exacting standard in Iowa

2018Given this exacting standard, a district court should only grant a motion for new trial "in the extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict rendered." Id.

2018Given this exacting standard, a district court should only grant a motion for new trial “in the extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict rendered.” Id.

2020As Spates recognizes, “[g]iven this exacting standard, a district court should only grant a motion for new trial ‘in the extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict rendered.’” Quoting Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706 . 1Spates does not challenge whether the district court applied the weight-of-the- evidence standard. 6 Spates argues his case warrants a new trial because much of the incriminating evidence against him came from the driver of the Tahoe, Williamson.

2015Our supreme court has recognized “counsels’ submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law can be extremely valuable in assisting the district court, especially in highly technical or complicated cases.” See id.

1980MRM, 290 N.W.2d at 344 ; Knight, 269 N.W.2d at 432.

1970We agree with the court, after upholding a two-thirds requirement under the traditional requirement, when it said in Brenner v. School District of Kansas City, 315 F.Supp. 627, 642 (three-judge court): “If that requirement is subject to a more exacting standard, we find and conclude that it is justified to meet a legitimate and compelling State need.” We think both .rational and compelling bases exist for the requirement that the outcome of bond elections “ ‘rest on widespread consent rather than teetering on the knife-edge of a transient 51 per cent.’” Bogcrt v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515, 524 , 46

1970We agree with the court, after upholding a two-thirds requirement under the traditional requirement, when it said in Brenner v. School District of Kansas City, 315 F.Supp. 627, 642 (three-judge court): “If that requirement is subject to a more exacting standard, we find and conclude that it is justified to meet a legitimate and compelling State need.” We think both .rational and compelling bases exist for the requirement that the outcome of bond elections “ ‘rest on widespread consent rather than teetering on the knife-edge of a transient 51 per cent.’” Bogcrt v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515, 524 , 46

1970The traditional standard was held to be applicable in McDonald because (1) ‘the distinctions * * * are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race’ and (2) because ‘there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellant’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.’ The Court stated that ‘It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’ “The traditional standard applied in McDonald , was based on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Kotch v. Board o

1970The traditional standard was held to be applicable in McDonald because (1) ‘the distinctions * * * are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race’ and (2) because ‘there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellant’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.’ The Court stated that ‘It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’ “The traditional standard applied in McDonald , was based on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Kotch v. Board o

1970The traditional standard was held to be applicable in McDonald because (1) ‘the distinctions * * * are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race’ and (2) because ‘there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellant’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.’ The Court stated that ‘It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’ “The traditional standard applied in McDonald , was based on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Kotch v. Board o

1970The traditional standard was held to be applicable in McDonald because (1) ‘the distinctions * * * are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race’ and (2) because ‘there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellant’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.’ The Court stated that ‘It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’ “The traditional standard applied in McDonald , was based on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Kotch v. Board o

1970The traditional standard was held to be applicable in McDonald because (1) ‘the distinctions * * * are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race’ and (2) because ‘there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellant’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.’ The Court stated that ‘It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’ “The traditional standard applied in McDonald , was based on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Kotch v. Board o

1970The traditional standard was held to be applicable in McDonald because (1) ‘the distinctions * * * are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race’ and (2) because ‘there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellant’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.’ The Court stated that ‘It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’ “The traditional standard applied in McDonald , was based on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Kotch v. Board o

1970McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 806 , 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 22 L.Ed.2d 739 , (1969), teaches that, as a point of beginning, ‘we must determine initially how stringent a standard to use in evaluating the classifications made [by the State law under attack] and whether the distinctions must be justified by a compelling State interest, * * *.’ In many cases which involved particular facets of the fundamental right of suf frage, the Court has applied a stringent and exacting standard.

1970McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 806 , 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1407 , 22 L.Ed.2d 739 , (1969), teaches that, as a point of beginning, ‘we must determine initially how stringent a standard to use in evaluating the classifications made [by the State law under attack] and whether the distinctions must be justified by a compelling State interest, * * *.’ In many cases which involved particular facets of the fundamental right of suf frage, the Court has applied a stringent and exacting standard.