Brady violation in Tennessee

2024Addressing the elements required to establish a Brady violation, see State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995), as amended on rehearing (Tenn. July 10, 1995), the post-conviction court found that (1) the defense requested discovery including reports by experts; (2) “[a]lthough apparently not in possession of the prosecutor, the report was certainly in possession of a state agency, DCS, and was not provided to the defense”; (3) it was “not apparent from the - 29 - report itself that the information was favorable” to the Petitioner; and (4) “[t]he Petitioner ha[d] not presented any testim

2024Addressing the elements required to establish a Brady violation, see State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995), as amended on rehearing (Tenn. July 10, 1995), the post-conviction court found that (1) the defense requested discovery including reports by experts; (2) “[a]lthough apparently not in possession of the prosecutor, the report was certainly in possession of a state agency, DCS, and was not provided to the defense”; (3) it was “not apparent from the - 29 - report itself that the information was favorable” to the Petitioner; and (4) “[t]he Petitioner ha[d] not presented any testim

2021Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (citing State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. -15- 1995); Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 389 ); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).

2021The State wrote in its motion to dismiss that “it appears that petitioner’s trial counsel is now asserting that his prior sworn testimony provided at the post-conviction hearing was either inaccurate or untruthful.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously, if trial counsel failed to discover the evidence or if the evidence was withheld as the Petitioner asserts, see, e.g., State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 597 (Tenn. 2014) (prosecution’s Brady violation in Shelby county murder trial warranted new trial); Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 63 (Tenn. 2001) (Shelby county prosecutors improperly withheld exculpa

2002The defendant bears the burden of proving a Brady violation by a preponderance of the evidence. -3- Id. at 610 ; State v. Joan Elizabeth Hall, No. 01C01-9710-CC-00503, slip op. at 19 (Tenn. Crim.

2002The defendant bears the burden of proving a Brady violation by a preponderance of the evidence. -3- Id. at 610 ; State v. Joan Elizabeth Hall, No. 01C01-9710-CC-00503, slip op. at 19 (Tenn. Crim.

2024In Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” In order to prove a Brady violation, the defendant must establish the following four elements: 1) that the defendant requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the State is bound to release the information whether requested or not); 2) that the State

2024In Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” In order to prove a Brady violation, the defendant must establish the following four elements: 1) that the defendant requested the information (unless the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the State is bound to release the information whether requested or not); 2) that the State

2026Whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon a Brady violation “presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 599 (Tenn. Crim.

2026Standard of Appellate Review Whether a defendant has shown the presence of a Brady violation “presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 599 (Tenn. Crim.

2024The purpose of the Brady rule “is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 . ii.

2024The purpose of the Brady rule “is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 . ii.

2021Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (citing State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. -15- 1995); Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 389 ); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).

2021Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (citing State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. -15- 1995); Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 389 ); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).

2021Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (citing State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. -15- 1995); Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 389 ); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).

2021Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 56 (citing State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. -15- 1995); Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 389 ); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).

2024See Jackson, 444 S.W.3d at 597 (stating that because the defendant established the four - 114 - requirements to establish a Brady violation, he is entitled to a new trial).

2024See Jackson, 444 S.W.3d at 597 (stating that because the defendant established the four - 114 - requirements to establish a Brady violation, he is entitled to a new trial).

2014Our determination that Defendant has established a Brady violation obviates the *598 need to address the prosecutor’s violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2. 53 See State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 534-35 (Tenn.1993) (discussing the history and the adoption of Rule 26.2).

2014Our determination that Defendant has established a Brady violation obviates the *598 need to address the prosecutor’s violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2. 53 See State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 534-35 (Tenn.1993) (discussing the history and the adoption of Rule 26.2).

2020Based on our reading of Kyles, the government’s delayed disclosure of obviously exculpatory information in its possession can result in a Brady violation requiring a reversal of a conviction if the delay itself causes prejudice to the defendant by putting “the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 .

2020Based on our reading of Kyles, the government’s delayed disclosure of obviously exculpatory information in its possession can result in a Brady violation requiring a reversal of a conviction if the delay itself causes prejudice to the defendant by putting “the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 .

2020In doing so, the Sixth Circuit noted “the district court dissected each 2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). -4- item of undisclosed evidence piecemeal in violation of Supreme Court precedent” and as a result, the Sixth Circuit refused to “affirm the district court’s ruling because it misapplied the Brady standard.” Id.

2020In doing so, the Sixth Circuit noted “the district court dissected each 2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). -4- item of undisclosed evidence piecemeal in violation of Supreme Court precedent” and as a result, the Sixth Circuit refused to “affirm the district court’s ruling because it misapplied the Brady standard.” Id.

2020For example, for the rule as to the [S]tate’s duty to disclose exculpatory 2 In its original opinion, our supreme court applied the materiality standard adopted in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), holding modified by United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), to determine there was no Brady violation.

2013The State submits that it gave no preferential treatment to Ms. Brunner, and, as such, the defendant could not establish a Brady violation. -7- The constitutional right to a fair trial imposes upon the State “duties consistent with the[] sovereign obligation to ensure ‘that justice shall be done’ in all criminal prosecutions.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2018“All that due process requires in the post- conviction setting is that the defendant have ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Stokes, 146 S.W.3d at 61 (quoting House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995)). - 85 - Even if Ferguson applied to post-conviction proceedings, the Petitioner’s claim under Ferguson fails for the same reason that his Brady claim fails, that is, the lack of evidence as to the contents of the missing envelope.

