exacting standard in District of Columbia

2020When the jury heard that Benjamin called appellant after confronting Smith on October 20, the government was finally able to square the circle by corroborating Smith’s description of the assault and his identification of appellant was his 20 assailant. 5 Although the test for harmless error “is an exacting standard,” Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C. 2008), we conclude here that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the admission of the redacted interview and the manner in which the government introduced it “might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24

2011The parties disagree as to which harmlessness analysis should drive our inquiry: appellant argues that the error is one of constitutional magnitude subject to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), standard, whereas the government argues that the less exacting standard of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), applies.

2011The parties disagree as to which harmlessness analysis should drive our inquiry: appellant argues that the error is one of constitutional magnitude subject to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), standard, whereas the government argues that the less exacting standard of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), applies.

2011The parties disagree as to which harmlessness analysis should drive our inquiry: appellant argues that the error is one of constitutional magnitude subject to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), standard, whereas the government argues that the less exacting standard of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), applies.

1999“In order to satisfy this exacting standard, the defendant must demonstrate both that the error was ‘plain’ in the sense of ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ and that the challenged ruling undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings and resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.” Nixon, 728 A.2d at 587 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-70 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)).

1999“In order to satisfy this exacting standard, the defendant must demonstrate both that the error was ‘plain’ in the sense of ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ and that the challenged ruling undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings and resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.” Nixon, 728 A.2d at 587 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-70 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)).

2024“This is an exacting standard,” id., that is met “only in the unusual case[] in which only one conclusion could reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 915 (D.C. 1993).

2023There is nothing in the order suggesting that Mr. Honemond was barred from providing exhibits or otherwise presenting corroborating evidence. 16 ‘which could establish, if credited, changed conditions’ that might alter their disability award.”) (quoting Bowser, 129 A.3d at 258 ).

2022It therefore may not be necessary for Greene to satisfy Whitley’s “reasonable probability” of acquittal standard to satisfy the more relaxed standard applicable in this context, that “a fair trial requires that the [new witness’] testimony be made available to the jury.” Benton, 188 F.2d at 627 ; see also Green, 164 A.3d at 93 ; Sellars, 410 A.2d at 979; Brodie v. United States, 295 F.2d 157, 160 (D.C.

2022In concluding its analysis, the court opined that Johnson had “changed his version of events,” while Wallace provided “limited details,” would not provide a sworn or recorded statement, and was biased because he was “either a friend or acquaintance” of Greene’s. 5 But the court never posited this as an alternative basis for its ruling, stripped of the express premise that Johnson 4 Whitley concerned a motion for a new trial filed more than two years after the verdict based on newly discovered evidence, and thus applied a more exacting standard than the one we confront here. 783 A.2d at 632 .

2013But the prosecution‘s total failure to present evidence of the kind discussed in the paragraphs above (i.e., evidence that might have established who owned the wallet found in the back bedroom and who could wear the clothes found in the dresser drawer) persuades us that the evidence as a whole was not ―enough to establish beyond a reasonable doubt -- the most exacting standard of proof known to our law -- that [appellant] had the necessary personal relationship to the weapon and ammunition‖12 for his 12 In re T.M., 577 A.2d 1149 , 1153 (D.C. 1990). 20 convictions to be sustained.

2011“This is an exacting standard, and ‘it is only in the unusual case, in which only one conclusion could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, that the court may properly grant judgment [as a matter of law].’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Homan v. Goya l, 711 A.2d 812, 817 (D.C.1998)).

2008In Nixon , for example, two men were shot — one was observed running from the scene of the shooting with two bullet holes in his body, including “a hole ... behind his ear with blood coming out,” while the other was seen “grabbing his shoulder and the back of his shirt was bleeding like he got hit in the back of his neck or his shoulder.” 730 A.2d at 148 .

2008The exacting standard we have adopted has led us on many occasions to conclude that evidence of a victim’s physical pain was insufficient as a matter of law to establish serious bodily injury when the victim’s pain was shown to be “merely significant.” See Swinton, 902 A.2d at 777-78 .

2005Although a showing that a judge’s alleged prejudice comes from an extrajudicial source may not be required when the circumstances are so extreme that “a judge’s bias appears to have become overpowering,” Whitaker v. McLean, 73 App.D.C. 259 , 118 F.2d 596 (1941) (per curiam), Plummer has not satisfied this most exacting standard.

2005Although a showing that a judge’s alleged prejudice comes from an extrajudicial source may not be required when the circumstances are so extreme that “a judge’s bias appears to have become overpowering,” Whitaker v. McLean, 73 App.D.C. 259 , 118 F.2d 596 (1941) (per curiam), Plummer has not satisfied this most exacting standard.

2003As the en banc court explained in Rivas , it requires the factfinder “to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” Jackson[, 443 U.S. at 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ].

2003As the en banc court explained in Rivas , it requires the factfinder “to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” Jackson[, 443 U.S. at 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ].

1999The right of cross-examination is "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he Confrontation Clause[, however,] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per cu-riam) (emphasis in original) (

1999The right of cross-examination is "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he Confrontation Clause[, however,] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per cu-riam) (emphasis in original) (

1999“In order to satisfy this exacting standard, the defendant must demonstrate both that the error was ‘plain’ in the sense of ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ and that the challenged ruling undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings and resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.” Nixon, 728 A.2d at 587 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-70 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)).

1999The right of cross-examination is "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he Confrontation Clause[, however,] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per cu-riam) (emphasis in original) (

1999The right of cross-examination is "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he Confrontation Clause[, however,] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per cu-riam) (emphasis in original) (

1999The right of cross-examination is "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he Confrontation Clause[, however,] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per cu-riam) (emphasis in original) (

1999The right of cross-examination is "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he Confrontation Clause[, however,] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per cu-riam) (emphasis in original) (