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9 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1954–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ehrlich v. City of Culver Citygreen1 sentence2002We also agree with the concurring opinion in Erhlich , which rhetorically observed that there would be little sense in using a deferential standard of review for taxes and other general assessments, while simultaneously using a more exacting standard for development fees that differ only in how they are spent: “[I]f a municipality can constitutionally impose a development tax as long as it is rationally based, why is a higher *399 level of constitutional scrutiny required when, as in the case of generally applicable development fees, the ‘tax’ is earmarked for use in alleviating specific devel | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Oregon v. Monk
green
2 sentences2021If the sufficiency of an indictment is chal- lenged after the verdict, the language of the indictment is held to a less exacting standard and is given a “more liberal construction.” Id. at 457 . 2007When the sufficiency of an indictment is challenged by way of a demurrer, it is strictly construed against the state, but when the sufficiency of an indictment is challenged after a verdict, the language of the indictment is held to a less exacting standard and is given a “more liberal construction.” State of Oregon v. Monk, 193 Or 450, 457 , 238 P2d 1110 (1951). | 2 | 2007–2021 |
State v. Follett
green
2 sentences2016Before Baker was decided in 2011, cases involving decisions related to the emergency aid exception were decided under the more exacting standard announced in State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), requiring that there was an “emergency” and an immediate need for officer assistance “for the protection of life.” We note that Baker did not adopt the requirement set forth in Follett that the “officer had to believe that the person was in danger of dying.” McCullough, 264 Or App at 502-03 . 2016Before Baker was decided in 2011, cases involving decisions related to the emergency aid exception were decided under the more exacting standard announced in State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), requiring that there was an “emergency” and an immediate need for officer assistance “for the protection of life.” We note that Baker did not adopt the requirement set forth in Follett that the “officer had to believe that the person was in danger of dying.” McCullough, 264 Or App at 502-03 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. McCullough
green
1 sentence2016Before Baker was decided in 2011, cases involving decisions related to the emergency aid exception were decided under the more exacting standard announced in State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), requiring that there was an “emergency” and an immediate need for officer assistance “for the protection of life.” We note that Baker did not adopt the requirement set forth in Follett that the “officer had to believe that the person was in danger of dying.” McCullough, 264 Or App at 502-03 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Hammonds
green
2 sentences2009State v. Hammonds/Deshler, 155 Or.App. 622 , 964 P.2d 1094 (1998). 2009State v. Hammonds/Deshler, 155 Or.App. 622 , 964 P.2d 1094 (1998). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Brewer
neutral
2 sentences2007When the language of an indictment is challenged after the verdict, the challenge will only be successful if the indictment wholly fails to state “ ‘any crime known to the law.’ ” State v. Brewer, 7 Or App 158, 160-61 , 490 P2d 202 (1971) (quoting Monk, 193 Or at 456-57 ). 2007When the language of an indictment is challenged after the verdict, the challenge will only be successful if the indictment wholly fails to state “ ‘any crime known to the law.’ ” State v. Brewer, 7 Or App 158, 160-61 , 490 P2d 202 (1971) (quoting Monk, 193 Or at 456-57 ). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Castro v. Heinzman
green
2 sentences2006On appeal, respondent argues that the contacts involving expression fail to meet the more exacting standard required of such contacts to avoid constitutional problems. *348 See Castro, 194 Or App at 13 . 2006The fact that expressive contacts, to support an SPO, must meet a more exacting standard is well-settled: “[T]o avoid constitutional overbreadth problems, [expressive] contacts must meet a more stringent standard than the one set out in the statute.” Id. (citing State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 300 , 977 P2d 379 (1999)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Rangel
green
2 sentences2006The fact that expressive contacts, to support an SPO, must meet a more exacting standard is well-settled: “[T]o avoid constitutional overbreadth problems, [expressive] contacts must meet a more stringent standard than the one set out in the statute.” Id. (citing State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 300 , 977 P2d 379 (1999)). 2006The fact that expressive contacts, to support an SPO, must meet a more exacting standard is well-settled: “[T]o avoid constitutional overbreadth problems, [expressive] contacts must meet a more stringent standard than the one set out in the statute.” Id. (citing State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 300 , 977 P2d 379 (1999)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Anaconda Co. v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence1998Also noted in the same dissent, *279 “Before adopting such an approach, we should carefully consider some of the practical consequences of employing such an exacting standard.” Id. at 731 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
green
2 sentences1998Federal courts repeatedly have stated that a waiver of tribal immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58 , 98 S Ct at 1677 ; Stock West Corp. v. Lujan, 982 F2d 1389, 1398 (9th Cir 1993); A.K. 1998Federal courts repeatedly have stated that a waiver of tribal immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 58 , 98 S Ct at 1677 ; Stock West Corp. v. Lujan, 982 F2d 1389, 1398 (9th Cir 1993); A.K. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Senkler v. Berry
green
2 sentences1954We find it well and clearly expounded in Senkler v. Berry, 52 Or 212, 215 , 96 P 1070 , in these words: "It is now the settled law of this State, that in divorce proceedings the title to real property authorized to be awarded to the successful party by Section 511, B. & C. 1954We find it well and clearly expounded in Senkler v. Berry, 52 Or 212, 215 , 96 P 1070 , in these words: "It is now the settled law of this State, that in divorce proceedings the title to real property authorized to be awarded to the successful party by Section 511, B. & C. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.