11 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mumm v. Mornsongreen2 sentences2025But “[o]nly the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 487 ; see also Hill, 871 N.W.2d at 906 (explaining that acts satisfying the “shocks-the-conscience standard . . . often evince[e] deliberate and unjustifiable injurious intent” (quotations omitted)); Northpointe Plaza v. City of 20 Rochester, 465 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1991) (observing that “the theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases” (quotation omitted)). 2024“Only the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
State of Minnesota v. Richard Ellis Hillgreen1 sentence2025But “[o]nly the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 487 ; see also Hill, 871 N.W.2d at 906 (explaining that acts satisfying the “shocks-the-conscience standard . . . often evince[e] deliberate and unjustifiable injurious intent” (quotations omitted)); Northpointe Plaza v. City of 20 Rochester, 465 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1991) (observing that “the theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Northpointe Plaza v. City of Rochestergreen1 sentence2025But “[o]nly the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 487 ; see also Hill, 871 N.W.2d at 906 (explaining that acts satisfying the “shocks-the-conscience standard . . . often evince[e] deliberate and unjustifiable injurious intent” (quotations omitted)); Northpointe Plaza v. City of 20 Rochester, 465 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1991) (observing that “the theory of substantive due process is properly reserved for truly egregious and extraordinary cases” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence2024We conclude that a new trial is warranted under this exacting standard. “[I]n rare cases, [] the cumulative effect of trial errors can deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.” State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 538 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted) (involving unobjected-to errors). | 1 | 1 |
R. A. v. v. City of St. Paulgreen2 sentences2010See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 , 112 S.Ct. at 2549-50 ; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that compelling governmental interest is an interest “of the highest order” (quotation omitted)). 2010See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 , 112 S.Ct. at 2549-50 ; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that compelling governmental interest is an interest “of the highest order” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Whitegreen1 sentence2010See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 , 112 S.Ct. at 2549-50 ; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that compelling governmental interest is an interest “of the highest order” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Alameda Books, Inc., a California Corporation Highland Books, Inc., a California Corporation v. City of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2000See Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 2000) (1977 study finding that concentration of adult uses causes secondary effects does not justify ordinance prohibiting multiple adult uses in one building). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nichols v. State
green
1 sentence2024Section 645.27 was enacted in 1941 4 to provide a “framework for interpreting whether a separate statutory provision waives sovereign immunity.” Nichols, 858 N.W.2d at 776 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
green
2 sentences2012Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, on the other hand, are subject to a less exacting standard of review: ‘‘[Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions] are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). . 2012Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, on the other hand, are subject to a less exacting standard of review: ‘‘[Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions] are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bowers v. Hardwick
red
2 sentences1999Under this less exacting standard, “substantive due process requires only that the legislative enactments not be arbitrary or capricious or, stated another way, that they be a reasonable means to a permissive object.” Id. (explaining the rational basis standard of review). 1999Under this less exacting standard, "substantive due process requires only that the legislative enactments not be arbitrary or capricious or, stated another way, that they be a reasonable means to a permissive object." Id. (explaining the rational basis standard of review). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255-58 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). 1986City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255-58 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Cipriano v. City of Houma
green
2 sentences1972Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” The court went on to recognize that in some situations the state might limit the franchise to those “primarily interested” or “primarily affected,” but concluded that in the case before it the statute did not “meet the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise.” A similar result 1972Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” The court went on to recognize that in some situations the state might limit the franchise to those “primarily interested” or “primarily affected,” but concluded that in the case before it the statute did not “meet the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise.” A similar result | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.