1997Recently, in House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn.1995), this Court held that “a full and fair hearing sufficient to support a finding of previous determination occurs if a petitioner is given the opportunity to present proof and argument on the claim.” From the opinion of the federal district court, it is apparent that Carter was afforded a “full and fair hearing” on his alleged Brady violation.

2022See Marshall, 845 S.W. 2d at 233 ; see also Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“No Brady violation exits where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stewart v. Winn, 967 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir. 2020).

2016App. 2013) (noting in context of Brady claim that “the State is not required to disclose „information that the accused already possesses or is able to obtain‟”) (citing State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim.

2020State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 548 (Tenn. 1993) (citing United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 (1st Cir. 1986)).

1999In United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 413 (1st Cir.1986), the Court held that defense counsel cured a potential Brady violation by failing to move for a continuance and then thoroughly cross-examining the witness.

2026“The burden of proving a Brady violation rests with the defendant, and the violation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 94 (Tenn. 2014).

2026“The burden of proving a Brady violation rests with the defendant, and the violation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 94 (Tenn. 2014).

2022See United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no Brady violation where the material was disclosed at trial and the defendant refused an opportunity to postpone the trial); Wayne R.

2020See United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no Brady violation where the material was disclosed at trial and the defendant refused an opportunity to postpone the trial); Wayne R.

2018“When exculpatory evidence is equally available to the prosecution and the accused, the accused ‘must bear the responsibility of [his] failure to seek its discovery.’” Marshall, 845 S.W.2d at 233 (quoting United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1985)).

2018“When exculpatory evidence is equally available to the prosecution and the accused, the accused ‘must bear the responsibility of [his] failure to seek its discovery.’” Marshall, 845 S.W.2d at 233 (quoting United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1985)).

2017The petitioner must show that “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to 6 “The „materiality‟ aspect of a Brady claim is governed by the same prejudice standard as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Cauthern, 145 S.W.3d at 598 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ). - 18 - put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 657 (Tenn. Crim.

2017The petitioner must show that “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to 6 “The „materiality‟ aspect of a Brady claim is governed by the same prejudice standard as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Cauthern, 145 S.W.3d at 598 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ). - 18 - put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 657 (Tenn. Crim.

2013The State submits that it gave no preferential treatment to Ms. Brunner, and, as such, the defendant could not establish a Brady violation. -7- The constitutional right to a fair trial imposes upon the State “duties consistent with the[] sovereign obligation to ensure ‘that justice shall be done’ in all criminal prosecutions.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2013The State submits that it gave no preferential treatment to Ms. Brunner, and, as such, the defendant could not establish a Brady violation. -7- The constitutional right to a fair trial imposes upon the State “duties consistent with the[] sovereign obligation to ensure ‘that justice shall be done’ in all criminal prosecutions.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2000See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380-86 (1985); Davis v. State, 823 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tenn. Crim.

2000See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380-86 (1985); Davis v. State, 823 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tenn. Crim.

2024App. Aug. 6, 2007) (holding that trial counsel’s conflict of interest, if proven, would be ineffective assistance of counsel, which is properly raised in a post-conviction proceeding); Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 812 (holding that a Brady violation is not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding).

2024App. Aug. 6, 2007) (holding that trial counsel’s conflict of interest, if proven, would be ineffective assistance of counsel, which is properly raised in a post-conviction proceeding); Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 812 (holding that a Brady violation is not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding).

2015App. 2011) (“There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available . . . from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.” (quoting Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 415 ) (6th Cir. 2008)).

2014This court has recently noted as follows: Brady obviously does not apply to information that is not wholly within the control of the-prosecution. • There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the-essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information,. or where the evidence is available ... from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.- Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 179-80 (Tenn.Crim.App.2011) (quotihg Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 415 (6th Cir.2008)) (ellipsis in original). ■ Here, the

2015See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999).

2015See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999).

2025After all, “[t]here is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available . . . from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.” Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 179-80 (Tenn. Crim.

2014This court has recently noted as follows: Brady obviously does not apply to information that is not wholly within the control of the-prosecution. • There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the-essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information,. or where the evidence is available ... from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.- Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 179-80 (Tenn.Crim.App.2011) (quotihg Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 415 (6th Cir.2008)) (ellipsis in original). ■ Here, the

2022See Marshall, 845 S.W. 2d at 233 ; see also Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“No Brady violation exits where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Stewart v. Winn, 967 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir. 2020).

2013“No Brady violation exits where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting -35- him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source.” Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517 (6 th Cir. 2000)(citations omitted).

2025There can be no Brady violation when evidence is available from another source “because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.” Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir. 1998).

2018When the defendant knows or should know “‘the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information,’” or when “‘the evidence is available . . . from another source,’” there can be no Brady violation “because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.” Coe, 161 F.3d at 344 (quoting United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1989)).

2021The State contends the post-conviction court properly denied the petition. 3 The petitioner refers to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 167 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt if the defendant intelligently concludes that his best interests would be served by a plea of guilty. -6- The petitioner bears the burden of proving his post-conviction factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence.

2021The State contends the post-conviction court properly denied the petition. 3 The petitioner refers to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S.Ct. 160, 167 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt if the defendant intelligently concludes that his best interests would be served by a plea of guilty. -6- The petitioner bears the burden of proving his post-conviction factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence.