exacting analysis in Rhode Island

2014See Pineda, 13 A.3d at 640 ; see also Cardona, 969 A.2d at 672 (noting that when this Court simultaneously faces a defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s rulings on motions for new trial and judgment of acquittal, we first conduct “the more exacting analysis required for review of a ruling on a motion for a new trial”).

2014We do so because both motions simultaneously raise a “challenge to the [legal] sufficiency of the evidence,” and thus, “we begin our review by ‘conducting] the more exacting analysis required for review of a ruling on a motion for a new trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Cardona, 969 A.2d at 672 ).

2014It should be recalled that we have stated as follows: "When faced with a defendant’s challenge to the rulings on both [a motion for a judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial], this Court first conducts a review of the new-trial motion. * * * The motion for a new trial requires a more exacting analysis, * * * therefore unless a defendant can show that the presented evidence failed to support his or her conviction upon the motion-for-a-new-trial standard, a defendant necessarily will be unable to establish he or she was entitled to a judgment of acquittal.’’ State v. Richardson, 47 A.

2014See Pineda, 13 A.3d at 640 ; see also Cardona, 969 A.2d at 672 (noting that when this Court simultaneously faces a defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s rulings on motions for new trial and judgment of acquittal, we first conduct “the more exacting analysis required for review of a ruling on a motion for a new trial”).

2011Effectively, “[p]roximate cause is a more exacting standard than simple ‘but for’ causation.” State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 451 (R.I.2008) (quoting Tavares v. Aramark Corp., 841 A.2d 1124, 1128 (R.I.2004)). 11 We note that Dr. Geffroy’s follow-up letter did not ask the three examining physicians whether Pierce’s disability was a “proximate result” of the 2006 injury, nor did he provide the physicians with a legal definition of the word “proximate.” Rather, in his follow-up inquiries, Dr. Geffroy asked the misinforming question, clearly based on the board’s interpret

2008Tavares v. Aramark Corp., 841 A.2d 1124, 1128 (R.I.2004).

2015It should also be recalled that “[t]he motion for a new trial requires a more exacting analysis!;] * * * therefore, unless a defendant can show that the presented evidence failed to support his or her conviction upon the motion-for-a-new-trial standard, a defendant necessarily will be unable to establish he or she was entitled to a judgment of acquittal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2014It should be recalled that we have stated as follows: "When faced with a defendant’s challenge to the rulings on both [a motion for a judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial], this Court first conducts a review of the new-trial motion. * * * The motion for a new trial requires a more exacting analysis, * * * therefore unless a defendant can show that the presented evidence failed to support his or her conviction upon the motion-for-a-new-trial standard, a defendant necessarily will be unable to establish he or she was entitled to a judgment of acquittal.’’ State v. Richardson, 47 A.

2011Ass'n, Inc. , 951 A.2d 428 , 451 (R.I. 2008)).

2011Effectively, “[p]roximate cause is a more exacting standard than simple ‘but for’ causation.” State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 451 (R.I.2008) (quoting Tavares v. Aramark Corp., 841 A.2d 1124, 1128 (R.I.2004)). 11 We note that Dr. Geffroy’s follow-up letter did not ask the three examining physicians whether Pierce’s disability was a “proximate result” of the 2006 injury, nor did he provide the physicians with a legal definition of the word “proximate.” Rather, in his follow-up inquiries, Dr. Geffroy asked the misinforming question, clearly based on the board’s interpret

2021Indeed, the Third Circuit has cautioned against the exacting standard of Brunette, observing that “a reasonable officer should be forgiven for not meticulously hewing to Brunette * * * because the probable cause determination takes into account the totality of the circumstances[;] the amount of information in the affidavit might well have led a reasonable officer to believe that his [or her] failure to attach photos or provide lurid descriptions would be made up for by the remaining details [contained in the affidavit].” United States v. Dennington, 399 F. App’x 720, 726 (3d Cir. 2010).

2021Importantly, since its holding in Brunette, the First Circuit has observed that “courts should generally not approve a warrant to search for child pornography based solely - 22 - on a police officer’s assertion that images he has seen but has not shown to the magistrate constitute such pornography.” United States v. Burdulis, 753 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (discussing Brunette).

2014When passing on a motion for a new trial, “the trial justice must determine ‘whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Baptista, 79 A.3d 24, 29 (R.I.2013) (quoting State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290 (R.I.2011)).

2014When passing on a motion for a new trial, it is incumbent upon the trial justice to determine “whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Stone, 924 A.2d 773, 779 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 725 (R.I.1994)).

2014When passing on a motion for a new trial, it is incumbent upon the trial justice to determine “whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Stone, 924 A.2d 773, 779 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 725 (R.I.1994)).

2014See Buchanan, 81 A.3d at 1127 (noting that, when faced with a challenge to rulings on both a motion for a new trial and for judgment of acquittal, this Court first conducts “the more exacting analysis required for review of a ruling on a motion for a new trial”) (quoting Gaffney, 68 A.3d at 893).

2014When passing on a motion for a new trial, “the trial justice must determine ‘whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Baptista, 79 A.3d 24, 29 (R.I.2013) (quoting State v. Staffier, 21 A.3d 287, 290 (R.I.2011)).

2009“When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1058 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2007)). “[T]he trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” Id. (quoting State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I.2006)).

2009“When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1058 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2007)). “[T]he trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” Id. (quoting State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I.2006)).

2009“When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1058 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2007)). “[T]he trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” Id. (quoting State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I.2006)).

2009“When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1058 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I.2007)). “[T]he trial justice must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.” Id. (quoting State v. Morales, 895 A.2d 114, 121 (R.I.2006)).