Brady violation in Delaware

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2023Hr’g Tr. at 25-27, 35. 30 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Michael, 529 A.2d at 756 (“Evidence which the defense can use to impeach a prosecution witness . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 756 n.9 (observing that: “In 1807, the United States Supreme Court ruled that prior to trial a defendant must have access to impeachment evidence in the government’s possession.” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.

2023Hr’g Tr. at 25-27, 35. 30 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Michael, 529 A.2d at 756 (“Evidence which the defense can use to impeach a prosecution witness . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 756 n.9 (observing that: “In 1807, the United States Supreme Court ruled that prior to trial a defendant must have access to impeachment evidence in the government’s possession.” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.

2025Trial Counsel “would agree that a Brady violation warrants a New Trial, if in fact the issue of who Wheeler was with prior to the shooting was relevant.” 181 However, Trial Counsel contends the violation is not crucial to the defense because, like the other individuals’ testimony Miller claims were key impeachment evidence, the interviews were conducted years after the incident. 182 Further, Trial Counsel maintains that proving Wheeler misidentified who was in the Trap House or the Jeep at the time of the incident would not overcome material evidence at trial. 183 There was an overwhelming amo

2025Trial Counsel “would agree that a Brady violation warrants a New Trial, if in fact the issue of who Wheeler was with prior to the shooting was relevant.” 181 However, Trial Counsel contends the violation is not crucial to the defense because, like the other individuals’ testimony Miller claims were key impeachment evidence, the interviews were conducted years after the incident. 182 Further, Trial Counsel maintains that proving Wheeler misidentified who was in the Trap House or the Jeep at the time of the incident would not overcome material evidence at trial. 183 There was an overwhelming amo

2025Such evidence is 114 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1558 (1995). 115 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 116 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 987-989 (Del. 2014). 117 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 993 (Del. 2014). 118 Ray v. State, 280 A.3d 627 , 646 (Del. 2022). 119 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014). 120 Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Del. 2001). 31 evidence favorable to the accused, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.121 The three prong test to determine whether there is a violation of the Brady

2025Such evidence is 114 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1558 (1995). 115 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 116 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 987-989 (Del. 2014). 117 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 993 (Del. 2014). 118 Ray v. State, 280 A.3d 627 , 646 (Del. 2022). 119 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014). 120 Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Del. 2001). 31 evidence favorable to the accused, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.121 The three prong test to determine whether there is a violation of the Brady

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2026Because there was no suppression of evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred.62 Thus, this argument fails as a matter of law.63 58 See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (describing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed

2025State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 324 (Del. 2013), as amended (May 28, 2013); (“The State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . does not, alone and 18 The Court may consider any adverse effect from nondisclosure “on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case.”87 But, in the context of a Rule 61 Motion seeking vacatur of a guilty plea, a defendant who later learns of impeachment information is not entitled to Rule 61 relief when the evidence does not bear upon whether the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.88 Conversely, a prosecutor’s improper failure t

2025State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 324 (Del. 2013), as amended (May 28, 2013); (“The State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . does not, alone and 18 The Court may consider any adverse effect from nondisclosure “on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case.”87 But, in the context of a Rule 61 Motion seeking vacatur of a guilty plea, a defendant who later learns of impeachment information is not entitled to Rule 61 relief when the evidence does not bear upon whether the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.88 Conversely, a prosecutor’s improper failure t

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2021Nov. 26, 2019) (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 ). 14 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)). 15 Taylor, 2019 WL 6353355, at *3 (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 437–38 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958))). 5 stated that “[t]he State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, . . . does not, alone and without more, constitute a Brady violation” 16 The Superior Court will grant a motion for new trial on the basis of

2021Nov. 26, 2019) (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 ). 14 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)). 15 Taylor, 2019 WL 6353355, at *3 (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 437–38 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958))). 5 stated that “[t]he State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, . . . does not, alone and without more, constitute a Brady violation” 16 The Superior Court will grant a motion for new trial on the basis of

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2025Guilford did not establish a Brady violation. 78 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1206 (Del. 2015) (explaining the “Constitution does not require the State to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant because a defendant who pleads guilty decides to forgo not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees and impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”) (cleaned up).

2025Guilford did not establish a Brady violation. 78 Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1206 (Del. 2015) (explaining the “Constitution does not require the State to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant because a defendant who pleads guilty decides to forgo not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees and impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”) (cleaned up).

