exacting standard in California

2025We acknowledge that James F. did not specify whether “the question of prejudice should be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice.” (In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67 , 82, fn. 10, citing James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911, fn. 1 [declining to address precise harmless error standard]

2025(James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 904-905, 915.) Although James F. did not specify the precise harmless error standard that applies (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911, fn. 1 ), given parents’ important fundamental rights to the companionship, custody and care of their children, which are at stake in a dependency proceeding, we apply the more exacting standard here.

2025(See James F., at p. 916; Esmeralda S., at p. 94 [asking whether competent parent’s “parental rights would likely have been terminated” despite due process violation].) James F. also did not specify whether “the question of prejudice should be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice.” (In re S

2025We acknowledge that James F. did not specify whether “the question of prejudice should be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice.” (In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67 , 82, fn. 10, citing James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911, fn. 1 [declining to address precise harmless error standard]

2025(See James F., at p. 916; Esmeralda S., at p. 94 [asking whether competent parent’s “parental rights would likely have been terminated” despite due process violation].) James F. also did not specify whether “the question of prejudice should be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice.” (In re S

2025We acknowledge that James F. did not specify whether “the question of prejudice should be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice.” (In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67 , 82, fn. 10, citing James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911, fn. 1 [declining to address precise harmless error standard]

1980However, the California Supreme Court has announced in People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ], and cases cited therein, that article I, section 13, of the California Constitution requires a more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.

1980However, the California Supreme Court has announced in People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ], and cases cited therein, that article I, section 13, of the California Constitution requires a more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.

2026(See Packingham, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [“Even making the assumption that the statute is . . . subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision cannot stand”]; McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) 572 U.S. 185, 199 , plur. opn. of Roberts, C.

2025(See Packingham, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [“Even making the assumption that the statute is . . . subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision cannot stand”]; McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) 572 U.S. 185, 199 , plur. opn. of Roberts, C.

2023(Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321 , citing CEQA Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (c)(5).) Instead, under . . . section 21094, the agency is required to apply a more exacting standard to determine whether the later project might cause significant environmental effects that were not fully examined in the initial program EIR.” (Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937, 960 (San Mateo Gardens).) “ ‘The standard for determining whether to engage in additional CEQA review for subsequent projects under a tiered EIR is more relaxed

2023Where “a later proposal is not ‘either 43 the same as or within the scope of the project . . . described in the program EIR,’ then review of the proposal is not governed by section 21166’s deferential substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Instead, under . . . section 21094, the agency is required to apply a more exacting standard to determine whether the later project might cause significant environmental effects that were not fully examined in the initial program EIR.” (San Mateo Gardens, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 960 citing Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321 ; CEQA Guidelines, §

2015The commonsense exemption is available only when the agency, based on the record evidence, meets its burden of demonstrating “with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3), italics added; see Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 386-387 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 , 160 P.3d 116 ].) This exacting requirement exceeds an agency’s obligation under section 15300.2(c), before applying a categorical exemption, to consider the evidence in its files and pr

2015The commonsense exemption is available only when the agency, based on the record evidence, meets its burden of demonstrating “with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3), italics added; see Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 386-387 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 , 160 P.3d 116 ].) This exacting requirement exceeds an agency’s obligation under section 15300.2(c), before applying a categorical exemption, to consider the evidence in its files and pr

2011First, in Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 162 , the United States Supreme Court reversed People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 ], in which we confirmed that the relevant California standard—even if it sometimes had been expressed as a "`reasonable inference'" ( People v. Johnson, at pp. 1312-1313)—was to show that it was "more likely than not" that purposeful discrimination had occurred. ( Id. at p. 1318.) The high court disapproved this exacting standard for federal constitutional purposes, and said that a prima facie burden simply involves "producing

2011First, in Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 162 , the United States Supreme Court reversed People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 ], in which we confirmed that the relevant California standard—even if it sometimes had been expressed as a "`reasonable inference'" ( People v. Johnson, at pp. 1312-1313)—was to show that it was "more likely than not" that purposeful discrimination had occurred. ( Id. at p. 1318.) The high court disapproved this exacting standard for federal constitutional purposes, and said that a prima facie burden simply involves "producing

2025(See e.g., Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 673 [applying federal constitutional standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) Various factors may render harmless any error in the procedures used to appoint a guardian ad litem in the dependency context even without a supportable incompetence finding.

