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5 Hawaii opinions name it 1 courts 1964–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Watson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020However, the Winfield II court specifically stated, “To the extent our decisions in Brown [v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093 (D.C. 1979)], Beale, and later cases, e.g., Watson v. United States, 612 A.2d 179, 182 (D.C. 1992), impose a more exacting standard of relevance [than FRE 401], we disavow them.” Winfield II, 676 A.2d at 5 . 23 The Denny “legitimate tendency” test requires third-party culpability evidence to show three prongs: (1) motive, (2) opportunity, and (3) a direct connection to the crime. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 345364green2 sentences2000To be valid, a fee need only bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of the services rendered by the agency." National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1094 , 1108 (D.C.Cir.1976) (emphasis in original). 2000To be valid, a fee need only bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of the services rendered by the agency.” National Cable Television Ass’n v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1094, 1108 (D.C.Cir.1976) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Masaki v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences1996In so holding, we noted that "[t]he purpose of fixing a particular standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication[,]" id. at 13 , 780 P.2d at 574 (citation omitted), and that the clear and convincing evidence standard has been recognized as "a more exacting standard [that] has been applied to a wide variety of civil cases where for policy reasons the courts require a higher than ordinary degree of certitude before making factual finding 1996In so holding, we noted that "[t]he purpose of fixing a particular standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication[,]" id. at 13 , 780 P.2d at 574 (citation omitted), and that the clear and convincing evidence standard has been recognized as "a more exacting standard [that] has been applied to a wide variety of civil cases where for policy reasons the courts require a higher than ordinary degree of certitude before making factual finding | 1 | 1 |
Rushing v. Lynchgreen2 sentences1964We deem it unnecessary to consider whether positive damage to the public would ensue should declaratory relief be granted, our position being rather that the case falls into the category where, as stated in Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, supra, 40 Haw. at 685, quoting from Rushing v. Lynch, 22 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. 1964We deem it unnecessary to consider whether positive damage to the public would ensue should declaratory relief be granted, our position being rather that the case falls into the category where, as stated in Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, supra, 40 Haw. at 685, quoting from Rushing v. Lynch, 22 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Winfield v. United States
green
1 sentence2020However, the Winfield II court specifically stated, “To the extent our decisions in Brown [v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093 (D.C. 1979)], Beale, and later cases, e.g., Watson v. United States, 612 A.2d 179, 182 (D.C. 1992), impose a more exacting standard of relevance [than FRE 401], we disavow them.” Winfield II, 676 A.2d at 5 . 23 The Denny “legitimate tendency” test requires third-party culpability evidence to show three prongs: (1) motive, (2) opportunity, and (3) a direct connection to the crime. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brown v. United States
green
1 sentence2020However, the Winfield II court specifically stated, “To the extent our decisions in Brown [v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093 (D.C. 1979)], Beale, and later cases, e.g., Watson v. United States, 612 A.2d 179, 182 (D.C. 1992), impose a more exacting standard of relevance [than FRE 401], we disavow them.” Winfield II, 676 A.2d at 5 . 23 The Denny “legitimate tendency” test requires third-party culpability evidence to show three prongs: (1) motive, (2) opportunity, and (3) a direct connection to the crime. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. General Grant Wilson
green
2 sentences2020Wilson, 864 N.W.2d at 64-67 . 31 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** multitude of fact situations in which the Denny test may be employed.” Id. 2020Wilson, 864 N.W.2d at 64-67 . 31 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** multitude of fact situations in which the Denny test may be employed.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Henry Selva
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 1306 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.