exacting standard in Arizona

2020See, e.g., Holle, 240 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 47 (reiterating that courts may not rewrite a statute to avoid an alleged constitutional flaw). ¶10 A party raising a facial challenge to a statute “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 , 418 (2015) (“Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash.

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2020Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ; State v. Hazlett, 205 Ariz. 523 , 527 ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (“[A] state can penalize conduct relating to [nude images of children] without meeting the more exacting standard for obscenity because the material involves actual children actually participating in the acts depicted.

2020Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ; State v. Hazlett, 205 Ariz. 523 , 527 ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (“[A] state can penalize conduct relating to [nude images of children] without meeting the more exacting standard for obscenity because the material involves actual children actually participating in the acts depicted.

2020See, e.g., Holle, 240 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 47 (reiterating that courts may not rewrite a statute to avoid an alleged constitutional flaw). ¶10 A party raising a facial challenge to a statute “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 , 418 (2015) (“Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash.

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2020See, e.g., Holle, 240 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 47 (reiterating that courts may not rewrite a statute to avoid an alleged constitutional flaw). ¶10 A party raising a facial challenge to a statute “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 , 418 (2015) (“Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash.

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2022Person, 467 F.3d at 143–44; Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618; Prete, 438 F.3d at 969–71; Pierce, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.3 Although the statutory wording in each case generally aligned with § 19-118.01, the reviewing courts made it clear they were analyzing the respective statutes with the understanding that they precluded “per signature payments.” Person, 467 F.3d at 143 (finding “insufficient support for a claim that the ban on per- signature payment is akin to the complete prohibition on paying petition circulators”); Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618 (noting the state presented sufficient evidence to justify

2022Person, 467 F.3d at 143–44; Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618; Prete, 438 F.3d at 969–71; Pierce, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.3 Although the statutory wording in each case generally aligned with § 19-118.01, the reviewing courts made it clear they were analyzing the respective statutes with the understanding that they precluded “per signature payments.” Person, 467 F.3d at 143 (finding “insufficient support for a claim that the ban on per- signature payment is akin to the complete prohibition on paying petition circulators”); Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618 (noting the state presented sufficient evidence to justify

2022See id. (emphasis added).

2022See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426 (rejecting the state’s argument that circulator compensation may lead to fraud, where no evidence was “offered to support that speculation”).

2022Person, 467 F.3d at 143–44; Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618; Prete, 438 F.3d at 969–71; Pierce, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.3 Although the statutory wording in each case generally aligned with § 19-118.01, the reviewing courts made it clear they were analyzing the respective statutes with the understanding that they precluded “per signature payments.” Person, 467 F.3d at 143 (finding “insufficient support for a claim that the ban on per- signature payment is akin to the complete prohibition on paying petition circulators”); Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618 (noting the state presented sufficient evidence to justify

2022Person, 467 F.3d at 143–44; Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618; Prete, 438 F.3d at 969–71; Pierce, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.3 Although the statutory wording in each case generally aligned with § 19-118.01, the reviewing courts made it clear they were analyzing the respective statutes with the understanding that they precluded “per signature payments.” Person, 467 F.3d at 143 (finding “insufficient support for a claim that the ban on per- signature payment is akin to the complete prohibition on paying petition circulators”); Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618 (noting the state presented sufficient evidence to justify

2020See, e.g., Holle, 240 Ariz. at 310 ¶ 47 (reiterating that courts may not rewrite a statute to avoid an alleged constitutional flaw). ¶10 A party raising a facial challenge to a statute “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 , 418 (2015) (“Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash.

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2018See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442 , 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 , 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is u

2017See also State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 236 , 242, ¶ 26, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (“ ‘[Ajlong the spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial and which vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny,’ the failure of a prosecutor to discover and disclose evidence requires an exacting inquiry.

2014As McDonald specifically requested the trial court provide the jury with the alleged erroneous instruction, he invited any error that may have arisen and “waived his right to challenge the instructions on appeal.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 225, ¶ 137 , 141 P.3d 368, 400 (2006); see Lucero, 223 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 20 , 220 P.3d at 256 (“[A] party invites an erroneous jury instruction by expressly requesting it.”).

2014As McDonald specifically requested the trial court provide the jury with the alleged erroneous instruction, he invited any error that may have arisen and “waived his right to challenge the instructions on appeal.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 225, ¶ 137 , 141 P.3d 368, 400 (2006); see Lucero, 223 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 20 , 220 P.3d at 256 (“[A] party invites an erroneous jury instruction by expressly requesting it.”).

2014As McDonald specifically requested the trial court provide the jury with the alleged erroneous instruction, he invited any error that may have arisen and “waived his right to challenge the instructions on appeal.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 225, ¶ 137 , 141 P.3d 368, 400 (2006); see Lucero, 223 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 20 , 220 P.3d at 256 (“[A] party invites an erroneous jury instruction by expressly requesting it.”).

2014As McDonald specifically requested the trial court provide the jury with the alleged erroneous instruction, he invited any error that may have arisen and “waived his right to challenge the instructions on appeal.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 225, ¶ 137 , 141 P.3d 368, 400 (2006); see Lucero, 223 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 20 , 220 P.3d at 256 (“[A] party invites an erroneous jury instruction by expressly requesting it.”).

2005The referendum power is subject to this exacting standard because it “permits a ‘minority to hold up the effective date of legislation which may well represent the wishes of the majority[.]’ ” Id. at 429, 814 P.2d at 770 (quoting Cottonwood, 134 Ariz. at 49 , 653 P.2d at 697 ). ¶ 13 In contrast, “requirements as to the form and manner in which citizens exercise their power of initiative should be liberally construed.” Kromko v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 51, 57-58 , 811 P.2d 12,18-19 (1991).

2005The referendum power is subject to this exacting standard because it “permits a ‘minority to hold up the effective date of legislation which may well represent the wishes of the majority[.]’ ” Id. at 429, 814 P.2d at 770 (quoting Cottonwood, 134 Ariz. at 49 , 653 P.2d at 697 ). ¶ 13 In contrast, “requirements as to the form and manner in which citizens exercise their power of initiative should be liberally construed.” Kromko v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 51, 57-58 , 811 P.2d 12,18-19 (1991).

2005This is because “courts must exercise restraint before imposing unreasonable restrictions on the people’s legislative authority, which ‘is as great as the power of the legislature to legislate.’ ” Id. at 57 , 811 P.2d at 18 (quoting State v. Osborn, 16 Ariz. 247, 250 , 143 P. 117, 118 (1914)).

2005This is because “courts must exercise restraint before imposing unreasonable restrictions on the people’s legislative authority, which ‘is as great as the power of the legislature to legislate.’ ” Id. at 57 , 811 P.2d at 18 (quoting State v. Osborn, 16 Ariz. 247, 250 , 143 P. 117, 118 (1914)).