2021The 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 796 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665, n.38 (1984)). 63 Green, 238 A.3d at 174. 64 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014). 65 Green, 238 A.3d at 174 (citing Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2012)). 11 likelihood of a different result must be substantial not just conceivable.66 Swan also asserts numerous claims that the State failed to produce evidence in violation of requirements established by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland.67 In the context of a Rule 61 motion for postconvict

2021The 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 796 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665, n.38 (1984)). 63 Green, 238 A.3d at 174. 64 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014). 65 Green, 238 A.3d at 174 (citing Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2012)). 11 likelihood of a different result must be substantial not just conceivable.66 Swan also asserts numerous claims that the State failed to produce evidence in violation of requirements established by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland.67 In the context of a Rule 61 motion for postconvict

2018Apr. 30, 2018). 6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 7 Id. 2 of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.”8 The Superior Court must apply the version of Rule 61 in effect at the time the motion for postconviction relief was filed.9 (4) For the Brady claim the Superior Court implicitly decided that Burton’s claim was formerly adjudicated in Burton’s earlier motion and thus barred under Rule 61(i)(4).10 But the court applied the “miscarriage of justice” exception under Rule 61(i)(5) to reach the merits of his claim.11 Unfortunately, the Superior Court applied the incorrect version of Rule

2018Apr. 30, 2018). 6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 7 Id. 2 of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.”8 The Superior Court must apply the version of Rule 61 in effect at the time the motion for postconviction relief was filed.9 (4) For the Brady claim the Superior Court implicitly decided that Burton’s claim was formerly adjudicated in Burton’s earlier motion and thus barred under Rule 61(i)(4).10 But the court applied the “miscarriage of justice” exception under Rule 61(i)(5) to reach the merits of his claim.11 Unfortunately, the Superior Court applied the incorrect version of Rule

2023Hr’g Tr. at 25-27, 35. 30 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Michael, 529 A.2d at 756 (“Evidence which the defense can use to impeach a prosecution witness . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 756 n.9 (observing that: “In 1807, the United States Supreme Court ruled that prior to trial a defendant must have access to impeachment evidence in the government’s possession.” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.

2023Hr’g Tr. at 25-27, 35. 30 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Michael, 529 A.2d at 756 (“Evidence which the defense can use to impeach a prosecution witness . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” (citation omitted)); id. at 756 n.9 (observing that: “In 1807, the United States Supreme Court ruled that prior to trial a defendant must have access to impeachment evidence in the government’s possession.” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.

2022Brady Violation Defendant also alleges in her Motion that the State’s belated production of discovery violates the State’s Brady obligations.32 Brady “is not a discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation.”33 A Brady violation occurs where there is a “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused…[that] violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”34 In order for the State to discharge its responsibility under Brady, the prosecutor must di

2022Brady Violation Defendant also alleges in her Motion that the State’s belated production of discovery violates the State’s Brady obligations.32 Brady “is not a discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation.”33 A Brady violation occurs where there is a “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused…[that] violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”34 In order for the State to discharge its responsibility under Brady, the prosecutor must di

2020In concluding that the Mother’s objections to visitation were not clearly unreasonable, the Family Court recognized the strained relationship between the Mother and the Former Step-Grandfather, which included their inability to communicate with each other and the Former Step- 12 See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 354-55 (Del. 2017) (recognizing that it was unnecessary to consider two of three elements necessary for a Brady violation because the movant failed to establish the third element of prejudice). 6 Grandfather making negative comments to and about the Mother.

2020In concluding that the Mother’s objections to visitation were not clearly unreasonable, the Family Court recognized the strained relationship between the Mother and the Former Step-Grandfather, which included their inability to communicate with each other and the Former Step- 12 See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 354-55 (Del. 2017) (recognizing that it was unnecessary to consider two of three elements necessary for a Brady violation because the movant failed to establish the third element of prejudice). 6 Grandfather making negative comments to and about the Mother.

2019This opinion testimony was arguably not proper, but in any event, it makes it difficult for us to conclude that the defense could make any effective use of the witnesses’ ignorance of any loud incident at the complex that day 54 See Robinson, 2016 WL 5957289, at *3 (finding that the delayed disclosure of a prior inconsistent statement was not a Brady violation requiring reversal because the defendant had made effective use of the statement by cross-examining the witness about it and relying on it during his closing argument). 55 See White, 816 A.2d at 778 (“When a defendant is confronted with

2019This opinion testimony was arguably not proper, but in any event, it makes it difficult for us to conclude that the defense could make any effective use of the witnesses’ ignorance of any loud incident at the complex that day 54 See Robinson, 2016 WL 5957289, at *3 (finding that the delayed disclosure of a prior inconsistent statement was not a Brady violation requiring reversal because the defendant had made effective use of the statement by cross-examining the witness about it and relying on it during his closing argument). 55 See White, 816 A.2d at 778 (“When a defendant is confronted with

