exacting standard in Florida

2008Error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be "fundamental" is subject to review in accord with State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986) (discussing the harmless error test). [7] Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Fla. 2002) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991)).

2005Error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be "fundamental" is subject to review in accord with State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986) (discussing the harmless error test).

2008Error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be "fundamental" is subject to review in accord with State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986) (discussing the harmless error test). [7] Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Fla. 2002) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991)).

2005Compare Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 311 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (holding that the admission of a coerced confession is “trial error” which is “similar in both degree and Mnd to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence,” and is subject to the harmless error rule); Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla.2002) (clarifying that error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be “fundamental” is subject to harmful error review).

2019Owners Coal., LLC, 95 So. 3d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (denying certiorari petition because "[t]he Town ha[d] not met this exacting standard"); Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So. 3d 627, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court established an exacting standard for certiorari review, always requiring irreparable harm to the petitioner.").

2017Owners Coal., LLC, 95 So.3d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (denying certiorari petition because “[t]he Town ha[d] not met this exacting standard”).

2019Owners Coal., LLC, 95 So. 3d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (denying certiorari petition because "[t]he Town ha[d] not met this exacting standard"); Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So. 3d 627, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court established an exacting standard for certiorari review, always requiring irreparable harm to the petitioner.").

2017See, e.g., Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So.3d 627, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court established an exacting standard for certiorari review, always requiring irreparable harm to the petitioner.”); Town of Longboat Key v. Islandside Prop.

2004See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).

2004See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S.Ct. 1439 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).

1992See generally, In the Interest of R.W., 495 So.2d 133 (Fla.1986); cf., Clark v. State, 395 So.2d 525 (Fla.1981) (applying a relaxed standard to a penal statute prohibiting the introduction of contraband into prisons, but noting the adequacy of the guidelines because the legislature specifically outlined what shall constitute contraband).

1992See generally, In the Interest of R.W., 495 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1986); cf., Clark v. State, 395 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1981) (applying a relaxed standard to a penal statute prohibiting the introduction of contraband into prisons, but noting the adequacy of the guidelines because the legislature specifically outlined what shall constitute contraband).

2005Compare Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 311 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (holding that the admission of a coerced confession is “trial error” which is “similar in both degree and Mnd to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence,” and is subject to the harmless error rule); Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla.2002) (clarifying that error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be “fundamental” is subject to harmful error review).

2005Compare Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 311 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (holding that the admission of a coerced confession is “trial error” which is “similar in both degree and Mnd to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence,” and is subject to the harmless error rule); Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla.2002) (clarifying that error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be “fundamental” is subject to harmful error review).

2014Other appellate opinions have loosely said that “the parties to a contract may modify the written agreement by subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing with one another despite the requirement of a writing in order to modify.” Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So.2d 342, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); White v. Ocean Bay Marina, Inc., 778 So.2d 412, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Crosslands Props., Inc. v. Univest Crossland Trace, Ltd., 516 So.2d 320 , 322 *995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

2014Other appellate opinions have loosely said that “the parties to a contract may modify the written agreement by subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing with one another despite the requirement of a writing in order to modify.” Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So.2d 342, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); White v. Ocean Bay Marina, Inc., 778 So.2d 412, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Crosslands Props., Inc. v. Univest Crossland Trace, Ltd., 516 So.2d 320 , 322 *995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

2014Other appellate opinions have loosely said that “the parties to a contract may modify the written agreement by subsequent oral agreement or course of dealing with one another despite the requirement of a writing in order to modify.” Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So.2d 342, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); White v. Ocean Bay Marina, Inc., 778 So.2d 412, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Crosslands Props., Inc. v. Univest Crossland Trace, Ltd., 516 So.2d 320 , 322 *995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

2010See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ("We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”) (emphasis supplied); Collins v. State, 4 So.3d 1249, 1250-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("Police are not required to stop a custodial interrogation when a suspect, who has waived his Miranda rights, makes an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel.

