Brady violation in Nevada

2021Brady claim: "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000).

2021There are three components to a successful Brady claim: "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 36-37 (2000).

2021See State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599 , 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003) (outlining good cause and prejudice requirements for a Brady claim).

2021See State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599 , 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003) (outlining good cause and prejudice requirements for a Brady claim).

2022To demonstrate good cause and prejudice through a Brady violation, the petitioner must show “(1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (8) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material.” State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198, 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (recognizing that the second and third prongs of a Brady violation mirror required showings of cause and prejudice).

2022To demonstrate good cause and prejudice through a Brady violation, the petitioner must show “(1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (8) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material.” State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198, 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (recognizing that the second and third prongs of a Brady violation mirror required showings of cause and prejudice).

2021Id. at 74, 993 P.2d at 41; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) C[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation unless the [Government's] nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict."); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2021Id. at 74 , 993 P.2d at 41 ; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) C[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation unless the [Government's] nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict."); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

1999In Nevada, a Brady violation occurring after the defense has made a specific request for evidence is material if “ ‘there exists a reasonable possibility that the claimed evidence would have affected the judgment of the trier of fact, and thus the outcome of the trial.’ ” Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (quoting Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1132 , 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994)).

1999In Nevada, a Brady violation occurring after the defense has made a specific request for evidence is material if “ ‘there exists a reasonable possibility that the claimed evidence would have affected the judgment of the trier of fact, and thus the outcome of the trial.’ ” Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (quoting Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1132 , 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994)).

2020State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1257 , 946 P.2d 1017, 1028 (1997) (`` [A] Brady violation does not result if the defendant, exercising reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information.").

2020State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1257 , 946 P.2d 1017, 1028 (1997) (`` [A] Brady violation does not result if the defendant, exercising reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information.").

2018Cf. West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385 , 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Brady claim that prosecution withheld evidence suggesting that defendant fabricated his confession because defendant "knew whether or not he had taken the necklace"); *1106 United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998 , 1007 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that there was no improper suppression of evidence under Brady where evidence at issue involved defendant's whereabouts, which were within defendant's knowledge).

2018CI West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Brady claim that prosecution withheld evidence suggesting that defendant fabricated his confession because defendant "knew whether or not he had taken the necklace"); United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1007 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that there SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 42 (0) 1947A .4e40 was no improper suppression of evidence under Brady where evidence at issue involved defendant's whereabouts, which were within defendant's knowledge).

2018Cf. West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385 , 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Brady claim that prosecution withheld evidence suggesting that defendant fabricated his confession because defendant "knew whether or not he had taken the necklace"); *1106 United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998 , 1007 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that there was no improper suppression of evidence under Brady where evidence at issue involved defendant's whereabouts, which were within defendant's knowledge).

2018CI West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Brady claim that prosecution withheld evidence suggesting that defendant fabricated his confession because defendant "knew whether or not he had taken the necklace"); United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1007 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that there SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 42 (0) 1947A .4e40 was no improper suppression of evidence under Brady where evidence at issue involved defendant's whereabouts, which were within defendant's knowledge).

2017Huebler held, where a Brady violation is alleged in the guilty-plea context after a specific request has been made, in order to establish undue prejudice under NRS 34.726(1)(b), a petitioner must show "a reasonable possibility that but for the failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 203 , 275 P.3d at 99 ; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985) (setting forth the test for the prejudice prong for establishing ineffective COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 12 (0)19473 assistance of counsel in the context o

2017Huebler held, where a Brady violation is alleged in the guilty-plea context after a specific request has been made, in order to establish undue prejudice under NRS 34.726(1)(b), a petitioner must show "a reasonable possibility that but for the failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 203 , 275 P.3d at 99 ; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985) (setting forth the test for the prejudice prong for establishing ineffective COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 12 (0)19473 assistance of counsel in the context o

2016See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (reiterating that the three components to a successful Brady claim are "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material"); Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (stating the materiality standard where a defendant made no specific request for the evidence).

2016See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (reiterating that the three components to a successful Brady claim are "the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material"); Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 619 , 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (stating the materiality standard where a defendant made no specific request for the evidence).

2018Having considered the identified evidence, we are not persuaded that the State committed a Brady violation, as the identified statement was not material." See Lay v. State, 116 Nev. 1185, 1194 , 14 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2000) (recognizing that evidence is "material" for Brady purposes "if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the evidence• had been disclosed").

2018Having considered the identified evidence, we are not persuaded that the State committed a Brady violation, as the identified statement was not material." See Lay v. State, 116 Nev. 1185, 1194 , 14 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2000) (recognizing that evidence is "material" for Brady purposes "if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the evidence• had been disclosed").

