Brady violation in North Carolina

2020To establish prejudice on such a claim, often referred to as a Brady claim,3 a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985)).

2020To establish prejudice on such a claim, often referred to as a Brady claim,3 a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985)).

2022Therefore, “[t]o establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” State v. McNeil, 155 N.C.

2022Therefore, “[t]o establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” State v. McNeil, 155 N.C.

2021To establish a successful Brady claim, a defendant must prove that the State withheld evidence which would have been “favorable” to the defendant, either as impeachment evidence or exculpatory evidence, and that the evidence was “material,” meaning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 636 (2008) (quoting State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517 (2002)).

2021To establish a successful Brady claim, a defendant must prove that the State withheld evidence which would have been “favorable” to the defendant, either as impeachment evidence or exculpatory evidence, and that the evidence was “material,” meaning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 636 (2008) (quoting State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517 (2002)).

2021To establish a successful Brady claim, a defendant must prove that the State withheld evidence which would have been “favorable” to the defendant, either as impeachment evidence or exculpatory evidence, and that the evidence was “material,” meaning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 636 (2008) (quoting State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517 (2002)).

2021To establish a successful Brady claim, a defendant must prove that the State withheld evidence which would have been “favorable” to the defendant, either as impeachment evidence or exculpatory evidence, and that the evidence was “material,” meaning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 636 (2008) (quoting State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517 (2002)).

2012Taylor, 344 N.C. at 50 , 473 S.E.2d at 607 (concluding that no Brady violation occurred given that the defendants received the evidence in question four days before the State rested its case and did not seek a continuance).

2012Taylor, 344 N.C. at 50 , 473 S.E.2d at 607 (concluding that no Brady violation occurred given that the defendants received the evidence in question four days before the State rested its case and did not seek a continuance).

2022For example, the State asserts that allowing such a defendant access to postconviction DNA testing would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a defendant seeking such testing “sign[ ] a sworn affidavit of innocence,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-269(b)(3), on the theory that, in order “[t]o comply with this requirement, a defendant who pled guilty and swore himself to be ‘in fact guilty’ of the crime must either: (1) lie and swear he is innocent even though he knows he is not or (2) admit that his earlier statement of factual guilt was untrue.” In addition, the State argues that “[t]here is n

2022For example, the State asserts that allowing such a defendant access to postconviction DNA testing would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a defendant seeking such testing “sign[ ] a sworn affidavit of innocence,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-269(b)(3), on the theory that, in order “[t]o comply with this requirement, a defendant who pled guilty and swore himself to be ‘in fact guilty’ of the crime must either: (1) lie and swear he is innocent even though he knows he is not or (2) admit that his earlier statement of factual guilt was untrue.” In addition, the State argues that “[t]here is n

2017A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley , 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 ; see also State v. Alston , 307 N.C. 321 , 337, 298 S.E.2d 631 , 642 (1983) ("In determining whether the suppression of certain information was violative of the defendant's right to due process, the focus should not be on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, but rather should be on the effect of the nondisclosure on the outcome of the trial." (citations omitted)). *828 Defendant inclu

2017A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley , 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 ; see also State v. Alston , 307 N.C. 321 , 337, 298 S.E.2d 631 , 642 (1983) ("In determining whether the suppression of certain information was violative of the defendant's right to due process, the focus should not be on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, but rather should be on the effect of the nondisclosure on the outcome of the trial." (citations omitted)). *828 Defendant inclu

2018The materiality standard that a defendant must assert in his motion, and that the trial court must find, is contained in subdivision 15A-269(b)(2): "If the DNA testing being requested had been conducted on the evidence, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant." This definition of "material" is consistent with how that term has been defined in the context of claims based on Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 3 Given the similarities in the Brady materiality standard and the standard contained in

2018The materiality standard that a defendant must assert in his motion, and that the trial court must find, is contained in subdivision 15A-269(b)(2): "If the DNA testing being requested had been conducted on the evidence, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant." This definition of "material" is consistent with how that term has been defined in the context of claims based on Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 3 Given the similarities in the Brady materiality standard and the standard contained in

2008App. 488, 490 , 508 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1998) (quoting State v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 50 , 473 S.E.2d 596, 607 (1996)); see also State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517 , 573 S.E.2d 132, 149 (2002) ("a Brady violation may not constitute error if the favorable evidence is provided in time for the defendant to make effective use of it").

2008App. 488, 490 , 508 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1998) (quoting State v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 50 , 473 S.E.2d 596, 607 (1996)); see also State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517 , 573 S.E.2d 132, 149 (2002) ("a Brady violation may not constitute error if the favorable evidence is provided in time for the defendant to make effective use of it").

1991I Defendant first argues that he was denied due process in that the State withheld exculpatory and impeaching evidence in violation of the holdings in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), after defendant made a “Brady motion” for discovery of such evidence.

1991I Defendant first argues that he was denied due process in that the State withheld exculpatory and impeaching evidence in violation of the holdings in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), after defendant made a “Brady motion” for discovery of such evidence.

2013At the outset, we recognize that, “[w]ith the exception of evidence falling within the realm of the Brady rule, . . . there is no general right to discovery in criminal cases under the United States Constitution].]” State v. Cunningham, 108 N.C.

2013App. 185, 195 , 423 S.E.2d 802, 808 (1992) (citation omitted).

2026Defendant’s delay in filing his motion to withdraw, however, coupled with these reasons, indicates his decision was based on obtaining more time to prepare for a trial, and not on a “swift change of heart.” See Chery, 203 N.C.

2026Defendant’s delay in filing his motion to withdraw, however, coupled with these reasons, indicates his decision was based on obtaining more time to prepare for a trial, and not on a “swift change of heart.” See Chery, 203 N.C.

2020Cf. Browning v. Trammell, 717 F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 2013) (confining Brady analysis “to the record before the state trial court”). -17- STATE V.

2019See Taylor, 362 N.C. at 525 , 669 S.E.2d at 253 (citations omitted). -7- STATE V.

2019See Taylor, 362 N.C. at 525 , 669 S.E.2d at 253 (citations omitted). -7- STATE V.

2017See State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579 , 604, 430 S.E.2d 188 , 200 ("The law is ... clear, however, that '[a] defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.' " (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) )), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1028 , 114 S.Ct. 644 , 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993).

2017See State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579 , 604, 430 S.E.2d 188 , 200 ("The law is ... clear, however, that '[a] defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.' " (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) )), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1028 , 114 S.Ct. 644 , 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993).

2017See State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579 , 604, 430 S.E.2d 188 , 200 ("The law is ... clear, however, that '[a] defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.' " (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) )), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1028 , 114 S.Ct. 644 , 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993).

2017See State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579 , 604, 430 S.E.2d 188 , 200 ("The law is ... clear, however, that '[a] defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.' " (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) )), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1028 , 114 S.Ct. 644 , 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993).

2017See State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579 , 604, 430 S.E.2d 188 , 200 ("The law is ... clear, however, that '[a] defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.' " (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) )), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1028 , 114 S.Ct. 644 , 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993).

2017See State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579 , 604, 430 S.E.2d 188 , 200 ("The law is ... clear, however, that '[a] defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.' " (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) )), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1028 , 114 S.Ct. 644 , 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993).

2014App. 217, 221-22 , 578 S.E.2d 628, 632 (2003) (holding in context of Brady analysis that “[t]he State . . . is under a duty to disclose only those matters in its possession and is not required to conduct an independent investigation to locate evidence favorable to a defendant” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

2013See id.

2013See id.