exacting standard in New York

2024Petitioner points to the egregious nature of the landlord's knowing actions in Thornton v Baron, 5 NY3d 175 (2005), Matter of Grimm v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 (2010), and Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as evidence that the courts require a willful, knowing fraudulent scheme, albeit under a less exacting standard that purportedly espoused in Regina and [*7] its progeny. [FN10] In reply, respondent doubles down, postulating that it "is explicit that under its new standard, common law fraud is not required (emphasis added).

2024Petitioner points to the egregious nature of the landlord's knowing actions in Thornton v Baron, 5 NY3d 175 (2005), Matter of Grimm v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 (2010), and Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as evidence that the courts require a willful, knowing fraudulent scheme, albeit under a less exacting standard that purportedly espoused in Regina and [*7]its progeny. [FN10] In reply, respondent doubles down, postulating that it "is explicit that under its new standard, common law fraud is not required (emphasis added)."

2024Petitioner points to the egregious nature of the landlord's knowing actions in Thornton v Baron, 5 NY3d 175 (2005), Matter of Grimm v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 (2010), and Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as evidence that the courts require a willful, knowing fraudulent scheme, albeit under a less exacting standard that purportedly espoused in Regina and [*7] its progeny. [FN10] In reply, respondent doubles down, postulating that it "is explicit that under its new standard, common law fraud is not required (emphasis added).

2024Petitioner points to the egregious nature of the landlord's knowing actions in Thornton v Baron, 5 NY3d 175 (2005), Matter of Grimm v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 (2010), and Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as evidence that the courts require a willful, knowing fraudulent scheme, albeit under a less exacting standard that purportedly espoused in Regina and [*7]its progeny. [FN10] In reply, respondent doubles down, postulating that it "is explicit that under its new standard, common law fraud is not required (emphasis added)."

2024Petitioner points to the egregious nature of the landlord's knowing actions in Thornton v Baron, 5 NY3d 175 (2005), Matter of Grimm v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 (2010), and Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as evidence that the courts require a willful, knowing fraudulent scheme, albeit under a less exacting standard that purportedly espoused in Regina and [*7] its progeny. [FN10] In reply, respondent doubles down, postulating that it "is explicit that under its new standard, common law fraud is not required (emphasis added).

2024Petitioner points to the egregious nature of the landlord's knowing actions in Thornton v Baron, 5 NY3d 175 (2005), Matter of Grimm v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 (2010), and Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1 (2015), as evidence that the courts require a willful, knowing fraudulent scheme, albeit under a less exacting standard that purportedly espoused in Regina and [*7]its progeny. [FN10] In reply, respondent doubles down, postulating that it "is explicit that under its new standard, common law fraud is not required (emphasis added)."

2017Inasmuch as unavailability of the declar-ant is a required element for the introduction of a declaration against penal interest (see DiPippo, 27 NY3d at 136-137 ; Brensic, 70 NY2d at 15; People v McFarland, 108 AD3d 1121 , 1122 [2013], lv denied 24 NY3d 1220 [2015]), and exclusion of the statement did not “infringe [ ] on defendant’s weighty interest in presenting exculpatory evidence” (People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1084 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 941 [2010]), we conclude that, even under the less exacting standard for declarations offered by a defendant to exculpate himself (see Brensic, 70 NY

2017Inasmuch as unavailability of the declar-ant is a required element for the introduction of a declaration against penal interest (see DiPippo, 27 NY3d at 136-137 ; Brensic, 70 NY2d at 15; People v McFarland, 108 AD3d 1121 , 1122 [2013], lv denied 24 NY3d 1220 [2015]), and exclusion of the statement did not “infringe [ ] on defendant’s weighty interest in presenting exculpatory evidence” (People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1084 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 941 [2010]), we conclude that, even under the less exacting standard for declarations offered by a defendant to exculpate himself (see Brensic, 70 NY

2017Inasmuch as unavailability of the declar-ant is a required element for the introduction of a declaration against penal interest (see DiPippo, 27 NY3d at 136-137 ; Brensic, 70 NY2d at 15; People v McFarland, 108 AD3d 1121 , 1122 [2013], lv denied 24 NY3d 1220 [2015]), and exclusion of the statement did not “infringe [ ] on defendant’s weighty interest in presenting exculpatory evidence” (People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1084 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 941 [2010]), we conclude that, even under the less exacting standard for declarations offered by a defendant to exculpate himself (see Brensic, 70 NY

2017Inasmuch as unavailability of the declar-ant is a required element for the introduction of a declaration against penal interest (see DiPippo, 27 NY3d at 136-137 ; Brensic, 70 NY2d at 15; People v McFarland, 108 AD3d 1121 , 1122 [2013], lv denied 24 NY3d 1220 [2015]), and exclusion of the statement did not “infringe [ ] on defendant’s weighty interest in presenting exculpatory evidence” (People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1084 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 941 [2010]), we conclude that, even under the less exacting standard for declarations offered by a defendant to exculpate himself (see Brensic, 70 NY

2012As discussed above, the three-tiered monetary threshold meets the more exacting standard of the home rule article in that it bears “a reasonable relationship to an accompanying substantial State concern” (PBA II, 97 NY2d at 386 ; see PBA I, 89 NY2d at 389 ).

2012As discussed above, the three-tiered monetary threshold meets the more exacting standard of the home rule article in that it bears “a reasonable relationship to an accompanying substantial State concern” (PBA II, 97 NY2d at 386 ; see PBA I, 89 NY2d at 389 ).

