Brady violation in Florida

2013ANALYSIS Brady In order to establish a Brady violation, “the defendant must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Mungin III, 79 So.3d at 734 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000)).

2013ANALYSIS Brady In order to establish a Brady violation, “the defendant must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Mungin III, 79 So.3d at 734 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000)).

2023Third, to establish a Brady claim, the defendant must show that "(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced." Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)).

2023Third, to establish a Brady claim, the defendant must show that "(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced." Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)).

2025Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”) (citation omitted); Smith v. State, 275 So. 3d 843, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“A Brady claim is cognizable in a postconviction motion.”); Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 954 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant.” (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000))); Provenzano v. State, 616

2025Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”) (citation omitted); Smith v. State, 275 So. 3d 843, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“A Brady claim is cognizable in a postconviction motion.”); Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 954 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant.” (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000))); Provenzano v. State, 616

2011This Court has explained that “[t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense ... had the information.” Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla.1993) (citing Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1991); James v. State, 453 So.2d 786, 790 (Fla.1984)).

2009At issue is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ). *451 With regard to Brady’s second prong, this Court has explained that “[t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla.1993) (citing Hegwood v. Stat

2025Floyd, for example, rejected a Brady claim predicated on the State’s purported failure “to advise defense counsel of the ‘differing’ statements by [a witness].” Id. at 450 .

2025Floyd, for example, rejected a Brady claim predicated on the State’s purported failure “to advise defense counsel of the ‘differing’ statements by [a witness].” Id. at 450 .

2024“To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) evidence favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that prejudice ensued.” Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 508 (Fla. 2003) (citing Jennings v. State, 782 So. 2d 853, 856 (Fla. 2001)).

2024“To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) evidence favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that prejudice ensued.” Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 508 (Fla. 2003) (citing Jennings v. State, 782 So. 2d 853, 856 (Fla. 2001)).

2022To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that “(1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Id.; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).

2022To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that “(1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Id.; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).

2013In order to establish a Brady violation Diaz must demonstrate: “(1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.” Johnson v. State, 921 So.2d 490, 507 (Fla.2005) (citing Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373, 378 (Fla.2001)). ‘When reviewing Brady claims, this Court applies a mixed standard of review, ‘deferring] to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by compe

2013In order to establish a Brady violation Diaz must demonstrate: “(1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.” Johnson v. State, 921 So.2d 490, 507 (Fla.2005) (citing Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373, 378 (Fla.2001)). ‘When reviewing Brady claims, this Court applies a mixed standard of review, ‘deferring] to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by compe

2023Third, to establish a Brady claim, the defendant must show that "(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced." Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)).

2023Third, to establish a Brady claim, the defendant must show that "(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced." Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)).

2011This Court has explained that “[t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense ... had the information.” Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla.1993) (citing Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1991); James v. State, 453 So.2d 786, 790 (Fla.1984)).

2009At issue is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ). *451 With regard to Brady’s second prong, this Court has explained that “[t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla.1993) (citing Hegwood v. Stat

2025To establish a Brady violation, Bell has the burden to show “(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and - 15 - (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 988 (Fla. 2009)).

2025To establish a Brady violation, Bell has the burden to show “(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and - 15 - (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 988 (Fla. 2009)).

2013See Evans v. State, 995 So.2d 933, 951 (Fla.2008) (denying Brady claim where information is neither exculpatory nor impeaching); see also Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 798 (Fla.2006) (same).

2008This Court rejected a similar Brady argument in Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 799 (Fla.2006), where the defendant "did not rebut the State's evidence that such a report was disclosed and further did not demonstrate that polygraph tests were admissible at trial as impeachment evidence." See also Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 787 (Fla.2004) (affirming summary denial of Brady claim because results of polygraph tests would not have been admissible at trial without consent of both parties).

2025Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”) (citation omitted); Smith v. State, 275 So. 3d 843, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“A Brady claim is cognizable in a postconviction motion.”); Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 954 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant.” (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000))); Provenzano v. State, 616

2025Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”) (citation omitted); Smith v. State, 275 So. 3d 843, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“A Brady claim is cognizable in a postconviction motion.”); Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 954 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant.” (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000))); Provenzano v. State, 616

2007The Florida Supreme Court, applying Brady , has held that in order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant has to prove: “[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Floyd v. State, 902 So.2d 775, 779 (Fla.2005) (citing Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 619 (Fla.2002)); Cardona v. State, 826 So.2d 968, 973 (Fla.2002)(citing Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000)).

2007The Florida Supreme Court, applying Brady , has held that in order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant has to prove: “[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Floyd v. State, 902 So.2d 775, 779 (Fla.2005) (citing Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 619 (Fla.2002)); Cardona v. State, 826 So.2d 968, 973 (Fla.2002)(citing Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000)).

1998In order for a defendant to prove a Brady violation, it must first be demonstrated that “had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1991) (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 , 110 S.Ct. 322 , 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989)).

1998In order for a defendant to prove a Brady violation, it must first be demonstrated that “had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1991) (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 , 110 S.Ct. 322 , 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989)).

2010To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate "(1) that favorable evidence — either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1101-02 (Fla.2008) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)); Polk v. State, 906 So.2d 1212, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). "[Pjrejudice is measured by determining 'whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different

2010To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate "(1) that favorable evidence — either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1101-02 (Fla.2008) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)); Polk v. State, 906 So.2d 1212, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). "[Pjrejudice is measured by determining 'whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different

2017"In reviewing a Brady claim, 'this Court defers to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of those facts to the law.' " Johnson v. State , 135 So.3d 1002 , 1028 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Lightbourne v. State , 841 So.2d 431 , 437 (Fla. 2003) ).

