exacting standard in Illinois

2014“In sum, ‘[r]easonable suspicion is a less exacting standard than probable cause.’ ” Daniel, 2013 IL App (1st) 111876, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Ward, 371 Ill.

2013In sum, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less exacting standard than probable cause.” People v. Ward, 371 Ill.

2021People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 30 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 ); cf. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 29-31 (holding that the petitioner’s claim warranted further proceedings where he submitted an affidavit supporting his claim that, although he was a young adult, his brain lacked mature development).

2021People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 30 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 ); cf. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 29-31 (holding that the petitioner’s claim warranted further proceedings where he submitted an affidavit supporting his claim that, although he was a young adult, his brain lacked mature development).

2024In a rescission hearing, “the motorist may challenge the propriety of the traffic stop leading to his or her DUI arrest.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Araiza, 2020 IL App (3d) 170735, ¶ 15 . ¶ 26 The Illinois Supreme Court has given the following guidance on the constitutionality of traffic stops: “Vehicle stops are subject to the fourth amendment’s reasonableness requirement. [Citations.] As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. [Citation.] However, as this court has observed, th

2022“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20 , 971 N.E.2d 1058, 1063-64 . “[Al]though traffic stops are frequently supported by probable cause ***, the less exacting standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion that justifies an investigative stop *** will suffice for purposes of the fourth amendment - 15 - irrespective of whether the stop is supported by probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.

2021People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 30 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 ); cf. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 29-31 (holding that the petitioner’s claim warranted further proceedings where he submitted an affidavit supporting his claim that, although he was a young adult, his brain lacked mature development).

2021People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 30 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 ); cf. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 29-31 (holding that the petitioner’s claim warranted further proceedings where he submitted an affidavit supporting his claim that, although he was a young adult, his brain lacked mature development).

2015See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005); People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 28 ("[A] traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause."). 8 multiple breaches of the fog line were justifiable under the improper lane usage statute.

2015See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005); People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 28 ("[A] traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause."). 8 multiple breaches of the fog line were justifiable under the improper lane usage statute.

2022Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 26-27 (the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive postconviction petition involves a higher standard than the first-stage frivolous or patently without merit standard that is set forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act). ¶ 45 To the extent that Williams relies on People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541 , and People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534 , we find those cases to be unpersuasive.

2020See id. ¶ 41 We note, briefly, defendant submitted a motion to cite People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534 .

2018Id. at 1048 . ¶ 18 A Terry stop can be based on information received from an informant (People v. Linley, 388 Ill.

2018Id. at 1048, 311 Ill.Dec. 359 , 868 N.E.2d 359 . ¶ 18 A Terry stop can be based on information received from an informant ( People v. Linley , 388 Ill.

2024(Also see People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008) (the cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the test to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction petition).) Here, the defendant received a discretionary sentence which he seeks to challenge in a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism for defendants to raise claims of violations of their constitutional rights.

2022Although the defendant correctly asserts that satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice test necessary to support a successive postconviction is a more exacting standard than the “gist standard” applicable to the review of initial postconviction petitions (see People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008)), we are at a loss to understand how the distinction in standards would alter the supreme court’s determination that a sentence pursuant to which a defendant has the opportunity to obtain release after serving less than 40 years’ incarceration is not a de facto life sentence. ¶ 26 Miller and it

2022“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20 , 971 N.E.2d 1058, 1063-64 . “[Al]though traffic stops are frequently supported by probable cause ***, the less exacting standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion that justifies an investigative stop *** will suffice for purposes of the fourth amendment - 15 - irrespective of whether the stop is supported by probable cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.

2022A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop when he “can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Id. (citing Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 505 ). ¶ 54 2.

2016Quoting Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), the State relies on the long-accepted principle that a statute is facially unconstitutional “only if ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’ ” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) The State’s argument, however, is misplaced. ¶ 27 In Patel, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 , the United States Supreme Court explained the proper analysis for facial challenges: “Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges,

2016In addressing the nature of a facial challenge, the Court explained: “Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’ [Citation.] But when assessing whether a statute meets this standard, the Court has considered only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). “[T]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry

2016Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 523 (2004); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1990).

2015Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 523 (2004); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1990).

2016In addressing the nature of a facial challenge, the Court explained: “Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’ [Citation.] But when assessing whether a statute meets this standard, the Court has considered only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). “[T]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry

2015In addressing the nature of a facial challenge, the Court explained: “Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.’ [Citation.] But when assessing whether a statute meets this standard, the Court has considered only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). “[T]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry

2016Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 523 (2004); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1990).

2015Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 523 (2004); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1990).

2016Quoting Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), the State relies on the long-accepted principle that a statute is facially unconstitutional “only if ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’ ” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) The State’s argument, however, is misplaced. ¶ 27 In Patel, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 , the United States Supreme Court explained the proper analysis for facial challenges: “Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges,

2015Quoting Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), the State relies on the long-accepted principle that a statute is facially unconstitutional “only if ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’ ” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) The State’s argument, however, is misplaced. ¶ 27 In Patel, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 , the United States Supreme Court explained the proper analysis for facial challenges: “Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges,

2016Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 523 (2004); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1990).

2015Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 523 (2004); People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1990).

2014In re Marriage of Wechselberger, 115 Ill.

2014In re Marriage of Wechselberger, 115 Ill.

2023Id. ¶ 50; see also People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶ 40 , 170 N.E.3d 204 , aff’d, 2023 IL 126461 (affirming the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition because the “[d]efendant’s flat assertion that a 19-year-old’s brain is more like a 17-year-old adolescent’s in terms of development [was] simply insufficient to survive the more exacting standard that would warrant the filing of a successive postconviction petition”). ¶ 83 Like the petition in Thomas, defendant’s petition failed to allege any particularized facts that would demonstrate Miller shoul

2022Defendant’s flat assertion a 19-year-old’s brain is more like a 17-year-old adolescent’s in terms of development is simply insufficient to survive the more exacting standard that would warrant the filing of a successive postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 44 Here, beyond general assertions regarding adolescent and young adult brain development, Williams failed to plead any particular facts or include any documentation in his motion to file a successive postconviction petition indicating how his specific own immaturity or individual circumstances constitute compelling reasons to allow him to file a

2018This is an exacting standard that is limited to “ ‘extreme situations.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knauerhaze v. Nelson, 361 Ill.

2018This is an exacting standard that is limited to " 'extreme situations.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knauerhaze v. Nelson , 361 Ill.

2018App. 3d 538, 548 (2005) (quoting Jones v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, 316 Ill.

2018App. 3d 538 , 548, 296 Ill.Dec. 889 , 836 N.E.2d 640 (2005) (quoting Jones v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital , 316 Ill.