App.3d 348 , 773 N.E.2d 576 (2002)], Harrison [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C.App. 545 , 613 S.E.2d 322 (2005)] is more closely aligned with the Court of Appeals's interpretation of Md.

2011The more exacting analysis of the class certification requirements in [Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex.App.2002)], Basco [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.La.2002)], Petty [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 Ohio App.3d 348 , 773 N.E.2d 576 (2002)], Harrison [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C.App. 545 , 613 S.E.2d 322 (2005)] is more closely aligned with the Court of Appeals's interpretation of Md.

2011Rule 2-231 articulated in [Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689 , 752 A.2d 200 (2000)] and Creveling [v. GEICO, 376 Md. 72 , 828 A.2d 229 (2003)].

2011Rule 2-231 articulated in [Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689 , 752 A.2d 200 (2000)] and Creveling [v. GEICO, 376 Md. 72 , 828 A.2d 229 (2003)].

2011Rule 2-231 articulated in [Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689 , 752 A.2d 200 (2000)] and Creveling [v. GEICO, 376 Md. 72 , 828 A.2d 229 (2003)].

2011Rule 2-231 articulated in [Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689 , 752 A.2d 200 (2000)] and Creveling [v. GEICO, 376 Md. 72 , 828 A.2d 229 (2003)].

2011The more exacting analysis of the class certification requirements in [Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex.App.2002)], Basco [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.La.2002)], Petty [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 Ohio App.3d 348 , 773 N.E.2d 576 (2002)], Harrison [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C.App. 545 , 613 S.E.2d 322 (2005)] is more closely aligned with the Court of Appeals's interpretation of Md.

2011The more exacting analysis of the class certification requirements in [Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex.App.2002)], Basco [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.La.2002)], Petty [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 Ohio App.3d 348 , 773 N.E.2d 576 (2002)], Harrison [v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C.App. 545 , 613 S.E.2d 322 (2005)] is more closely aligned with the Court of Appeals's interpretation of Md.

2010See, e.g., State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113 , 913 P.2d 39 (1996) (expressly rejecting the Gates standard of review in favor of de novo review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause because the Hawaii Constitution provided more extensive protections than the United States Constitution); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (holding that, because Utah Supreme Court had authority under its state constitution to manage the appellate process and supervisory authority over all state courts, it had power to fashion standards of review and, thus, absent any prohibition by the United St

2010See, e.g., State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113 , 913 P.2d 39 (1996) (expressly rejecting the Gates standard of review in favor of de novo review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause because the Hawaii Constitution provided more extensive protections than the United States Constitution); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (holding that, because Utah Supreme Court had authority under its state constitution to manage the appellate process and supervisory authority over all state courts, it had power to fashion standards of review and, thus, absent any prohibition by the United St

2010See, e.g., State v. Navas, 81 Hawai’i 113, 913 P.2d 39 (1996) (expressly rejecting the Gates standard of review in favor of ele novo review of a magistrate’s determination of probable cause because the Hawaii Constitution provided more extensive protections than the United States Constitution); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (holding that, because Utah Supreme Court had authority under its state constitution to manage the appellate process and supervisory authority over all state courts, it had power to fashion standards of review and, thus, absent any prohibition by the United St

2010See, e.g., State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113 , 913 P.2d 39 (1996) (expressly rejecting the Gates standard of review in favor of de novo review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause because the Hawaii Constitution provided more extensive protections than the United States Constitution); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (holding that, because Utah Supreme Court had authority under its state constitution to manage the appellate process and supervisory authority over all state courts, it had power to fashion standards of review and, thus, absent any prohibition by the United St

2010See, e.g., State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113 , 913 P.2d 39 (1996) (expressly rejecting the Gates standard of review in favor of de novo review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause because the Hawaii Constitution provided more extensive protections than the United States Constitution); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (holding that, because Utah Supreme Court had authority under its state constitution to manage the appellate process and supervisory authority over all state courts, it had power to fashion standards of review and, thus, absent any prohibition by the United St

2010See, e.g., State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113 , 913 P.2d 39 (1996) (expressly rejecting the Gates standard of review in favor of de novo review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause because the Hawaii Constitution provided more extensive protections than the United States Constitution); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (holding that, because Utah Supreme Court had authority under its state constitution to manage the appellate process and supervisory authority over all state courts, it had power to fashion standards of review and, thus, absent any prohibition by the United St