2025Plaintiff's amorphous testimony as to the poor lighting conditions, albeit sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether section 23-1.30 was violated, is insufficient to demonstrate the absence of any triable issue of fact as to whether such section was violated and, in particular, the exacting requirement embedded in section 23-1.30 that "in no case shall such illumination be less than 10 foot candles in any area where persons are required to work nor less than five foot candles in any passageway. . . ." ( see Pullman v Silverman , 28 NY3d 1060 , 1062-1063 [2016] [movant's summary judgme

2025Plaintiff's amorphous testimony as to the poor lighting conditions, albeit sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether section 23-1.30 was violated, is insufficient to demonstrate the absence of any triable issue of fact as to whether such section was violated and, in particular, the exacting requirement embedded in section 23-1.30 that "in no case shall such illumination be less than 10 foot candles in any area where persons are required to work nor less than five foot candles in any passageway. . . ." ( see Pullman v Silverman , 28 NY3d 1060 , 1062-1063 [2016] [movant's summary judgme

2014Defendants did not establish that the indemnification provision satisfied the exacting standard of language “exclusively or unequivocally referable to claims between the parties themselves” as opposed to third-party claims only (see Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487, 492 [1989]; Gate Five, LLC v Knowles-Carter, 100 AD3d 416 [1st Dept 2012]).

2014Defendants did not establish that the indemnification provision satisfied the exacting standard of language “exclusively or unequivocally referable to claims between the parties themselves” as opposed to third-party claims only (see Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487, 492 [1989]; Gate Five, LLC v Knowles-Carter, 100 AD3d 416 [1st Dept 2012]).

2009Given the importance of Chase’s statements to the defense, the other evidence supporting those statements, and Chase’s availability to testify and test the credibility of those statements, exclusion of those statements infringed on defendant’s weighty interest in presenting exculpatory evidence, thus depriving him of a fair trial (see Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US at 302-303 ; People v Darrisaw, 206 AD2d at 665 ; cf. Hawkins v Costello, 460 F3d at 245 ).

1994Moreover, where the statement forms a critical part of the defense, due process concerns may tip the scales in favor of admission (see, Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302 ).

2009Rather, a warrant supported by probable cause—a more exacting standard than founded suspicion—is required before such investigations will be permitted; in the absence of a warrant, governmental intrusion into the privacy of the home will not be permitted unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies (s ee People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d at 127 ).

2008Recognizing the inherent potential for intimidation and coercion in police initiated encounters (see Hollman, 79 NY2d at 191-192 ) and the daunting burden to which the People are put when the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent is at issue (see Gonzalez, 39 NY2d at 128 ), this State’s courts have categorically rejected prosecutorial reliance on consent to validate otherwise impermissible searches when consent was given in consequence of improperly initiated police inquiry or intrusion.

1995Moreover, although respondent’s unexpected court appearance may have provided "good cause” for an adjournment, this was the second adjournment of the proceedings and in such cases the statute requires a showing of "special circumstances”, "a more exacting standard than that of 'good cause’ ” (see, Matter of Nakia L., 81 NY2d 898, 901 ).

1995Moreover, although respondent's unexpected court appearance may have provided "good cause" for an adjournment, this was the second adjournment of the proceedings and in such cases the statute requires a showing of "special circumstances", "a more exacting standard than that of `good cause'" ( see , Matter of Nakia L. , 81 N.Y.2d 898, 901 ).

1994The statute, which has been strictly construed (see, Matter of Randy K., 77 NY2d 398 ; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408 ), specifically excludes calendar congestion or the condition of the judicial docket as excuses for delay.

1993The requirement of "special circumstances” entails a more exacting standard than that of "good cause” (see, Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 414 ) and notably, the hearing court found that the presentment agency had failed here to meet even the more lenient "good cause” standard.

1982Such a clause is certainly subject to close judicial scrutiny, with an exacting standard to be used to measure its validity (Van Dyke Prods, v Eastman Kodak Co., 12 NY2d 301, 304 ).

1980Unless the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and “unequivocal terms” a negligent party will not be relieved of liability (Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107, 110 ; Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., 12 NY2d 301, 305 ; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 ).

1982Thus, the reported decisions have required that the intention to insulate a party from liability for his own negligence be clear and unequivocal, expressed in explicit and unmistakable language (Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102,107 ; Van Dyke Prods, v Eastman Kodak Co., supra, at p 304; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 ; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, 281 App Div 568, 570-571 , affd 307 NY 646 ).

1980Unless the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and “unequivocal terms” a negligent party will not be relieved of liability (Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107, 110 ; Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., 12 NY2d 301, 305 ; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 ).

2026Id.

2026Id.

2024The issues before us are whether plaintiff was barred from pursuing, at the pleading stage, his cause of action for IIED because plaintiff pleaded negligence causes of action based on the same core facts underpinning the claim for IIED; and, if plaintiff is not barred, whether his allegations are sufficient to satisfy the exacting standard that defendant's alleged conduct was "extreme and outrageous" under Fischer v Maloney ( 43 NY2d 553 [1978]) and its progeny.

2023A lapsed notice of pendency may not be revived ( see id. at 442 ; RKO Props., Ltd. v Boymelgreen , 31 AD3d 625 ).

2022On the latter point, this Court has stated that “[t]he preferred remedy” for deterring frivolous litigation under the American Rule is “the use of separate, plenary actions after the challenged proceedings have concluded” (Lezak, 69 NY2d at 5 ). -4- -5- No. 75 decisions presume that broadly worded indemnification provisions by their nature are intended to cover attorney’s fees in direct party actions, they deviate from this Court’s exacting standard that the agreement must contain “unmistakably clear” language of the parties’ intent to encompass such actions (see Hooper, 74 NY2d at 492 ).

2020This is an exacting standard, which is not easily met at the pre-answer stage" ( id. at 45-46 ).