2021(See James F., at p. 911, fn. 1 [“[b]ecause we did not grant review on the appropriate harmless error standard and the parties have not briefed it, we do not address that issue here”].) While we are inclined to agree with those appellate courts that have found the Chapman standard appropriate for the due process violation at issue (see In re Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 914 [due process violation in appointing guardian ad litem held harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt”]; In re Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 674 [due process violation in appointing guardian ad litem reversible

2021In their written opposition to the motion to suppress, the People presented three, briefly stated arguments: (1) the smell of marijuana raised a reasonable suspicion that minor had used marijuana recently;4 (2) the search was permissible under Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , which imposes a more exacting standard than that applicable to searches by school officials; and (3) minor was on probation and subject to a warrantless search condition.5 In their oral argument to the court, the People argued primarily that the search was permissible under Terry because Aguilar suspected minor had a wea

1978Here, although it was defendant’s alighting from the car which exposed the purse, the purpose of the order to get out of the car was a pat-down. 4 Second, at this point we simply do not know whether Mimms will be held to accord with “article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, which requires a more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.” (People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ].) Nevertheless, looking at the totality of the situation, we have no doubt that the limited intrusion of a pat-down met the standards of Terry v. O

2011(People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1092 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651 , 189 P.3d 911 ].) In my view, the extreme emotional nature of the letter makes it reasonably possible that the improper argument tipped the balance.

2011Dr. Missett tempered his opinion that antisocial personality disorder was “the best description” of defendant with the proviso that 24 We applied the higher “reasonable possibility” standard in People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pages 1087 through 1088 because the error in that case occurred at the penalty phase of a capital trial when the more exacting standard applies. 100 he had not personally examined him, and he did not suggest the fact that defendant refused to be interviewed had any bearing on his diagnosis.

2011Here, as elsewhere, the "`absolute size of th[e] sample'" undergoing such scrutiny is "`small.'" ( People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 342-343 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 160 P.3d 84 ] ( Bonilla ), quoting People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597-598 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 , 151 P.3d 292 ].) While no prospective juror may be struck on improper grounds, we have found it "`impossible,'" as a practical matter, to draw the requisite inference where only a few members of a cognizable group have been excused and no indelible pattern of discrimination appears. ( Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 342-3

2008In Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. *1293 162, the United States Supreme Court reversed People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 ], in which we confirmed that the relevant California standard—even if it sometimes had been expressed as a "`reasonable inference'" ( People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1312 )— was to show that it was "more likely than not" that purposeful discrimination had occurred. ( Id. at p. 1318.) The high court has since disapproved this exacting standard for federal constitutional purposes, and has said that a prima facie burden

2023(Beeman, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 352 ; see McDonough v. Goodcell, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 743 .) Assuming that section 2076 restricts the protected speech rights of bail bond agents, it is not the type of restriction 22 PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. that warrants the most exacting standard of constitutional review.15 Martinez resists this conclusion.

2023Appellant filed an ex parte application for a continuance on January 12, 2022, which was denied by the presiding judge. 2 Under section 437c(h), “ ‘The nonmoving party seeking a continuance “must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ Generally speaking, the party seeking the continuance must ‘provide supporting affidavits or declarations detailing facts that would establish the existence of controverting evid

2022Wallace [and Krebs], because the error in th[ose] case[s] occurred at the penalty phase of a capital trial when the more exacting standard applies.” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 941, fn. 24 .) 39 PEOPLE v. CAMACHO Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C.