2015Like the Brady claim, Lisle's good-cause claim based on the alleged ineffective assistance of first post-conviction counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), was untimely because it was not asserted within a reasonable time after it became available: the petition was filed nearly six years after the remittitur issued in the appeal from the denial of his first post-conviction habeas petition, see Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252-53 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869-70 , 34 P.3d at 5

2015Like the Brady claim, Lisle's good-cause claim based on the alleged ineffective assistance of first post-conviction counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), was untimely because it was not asserted within a reasonable time after it became available: the petition was filed nearly six years after the remittitur issued in the appeal from the denial of his first post-conviction habeas petition, see Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252-53 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869-70 , 34 P.3d at 5

2021Id. at 74, 993 P.2d at 41; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) C[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation unless the [Government's] nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict."); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2021See Wade v. State, 114 Nev. 914, SUPREME CounT 920-21, 966 P.2d 160, 164 (1998) (finding no Brady violation where the State OF NEVADA 3 (01 I)47A 4.424t9 - did not possess a file within the control of the DEA and the DEA "did not act as an agent of the State prosecution"); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 C[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." (emphasis added)).

2017See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (holding that Brady claim requires that the State withheld favorable evidence, among other factors); see also United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1501 n.5 ("[I]f the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, the Brady claim fails ") Likewise, because the information was publicly available and available to Skropeta with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Facebook posts were not newly discovered evidence when counsel reviewed them after trial.

2017See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48 , 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (holding that Brady claim requires that the State withheld favorable evidence, among other factors); see also United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1501 n.5 ("[I]f the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, the Brady claim fails ") Likewise, because the information was publicly available and available to Skropeta with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Facebook posts were not newly discovered evidence when counsel reviewed them after trial.

2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br

2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br

2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br

2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br

2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br

2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br

2017See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. 1979).

2017See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. 1979).

2022Given he alleges a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation, good cause must be shown by proving the following: "(1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198 , 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the second and third prongs of a Brady violation mirror the two requirements for demonstrating good cause for the delay in filing the ha

2022Given he alleges a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation, good cause must be shown by proving the following: "(1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198 , 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the second and third prongs of a Brady violation mirror the two requirements for demonstrating good cause for the delay in filing the ha

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

2022Id. at 198 n.3, 275 P.3d at 95 n.3; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996) (observing that a Brady claim could be procedurally barred when the petitioner knew of the grounds but did not raise it in the first state petition).

2022Id. at 198 n.3, 275 P.3d at 95 n.3; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996) (observing that a Brady claim could be procedurally barred when the petitioner knew of the grounds but did not raise it in the first state petition).

2022Court, 133 Nev. 754 , 761 n.5, 405 P.3d 668 , 674 n.5 (2017) (explaining that while a criminal defendant may not be entitled to such records in pretrial proceedings, he or she may be entitled to them at trial); Sonner v. State, 112 Nev. 1328, 1341 , 930 P.2d 707, 716 (1996) (approving the denial of a request for an individual’s records because the “request was based on nothing more than the assertion of a general right to search for whatever mitigating evidence might be found in [the] records”).

2022Court, 133 Nev. 754 , 761 n.5, 405 P.3d 668 , 674 n.5 (2017) (explaining that while a criminal defendant may not be entitled to such records in pretrial proceedings, he or she may be entitled to them at trial); Sonner v. State, 112 Nev. 1328, 1341 , 930 P.2d 707, 716 (1996) (approving the denial of a request for an individual’s records because the “request was based on nothing more than the assertion of a general right to search for whatever mitigating evidence might be found in [the] records”).

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

2017See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 140.

2017See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 140.

2017Because impeachment evidence constitutes "evidence favorable to an accused," Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 , it also falls within the Brady rule.

2017Because impeachment evidence constitutes "evidence favorable to an accused," Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 , it also falls within the Brady rule.

2015Like the Brady claim, Lisle's good-cause claim based on the alleged ineffective assistance of first post-conviction counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), was untimely because it was not asserted within a reasonable time after it became available: the petition was filed nearly six years after the remittitur issued in the appeal from the denial of his first post-conviction habeas petition, see Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252-53 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869-70 , 34 P.3d at 5

2015Like the Brady claim, Lisle's good-cause claim based on the alleged ineffective assistance of first post-conviction counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), was untimely because it was not asserted within a reasonable time after it became available: the petition was filed nearly six years after the remittitur issued in the appeal from the denial of his first post-conviction habeas petition, see Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252-53 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869-70 , 34 P.3d at 5

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute

2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute