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8 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Commissionergreen2 sentences1994State Highway Commissioner, 413 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D.1987). 1994State Highway Commissioner, 413 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D.1987). | 2 | 2 |
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Caseyred2 sentences2014The United States Supreme Court recognized as much in Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, 871-72 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , when it said “abortion is a unique act” and described the practical difficulties in applying the exacting standard of strict scrutiny to abortion regulations because of a state’s important and legitimate interests in a woman’s health and in potential life. [¶ 82] I acknowledge that some state courts have recognized a woman’s fundamental state constitutional liberty or privacy right to terminate a pregnancy, which is subject to judicial review under strict scrutiny. 2014The United States Supreme Court recognized as much in Casey, 505 U.S. at 852, 871-72 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , when it said “abortion is a unique act” and described the practical difficulties in applying the exacting standard of strict scrutiny to abortion regulations because of a state’s important and legitimate interests in a woman’s health and in potential life. [¶ 82] I acknowledge that some state courts have recognized a woman’s fundamental state constitutional liberty or privacy right to terminate a pregnancy, which is subject to judicial review under strict scrutiny. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Placekgreen1 sentence1987"A peace officer may stop a motorist under circumstances short of probable cause for arrest." Syllabus ¶ 2, Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D.1969). "[A]n officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating the law in order to legally stop a vehicle” [State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.D.1986) ], which is a less exacting standard than probable cause. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Interest of Kupperion
green
2 sentences1991Drawing on a view expressed in a special concurrence and dissent in In the Interest of Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D.1983), he suggests that the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard for appellate review of findings of fact is inconsistent with the ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof in the trial court for mental health commitment cases. 1991Drawing on a view expressed in a special concurrence and dissent in In the Interest of Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D.1983), he suggests that the `clearly erroneous' standard for appellate review of findings of fact is inconsistent with the `clear and convincing' standard of proof in the trial court for mental health commitment cases. | 2 | 1986–1991 |
City of Minot v. Nelson
green
1 sentence2005The information obtained from an anonymous informant and used for an investigative stop “must be sufficiently reliable to support a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, though not the more exacting standard of probable cause necessary to make an arrest.” Id. [¶ 17] In the case at bar, Chief Kluth received information from two local citizens about a car leaving the Cenex station after being approached by the two citizen's. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Borman v. Tschida
green
1 sentence1987"A peace officer may stop a motorist under circumstances short of probable cause for arrest." Syllabus ¶ 2, Borman v. Tschida, 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D.1969). "[A]n officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating the law in order to legally stop a vehicle” [State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.D.1986) ], which is a less exacting standard than probable cause. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. VandeHoven
green
1 sentence1987State v. Vande-Hoven, supra, 388 N.W.2d at 858 n. 1. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence1987In Olson v. Com'r of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1985), an anonymous informant reported a possible drunken driver, describing the car and its location. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.