2010See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ("We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”) (emphasis supplied); Collins v. State, 4 So.3d 1249, 1250-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("Police are not required to stop a custodial interrogation when a suspect, who has waived his Miranda rights, makes an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel.

2010See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ("We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”) (emphasis supplied); Collins v. State, 4 So.3d 1249, 1250-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("Police are not required to stop a custodial interrogation when a suspect, who has waived his Miranda rights, makes an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel.

2008Error which does not meet the exacting standard so as to be "fundamental" is subject to review in accord with State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986) (discussing the harmless error test). [7] Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Fla. 2002) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991)).

2006See Hadley v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 472 , 910 S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of rape and incest); Louisiana v. Zeringue, 862 So.2d 186, 192-93 (La.Ct.App.2003)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of carnal knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 441 Pa.Super. 320 , 657 A.2d 946, 947 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of corruption of minors); Houston v. Alabama, 565 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of felony sexual abuse).

2006See Hadley v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 472 , 910 S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of rape and incest); Louisiana v. Zeringue, 862 So.2d 186, 192-93 (La.Ct.App.2003)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of carnal knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 441 Pa.Super. 320 , 657 A.2d 946, 947 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of corruption of minors); Houston v. Alabama, 565 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of felony sexual abuse).

2006See Hadley v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 472 , 910 S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of rape and incest); Louisiana v. Zeringue, 862 So.2d 186, 192-93 (La.Ct.App.2003)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of carnal knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 441 Pa.Super. 320 , 657 A.2d 946, 947 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of corruption of minors); Houston v. Alabama, 565 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of felony sexual abuse).

2006See Hadley v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 472 , 910 S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of rape and incest); Louisiana v. Zeringue, 862 So.2d 186, 192-93 (La.Ct.App.2003)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of carnal knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 441 Pa.Super. 320 , 657 A.2d 946, 947 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of corruption of minors); Houston v. Alabama, 565 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of felony sexual abuse).

2006See Hadley v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 472 , 910 S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of rape and incest); Louisiana v. Zeringue, 862 So.2d 186, 192-93 (La.Ct.App.2003)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of carnal knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 441 Pa.Super. 320 , 657 A.2d 946, 947 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of corruption of minors); Houston v. Alabama, 565 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of felony sexual abuse).

2006See Hadley v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 472 , 910 S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of rape and incest); Louisiana v. Zeringue, 862 So.2d 186, 192-93 (La.Ct.App.2003)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of carnal knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 441 Pa.Super. 320 , 657 A.2d 946, 947 (1995)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of corruption of minors); Houston v. Alabama, 565 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(permitting circumstantial evidence of age in a case of felony sexual abuse).

2006Id. at 31 ; see also Martinez v. State, 842 So.2d 900, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (concluding that motion filed "quickly" after INS notice to appear in deportation proceedings, but nine years after plea, "cannot be ruled untimely on its face"). *215 Even under the Fourth District's less exacting standard for establishing a threatened deportation in this case, "timely" motions alleging a rule 3.172(c)(8) violation can be filed many years after the plea.

2003See Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla.1994) ("As evidenced by the number and breadth of the statutes concerning minors and sexual exploitation, the Florida Legislature has established an unquestionably strong policy interest in protecting minors from harmful sexual conduct."); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381, 1386 (Fla.1998) ("[O]ur reasoning in Jones is equally applicable here in recognizing the State's compelling interest in protecting twelve-year-olds from older teenagers and from their own immaturity in choosing to participate in harmful activity.").

2003See Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla.1994) ("As evidenced by the number and breadth of the statutes concerning minors and sexual exploitation, the Florida Legislature has established an unquestionably strong policy interest in protecting minors from harmful sexual conduct."); J.A.S. v. State, 705 So.2d 1381, 1386 (Fla.1998) ("[O]ur reasoning in Jones is equally applicable here in recognizing the State's compelling interest in protecting twelve-year-olds from older teenagers and from their own immaturity in choosing to participate in harmful activity.").