Brady violation in New Mexico

2025To establish a Brady violation, Defendant must show “(1) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material to the defense.” Hatch, 2008-NMSC-024, ¶ 44 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025To establish a Brady violation, Defendant must show “(1) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material to the defense.” Hatch, 2008-NMSC-024, ¶ 44 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). {4} We conclude that Defendant failed to preserve a Brady challenge because his argument below was squarely based on the rules of criminal procedure, which is not the same as invoking a Brady ruling.

2025See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). {4} We conclude that Defendant failed to preserve a Brady challenge because his argument below was squarely based on the rules of criminal procedure, which is not the same as invoking a Brady ruling.

2016“Implicit in the standard of materiality is the notion that the significance of any particular bit of evidence can only be determined by comparison to the rest.” Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {34} The State points to our Supreme Court’s case, State v. Rondeau, 1976-NMSC-044 , ¶ 40, 89 N.M. 408 , 553 P.2d 688 , as support for its assertion that because the pediatrician’s report and information regarding Mother’s U-Visa were not suppressed throughout the entire trial, suppression of that evidence cannot constitute a Brady violation.

2016“Implicit in the standard of materiality is the notion that the significance of any particular bit of evidence can only be determined by comparison to the rest.” Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {34} The State points to our Supreme Court’s case, State v. Rondeau, 1976-NMSC-044 , ¶ 40, 89 N.M. 408 , 553 P.2d 688 , as support for its assertion that because the pediatrician’s report and information regarding Mother’s U-Visa were not suppressed throughout the entire trial, suppression of that evidence cannot constitute a Brady violation.

2025See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 2020-NMCA-005, ¶ 17 , 455 P.3d 890 (explaining that the defendant’s district court motion raising arguments under local rules and the rules of criminal procedure was “not the same as a Brady violation and nothing in the motion was sufficient to raise an allegation of a Brady violation”); see also Rule 12-321(A) NMRA (“To preserve an issue for review, it must appear that a ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked.”).

2025See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 2020-NMCA-005, ¶ 17 , 455 P.3d 890 (explaining that the defendant’s district court motion raising arguments under local rules and the rules of criminal procedure was “not the same as a Brady violation and nothing in the motion was sufficient to raise an allegation of a Brady violation”); see also Rule 12-321(A) NMRA (“To preserve an issue for review, it must appear that a ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked.”).

2024When asked by the district court whether it believed the photographs would have been exculpatory, the State responded that it did not believe so based on Sergeant Smith’s statements that Defendant did not appear to have any injuries. {9} “An alleged Brady violation constitutes a charge of prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. Balenquah, 2009-NMCA-055, ¶ 11 , 146 N.M. 267 , 208 P.3d 912 .

2024When asked by the district court whether it believed the photographs would have been exculpatory, the State responded that it did not believe so based on Sergeant Smith’s statements that Defendant did not appear to have any injuries. {9} “An alleged Brady violation constitutes a charge of prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. Balenquah, 2009-NMCA-055, ¶ 11 , 146 N.M. 267 , 208 P.3d 912 .

2025See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972); see 7 also, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (explaining 8 impeachment “evidence is ‘evidence favorable to an accused,’ so that, if disclosed 9 and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal” 10 (citation omitted)). 11 {31} However, the Brady rule is limited to material evidence. “[T]he prosecutor is 12 not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence 13 favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair 14

2025See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972); see 7 also, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (explaining 8 impeachment “evidence is ‘evidence favorable to an accused,’ so that, if disclosed 9 and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal” 10 (citation omitted)). 11 {31} However, the Brady rule is limited to material evidence. “[T]he prosecutor is 12 not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence 13 favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair 14

2025See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972); see 7 also, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (explaining 8 impeachment “evidence is ‘evidence favorable to an accused,’ so that, if disclosed 9 and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal” 10 (citation omitted)). 11 {31} However, the Brady rule is limited to material evidence. “[T]he prosecutor is 12 not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence 13 favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair 14

2025See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972); see 7 also, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (explaining 8 impeachment “evidence is ‘evidence favorable to an accused,’ so that, if disclosed 9 and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal” 10 (citation omitted)). 11 {31} However, the Brady rule is limited to material evidence. “[T]he prosecutor is 12 not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence 13 favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair 14

2016Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036, ¶ 35 . 9 In order to be material under Brady, there must be “ ‘a reasonable probability that, 10 had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 11 have been different.’ ” State v. Baca, 1993-NMCA-051 , ¶ 21, 115 N.M. 536 , 854 12 P.2d 363 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

2016Turrietta, 2013-NMSC-036, ¶ 35 . 9 In order to be material under Brady, there must be “ ‘a reasonable probability that, 10 had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 11 have been different.’ ” State v. Baca, 1993-NMCA-051 , ¶ 21, 115 N.M. 536 , 854 12 P.2d 363 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

2008Chacon v. State, 88 N.M. 198, 199 , 539 P.2d 218, 219 (Ct.App. 1975). {46} In addition, "the `prosecution' for Brady purposes encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, but extends to the prosecutor's entire office, as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state involved in investigative aspects [of the case]." Smith, 50 F.3d at 824 (citation and footnote omitted); accord State v. Wisniewski, 103 N.M. 430, 435 , 708 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1985). {47} An alleged Brady violation is a charge of prosecutorial misconduct.