2018Hollywood portrayals aside, electronic devices cannot always be tracked with pinpoint precision,19 so even if the iPad responded to the school’s efforts to track it, there still may have been more searching to do (and, control over.”); United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he prosecution must disclose any information within the possession or control of law enforcement personnel . . . .”); United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1975) (recognizing that Brady does not extend to materials that the government does not possess and has “no right to

2018Hollywood portrayals aside, electronic devices cannot always be tracked with pinpoint precision,19 so even if the iPad responded to the school’s efforts to track it, there still may have been more searching to do (and, control over.”); United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he prosecution must disclose any information within the possession or control of law enforcement personnel . . . .”); United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1975) (recognizing that Brady does not extend to materials that the government does not possess and has “no right to

2021Nov. 26, 2019) (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 ). 14 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)). 15 Taylor, 2019 WL 6353355, at *3 (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 437–38 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958))). 5 stated that “[t]he State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, . . . does not, alone and without more, constitute a Brady violation” 16 The Superior Court will grant a motion for new trial on the basis of

2021Nov. 26, 2019) (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 ). 14 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)). 15 Taylor, 2019 WL 6353355, at *3 (citing Wright, 91 A.3d at 977 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 437–38 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958))). 5 stated that “[t]he State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, . . . does not, alone and without more, constitute a Brady violation” 16 The Superior Court will grant a motion for new trial on the basis of

2025August 12, 2024) (“[t]he procedural bars of Rule 61 do not bar a timely claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”) 96 Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 475 (Del. 2000). 97 Id. 98 McGriff, 2024 WL 3770733 , at *2 (holding Defendant’s Brady violation claim barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because Defendant failed to contest the matter during trial, bring up on direct appeal, and provide a basis for cause-and- prejudice from the procedural default.) 99 Id. 100 D.I. 184 p. 52-53. 101 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 , (1986) (“[W]e hold that counsel’s failure to raise a par

2025August 12, 2024) (“[t]he procedural bars of Rule 61 do not bar a timely claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”) 96 Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 475 (Del. 2000). 97 Id. 98 McGriff, 2024 WL 3770733 , at *2 (holding Defendant’s Brady violation claim barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because Defendant failed to contest the matter during trial, bring up on direct appeal, and provide a basis for cause-and- prejudice from the procedural default.) 99 Id. 100 D.I. 184 p. 52-53. 101 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 , (1986) (“[W]e hold that counsel’s failure to raise a par

2020A defendant’s statements to the Superior Court during 10 Id. at 59 . 11 Mack v. State, 2019 WL 7342514 , at *2 (Del.

2016Aug. 2, 2016) (rejecting postconviction claim of Brady violation “[i]n the absence of any indication that the alleged misconduct of [the Chief Medical Examiner] involved Garvey’s case”); see Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988) (holding that in the context of a guilty plea, a movant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the movant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial). 4

2015BY THE COURT: Justice 6 2 8 See, e.g., Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (“There are three components of a Brady violation: (1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or irnpeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant”). 9 Cf. Brown v. State, _ A.3d _, 2015 WL 3776933, at *10 (Del.

2015BY THE COURT: Justice 6 2 8 See, e.g., Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (“There are three components of a Brady violation: (1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or irnpeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant”). 9 Cf. Brown v. State, _ A.3d _, 2015 WL 3776933, at *10 (Del.

2026Def.’s Mot. for a Brady Violation (“The Prosicution [sic], Mr. Earl, and Judge Wallace are now in possession of these missing records.”). 63 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[T]he government is not obliged under Brady -15- NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY. (28) Mr. Earl requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing into the above matters.64 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h), the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing rests within the Court’s discretion.65 And where it is a

2026Def.’s Mot. for a Brady Violation (“The Prosicution [sic], Mr. Earl, and Judge Wallace are now in possession of these missing records.”). 63 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[T]he government is not obliged under Brady -15- NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY. (28) Mr. Earl requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing into the above matters.64 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h), the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing rests within the Court’s discretion.65 And where it is a

2026Def.’s Mot. for a Brady Violation (“The Prosicution [sic], Mr. Earl, and Judge Wallace are now in possession of these missing records.”). 63 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[T]he government is not obliged under Brady -15- NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY. (28) Mr. Earl requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing into the above matters.64 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h), the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing rests within the Court’s discretion.65 And where it is a

2026Def.’s Mot. for a Brady Violation (“The Prosicution [sic], Mr. Earl, and Judge Wallace are now in possession of these missing records.”). 63 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[T]he government is not obliged under Brady -15- NO EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY. (28) Mr. Earl requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing into the above matters.64 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h), the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing rests within the Court’s discretion.65 And where it is a