2017"In reviewing a Brady claim, 'this Court defers to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of those facts to the law.' " Johnson v. State , 135 So.3d 1002 , 1028 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Lightbourne v. State , 841 So.2d 431 , 437 (Fla. 2003) ).

2017Cf. Wright v. State , 857 So.2d 861 , 870 (Fla. 2003) (finding no Brady violation where "the exculpatory effect" of the evidence was "merely speculative").

2009Compare Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373, 384 (Fla.2001) (finding Brady violation for nondisclosure of police reports containing a tape revealing favorable, relevant evidence of coaching by the prosecutor and conflicting accounts of a witness’s testimony) w ith Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 870 (Fla.2003) (rejecting claim that “information contained in police files concerning other possible suspects and other criminal activity in the same neighborhood” was Brady material).

2026“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show ‘(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.’” Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 789 (quoting Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011)).

2026“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show ‘(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.’” Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 789 (quoting Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011)).

2022“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393 , 400 (Fla. 2017) - 45 - (quoting Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1184 (Fla. 2014)).

2022“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393 , 400 (Fla. 2017) - 45 - (quoting Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1184 (Fla. 2014)).

2012To prove the existence of a valid Brady claim, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that favorable evidence — either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Rodriguez v. State, 39 So.3d 275, 285 (Fla.2010) (quoting Riechmann v. State, 966 So.2d 298, 307 (Fla.2007)).

2011To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show “(1) that favorable evidence — either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Rodriguez v. State, 39 So.3d 275, 285 (Fla.2010) (quoting Riechmann v. State, 966 So.2d 298, 307 (Fla.2007)).

2008"In reviewing the materiality of an alleged Brady violation and whether prejudice ensued, `[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.'" State v. Huggins, 788 So.2d 238, 243 (Fla.2001) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ).

2008"In reviewing the materiality of an alleged Brady violation and whether prejudice ensued, `[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.'" State v. Huggins, 788 So.2d 238, 243 (Fla.2001) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ).

2013In order to establish a Brady violation Diaz must demonstrate: “(1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.” Johnson v. State, 921 So.2d 490, 507 (Fla.2005) (citing Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373, 378 (Fla.2001)). ‘When reviewing Brady claims, this Court applies a mixed standard of review, ‘deferring] to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by compe

2013In order to establish a Brady violation Diaz must demonstrate: “(1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice.” Johnson v. State, 921 So.2d 490, 507 (Fla.2005) (citing Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373, 378 (Fla.2001)). ‘When reviewing Brady claims, this Court applies a mixed standard of review, ‘deferring] to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by compe

2018This Court has explicitly stated: "[W]e point out that there is no 'due diligence' requirement in the Brady test and that the prosecutor is charged with possession of what the State possesses ...." Archer v. State , 934 So.2d 1187 , 1203 (Fla. 2006).

2018This Court has explicitly stated: "[W]e point out that there is no 'due diligence' requirement in the Brady test and that the prosecutor is charged with possession of what the State possesses ...." Archer v. State , 934 So.2d 1187 , 1203 (Fla. 2006).

2017We disagree because this information is not material under the Brady standard, which requires showing " 'a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Mordenti v. State , 894 So.2d 161 , 170 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263 , 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) ).

2017We disagree because this information is not material under the Brady standard, which requires showing " 'a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Mordenti v. State , 894 So.2d 161 , 170 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263 , 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) ).

2024Cf. Morris, 317 So. 3d at 1071 (“[T]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution . . . .” (quoting Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 497 (Fla. 2007))).

2022As a threshold matter, “[t]here is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution.” Morris, 317 So. 3d at 1071 (alteration in original) (quoting Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 497 (Fla. 2007)). -7- Here, the trial transcript demonstrates that Agent Neil expressly used his handwritten notes to refresh his recollection during his direct examination.

2018Jimenez also makes the related argument that the Brady violations he claims are reflected in NMPD's post-warrant disclosure show that the State failed to comply with its discovery obligations. *479 As this Court has explained, "when discovery violations are proven in motions for postconviction relief[,] ... [t]he test for measuring the effect of the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, regardless of whether such failure constitutes a discovery violation, is [the same that applies to a Brady violation, namely] whether there is a reasonable probability that 'had the evidence been disclosed

2018Jimenez also makes the related argument that the Brady violations he claims are reflected in NMPD's post-warrant disclosure show that the State failed to comply with its discovery obligations. *479 As this Court has explained, "when discovery violations are proven in motions for postconviction relief[,] ... [t]he test for measuring the effect of the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, regardless of whether such failure constitutes a discovery violation, is [the same that applies to a Brady violation, namely] whether there is a reasonable probability that 'had the evidence been disclosed

2018Furthermore, to assess materiality where more than one Brady violation is alleged, pursuant to Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), [i]n making the materiality determination, a court must first "evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item" before separately "evaluat[ing] its cumulative effect." See [ Kyles , 514 U.S.] at 436 n.10, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ("We evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no other way.

2018Furthermore, to assess materiality where more than one Brady violation is alleged, pursuant to Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), [i]n making the materiality determination, a court must first "evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item" before separately "evaluat[ing] its cumulative effect." See [ Kyles , 514 U.S.] at 436 n.10, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ("We evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no other way.

2026The Brady rule only applies to “the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 507 (Fla. 2008) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).

2026The Brady rule only applies to “the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 507 (Fla. 2008) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).