exacting standard in Kentucky

2024Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?’” Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7 (quoting James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002)).

2022ANALYSIS Motions to dismiss are governed by Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02. “‘[T]he pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true.’ This exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the trial court to make findings of fact[.]” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnotes omitted).

2025Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” Id. (quoting James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002)).

2024Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?’” Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7 (quoting James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002)).

2024As Colorado’s highest court succinctly stated, “[I]n light of the automobile exception, which already provides an exception to the warrant requirement whenever police have probable cause to believe an automobile contains evidence of a crime, . . . a requirement of probable cause in this context would render the entire second prong of the Gant search-incident-to-arrest exception superfluous.” Colorado v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Colo. 2010) (citation omitted).

2022The motion should only be granted if “it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved[.]” Unifund CCR Partners v. Harrell, 509 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Ky. 2017) (citations omitted). “[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.” Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7 (citations omitted). -3- I.

2020This exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the trial court to make findings of fact; rather, the question is purely a matter of law.” Brown-Forman Corp. v. Miller, 528 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Ky. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Because the issue was not preserved at trial, Appellant seeks palpable error review under RCr 10.26. 3 In Young v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.3d 577, 584 (Ky. 2014), we articulated this exacting standard for correcting palpable error on appeal under RCr 10.26: For error to be palpable, “it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).

2017The rule’s requirement of manifest injustice requires “showing ... [a] probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).

2017Because the issue was not preserved at trial, Appellant seeks palpable error review under RCr 10.26. 3 In Young v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.3d 577, 584 (Ky. 2014), we articulated this exacting standard for correcting palpable error on appeal under RCr 10.26: For error to be palpable, “it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).