Brady violation in Minnesota

2023The three elements of a Brady violation are: “(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

2023The three elements of a Brady violation are: “(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2016We need not consider Kidd’s argument that her petitions have substantive merit based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady violation, or a violation of due process because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

2016We need not consider Kidd’s argument that her petitions have substantive merit based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady violation, or a violation of due process because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

2016Virginia Carlson makes additional arguments in a pro se brief. 16 Brady violation “A failure by the State to disclose material, exculpatory evidence justifies a new trial.” State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 622 (Minn. 2012) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 87–88, 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 1196–97 (1963)).

2016Virginia Carlson makes additional arguments in a pro se brief. 16 Brady violation “A failure by the State to disclose material, exculpatory evidence justifies a new trial.” State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 622 (Minn. 2012) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 87–88, 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 1196–97 (1963)).

2016We need not consider Kidd’s argument that her petitions have substantive merit based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady violation, or a violation of due process because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

2016We need not consider Kidd’s argument that her petitions have substantive merit based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady violation, or a violation of due process because a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980)).

2016“To establish a Brady violation, it must be true that: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice to the accused resulted.” State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 622 (Minn. 2012).

2016“To establish a Brady violation, it must be true that: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice to the accused resulted.” State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 622 (Minn. 2012).

2016Finally, a Brady violation also requires a 9 showing of prejudice, in this context “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2000) (quotation and citation omitted).

2016Finally, a Brady violation also requires a 9 showing of prejudice, in this context “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2000) (quotation and citation omitted).

2016Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Minn. 2010). 6 Kidd argues that her postconviction petition has merit based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady violation, a due-process violation, manifest injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

2016Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Minn. 2010). 6 Kidd argues that her postconviction petition has merit based on newly discovered evidence, a Brady violation, a due-process violation, manifest injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2024See State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 326-27 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice stemming from his claimed Brady violation because “the evidence in question was not admissible”); State v. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 1985) (finding discovery violation harmless because most of the 20 undisclosed evidence would have been inadmissible).

1990See State v. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498, 506-07 (Minn.1985).

2023Affirmed. 1 Graham argues that State v. Schmid supports his Brady claim. 487 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 1992).

2023In Schmid, this court stated that “[w]hen the police intentionally destroy evidence, it is a natural inference that it was destroyed because it may have been exculpatory and, hence, prejudice has been caused to defendant.” Id. at 542 (emphasis added).

2016We conclude that Virginia Carlson has failed to establish any element of a Brady violation. 17 Right to testify “A defendant’s right to testify is protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Minnesota law.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2013).

2016We conclude that Virginia Carlson has failed to establish any element of a Brady violation. 17 Right to testify “A defendant’s right to testify is protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Minnesota law.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2013).

2016“Whether a discovery violation occurred presents a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Colbert, 716 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Minn. 2006).

2016“Whether a discovery violation occurred presents a question of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Colbert, 716 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Minn. 2006).

2003Woodruff v. State, 608 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Minn.2000) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)).

2003Woodruff v. State, 608 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Minn.2000) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)).

2025And in Giglio, the Supreme Court extended the Brady rule to material evidence that could be used to impeach a witness’s credibility. 405 U.S. at 154 .

2025And in Giglio, the Supreme Court extended the Brady rule to material evidence that could be used to impeach a witness’s credibility. 405 U.S. at 154 .

2016We recognized in Roberts that the information regarding the SPPDCL could have influenced the defendant’s decision to waive his right to a trial and plead guilty, but determined “it is not fundamentally unfair to hold [appellant] accountable for his choice to accept the state’s scientific evidence at face value and resolve his case with a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence.” Id. 6 Appellant asserts that his petition has substantive merit based on a Brady violation, a due process violation, a manifest injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

2016We recognized in Roberts that the information regarding the SPPDCL could have influenced the defendant’s decision to waive his right to a trial and plead guilty, but determined “it is not fundamentally unfair to hold [appellant] accountable for his choice to accept the state’s scientific evidence at face value and resolve his case with a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence.” Id. 6 Appellant asserts that his petition has substantive merit based on a Brady violation, a due process violation, a manifest injustice, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

2024But Melina claims the postconviction court should have held an evidentiary hearing because “the record does not reflect whether the recordings were returned [to him] as ordered.” “When information is readily available to the defendant, it is not Brady material, and the prosecution does not violate Brady by not discovering and disclosing the 20 information.” United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1994).

2024See State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 326-27 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice stemming from his claimed Brady violation because “the evidence in question was not admissible”); State v. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 1985) (finding discovery violation harmless because most of the 20 undisclosed evidence would have been inadmissible).

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2024Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 459-60 (Minn. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 1 A defendant “must meet all three requirements to establish a Brady violation.” Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017).

2018See Perry v. State , 731 N.W.2d 143 , 146 (Minn. 2007) ("Claims asserted in a ... subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred under this court's Knaffla rule if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition."); see also State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , 243 N.W.2d 737 , 741 (1976).

2018See Perry v. State , 731 N.W.2d 143 , 146 (Minn. 2007) ("Claims asserted in a ... subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred under this court's Knaffla rule if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition."); see also State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , 243 N.W.2d 737 , 741 (1976).

2018See Perry v. State , 731 N.W.2d 143 , 146 (Minn. 2007) ("Claims asserted in a ... subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred under this court's Knaffla rule if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition."); see also State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , 243 N.W.2d 737 , 741 (1976).

2018See Perry v. State , 731 N.W.2d 143 , 146 (Minn. 2007) ("Claims asserted in a ... subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred under this court's Knaffla rule if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition."); see also State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246 , 243 N.W.2d 737 , 741 (1976).

2016See also Mitchell, 216 Minn. at 373 , 13 N.W.2d at 23 (permitting second new-trial motion on *888 grounds that were “nonexistent” at the time of the first new-trial motion).

2016See also Mitchell, 216 Minn. at 373 , 13 N.W.2d at 23 (permitting second new-trial motion on *888 grounds that were “nonexistent” at the time of the first new-trial motion).

2016On September 26, 2016 the state dismissed the remaining count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct against R.E. 3 Appellant, in his pro se supplemental brief, asserts that “this is a Brady violation.” “An assignment of error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007).

2016On September 26, 2016 the state dismissed the remaining count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct against R.E. 3 Appellant, in his pro se supplemental brief, asserts that “this is a Brady violation.” “An assignment of error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007).

2016State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn. 1999).

2016State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn. 1999).

2016See State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).

2016See State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).

2016Co. v. Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 925-26 (Minn.1996)). 8 Applying Rubey here, DeLaCruz has established a satisfactory reason for raising the alleged Brady violation in his amended new-trial motion.

2016Co. v. Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 925-26 (Minn.1996)). 8 Applying Rubey here, DeLaCruz has established a satisfactory reason for raising the alleged Brady violation in his amended new-trial motion.

2016DECISION “The denial of a new trial by a postconviction court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion and review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” State v. Hooper, 620 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Minn. 2000). 1.