2008Chacon v. State, 88 N.M. 198, 199 , 539 P.2d 218, 219 (Ct.App. 1975). {46} In addition, "the `prosecution' for Brady purposes encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, but extends to the prosecutor's entire office, as well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state involved in investigative aspects [of the case]." Smith, 50 F.3d at 824 (citation and footnote omitted); accord State v. Wisniewski, 103 N.M. 430, 435 , 708 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1985). {47} An alleged Brady violation is a charge of prosecutorial misconduct.

2019See State v. Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 33 , 292 P.3d 2 493 (“We generally do not consider issues on appeal that are not preserved below.” 3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2019See State v. Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 33 , 292 P.3d 2 493 (“We generally do not consider issues on appeal that are not preserved below.” 3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2019See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10 , 127 13 N.M. 393 , 981 P.2d 1211 (stating that there is a presumption of correctness in the 14 rulings or decisions of the district court, and the party claiming error bears the burden 15 of showing such error).

2019See State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10 , 127 13 N.M. 393 , 981 P.2d 1211 (stating that there is a presumption of correctness in the 14 rulings or decisions of the district court, and the party claiming error bears the burden 15 of showing such error).

2016“The Brady requirement of disclosing 4 such material applies to all members of the prosecutorial team, including police 5 authorities.” State v. Wisniewski, 1985-NMSC-079 , ¶ 21, 103 N.M. 430 , 708 P.2d 6 1031 (citations omitted); see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (stating that in the context of a 7 Brady violation, “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 8 evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including 9 the police”).

2016“The Brady requirement of disclosing 4 such material applies to all members of the prosecutorial team, including police 5 authorities.” State v. Wisniewski, 1985-NMSC-079 , ¶ 21, 103 N.M. 430 , 708 P.2d 6 1031 (citations omitted); see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (stating that in the context of a 7 Brady violation, “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 8 evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including 9 the police”).

2016“Implicit in the standard of materiality is the notion that the significance of any particular bit of evidence can only be determined by comparison to the rest.” Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {34} The State points to our Supreme Court’s case, State v. Rondeau, 1976-NMSC-044 , ¶ 40, 89 N.M. 408 , 553 P.2d 688 , as support for its assertion that because the pediatrician’s report and information regarding Mother’s U-Visa were not suppressed throughout the entire trial, suppression of that evidence cannot constitute a Brady violation.

2016“Implicit in the standard of materiality is the notion that the significance of any particular bit of evidence can only be determined by comparison to the rest.” Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {34} The State points to our Supreme Court’s case, State v. Rondeau, 1976-NMSC-044 , ¶ 40, 89 N.M. 408 , 553 P.2d 688 , as support for its assertion that because the pediatrician’s report and information regarding Mother’s U-Visa were not suppressed throughout the entire trial, suppression of that evidence cannot constitute a Brady violation.

2025See State v. Candelaria, 2019-NMSC-004 , ¶ 31, 434 P.3d 297 (“Fundamental error only applies in exceptional circumstances when guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the judicial conscience to allow the conviction to stand.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2025See State v. Candelaria, 2019-NMSC-004 , ¶ 31, 434 P.3d 297 (“Fundamental error only applies in exceptional circumstances when guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the judicial conscience to allow the conviction to stand.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2024See, e.g., State v. Ibarra, 1993-NMCA-040 , ¶ 13, 116 N.M. 486 , 864 P.2d 302 (indicating that where an issue is not viable, a motion to amend the docketing statement will be denied). {3} We turn next to the issue originally identified in the docketing statement and renewed in the memorandum in opposition, by which Defendant advances a Brady claim, based upon the State’s failure to disclose reports of prior domestic violence between Defendant and Victim. [MIO 20-25] As we observed in the notice of proposed summary disposition, [CN 2] Defendant’s failure to preserve this issue is problematic.

2024See, e.g., State v. Ibarra, 1993-NMCA-040 , ¶ 13, 116 N.M. 486 , 864 P.2d 302 (indicating that where an issue is not viable, a motion to amend the docketing statement will be denied). {3} We turn next to the issue originally identified in the docketing statement and renewed in the memorandum in opposition, by which Defendant advances a Brady claim, based upon the State’s failure to disclose reports of prior domestic violence between Defendant and Victim. [MIO 20-25] As we observed in the notice of proposed summary disposition, [CN 2] Defendant’s failure to preserve this issue is problematic.

2020See Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (“Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”); see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009) (observing that when the prosecution violates Brady it violates due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).

2020See Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (“Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”); see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009) (observing that when the prosecution violates Brady it violates due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).

2020“Where evidence ‘insignificantly impact[s] the degree of impeachment,’ it generally will ‘not be sufficient to meet the . . . materiality standard.’” Id. at 1120 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009)); accord Case IV, 731 F.3d at 1041-42 ; Case II, 2008-NMSC-024, ¶ 54 .

2020The February 3, 1982, statement was cumulative evidence that Autry did not always tell the truth or the whole truth. “[W]here the credibility of a witness has already been substantially called into question in the same respects by other evidence, additional impeachment evidence will generally be immaterial and will not provide the basis for a Brady claim.” Cooper, 654 F.3d at 1120 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020The statement was not material A “real” Brady violation requires “nondisclosure . . . so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 .

2020The crux of the Brady analysis “is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. at 289-90 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020Concerning whether the suppressed evidence was material to the verdict, this Court has stated, “Materiality only exists if the suppressed evidence ‘creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.’” Case II, 2008-NMSC-024 , ¶ 54 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).

2020See Case III, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-36 .