Brady violation in Colorado

2025See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” (emphasis added)).

2025See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” (emphasis added)).

2022Eason appears to accept this view. 24 Sheriff’s Department destroyed it. “[E]xculpatory evidence includes evidence which bears on the credibility of a witness the prosecution intends to call at a trial.” Braunthal, 31 P.3d at 174-75 ; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”).

2022Eason appears to accept this view. 24 Sheriff’s Department destroyed it. “[E]xculpatory evidence includes evidence which bears on the credibility of a witness the prosecution intends to call at a trial.” Braunthal, 31 P.3d at 174-75 ; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”).

2025Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995).

2025Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995).

2025See People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4, ¶ 29 (listing elements of a Brady claim). 19 continuing his trial was nonetheless inappropriate under the circumstances.

2025See People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4, ¶ 29 (listing elements of a Brady claim). 19 continuing his trial was nonetheless inappropriate under the circumstances.

2021Unit ed States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). ¶ 27 To obtain reversal of a conviction based on a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution sup pressed specific evidence; (2) the suppressed evidence is exculpatory or favorable to the defendant; and (3) it is material to the case.

2021Unit ed States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). ¶ 27 To obtain reversal of a conviction based on a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution sup pressed specific evidence; (2) the suppressed evidence is exculpatory or favorable to the defendant; and (3) it is material to the case.

2025Bueno, ¶ 29; see Smith, 50 F.3d at 824 .

2025Bueno, ¶ 29; see Smith, 50 F.3d at 824 .

2025People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4 , ¶ 29 (citing People v. Pope, 724 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. 1986)).

2025People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4 , ¶ 29 (citing People v. Pope, 724 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. 1986)).

2019“Under the Brady standard, ‘withheld evidence that is material may be that which impeaches a witness where the issue of the witness’ reliability and credibility is crucial.’” Id. at 345 (quoting State v. Henries, 704 A.2d 24, 35 (N.J.

2019“Under the Brady standard, ‘withheld evidence that is material may be that which impeaches a witness where the issue of the witness’ reliability and credibility is crucial.’” Id. at 345 (quoting State v. Henries, 704 A.2d 24, 35 (N.J.

2017P. 16(I)(a)(2), a prosecutor “shall disclose to the defense any material or information within his or her possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce the punishment therefor.” This discovery rule “incorporates the holding of Brady v. Maryland.” People v. Bradley, 25 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo. App. 2001); see also Bueno, ¶ 11 (“Under Crim.

2017P. 16(I)(a)(2), a prosecutor “shall disclose to the defense any material or information within his or her possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce the punishment therefor.” This discovery rule “incorporates the holding of Brady v. Maryland.” People v. Bradley, 25 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo. App. 2001); see also Bueno, ¶ 11 (“Under Crim.

2017That is, even assuming the prosecutor’s failure to disclose constituted a Brady violation, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the district court’s failure to provide an adequate sanction “might have contributed to the conviction.” Hagos, ¶ 11 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ). ¶ 46 This means, of course, any error in the district court’s issuance of a sanction under Rule 16 was necessarily harmless under the lesser non-constitutional standard.

2017That is, even assuming the prosecutor’s failure to disclose constituted a Brady violation, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the district court’s failure to provide an adequate sanction “might have contributed to the conviction.” Hagos, ¶ 11 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ). ¶ 46 This means, of course, any error in the district court’s issuance of a sanction under Rule 16 was necessarily harmless under the lesser non-constitutional standard.

2014Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 , 129 S.Ct. 2308 , 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009) (holding the Brady framework inapplicable to post-conviction proceedings generally), we have long-since concluded that the constitutional requirement to disclose favorable evidence continues, at least through the auto matic review by the supreme court required in this jurisdiction, Rodrigues, 786 P.2d at 1082.

2014Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68-69 , 129 S.Ct. 2308 , 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009) (holding the Brady framework inapplicable to post-conviction proceedings generally), we have long-since concluded that the constitutional requirement to disclose favorable evidence continues, at least through the auto matic review by the supreme court required in this jurisdiction, Rodrigues, 786 P.2d at 1082.

2008Although the defendant does not have a due process right to receive notice of inculpatory evidence, see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168-70 [, 116 S.Ct. 2074 , 135 L.Ed.2d 457 ] (1996); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-61 [, 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 ] (1977), the statute permits disclosure of any information that is necessary to a fair resolution of the charges.

2008Although the defendant does not have a due process right to receive notice of inculpatory evidence, see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168-70 [, 116 S.Ct. 2074 , 135 L.Ed.2d 457 ] (1996); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-61 [, 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 ] (1977), the statute permits disclosure of any information that is necessary to a fair resolution of the charges.

2008Although the defendant does not have a due process right to receive notice of inculpatory evidence, see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168-70 [, 116 S.Ct. 2074 , 135 L.Ed.2d 457 ] (1996); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-61 [, 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 ] (1977), the statute permits disclosure of any information that is necessary to a fair resolution of the charges.

2008Although the defendant does not have a due process right to receive notice of inculpatory evidence, see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 168-70 [, 116 S.Ct. 2074 , 135 L.Ed.2d 457 ] (1996); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-61 [, 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 ] (1977), the statute permits disclosure of any information that is necessary to a fair resolution of the charges.

1990A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 ; accord Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 , 107 S.Ct. at 1001-1002 . *338 The Bagley materiality standard is couched in terms appropriate for use in appellate review.

1990A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 ; accord Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 , 107 S.Ct. at 1001-1002 . *338 The Bagley materiality standard is couched in terms appropriate for use in appellate review.

1990See, e.g., People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334, 337 (Colo.1987); People v. Gann, 724 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Colo.1986).

1990See, e.g., People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334, 337 (Colo.1987); People v. Gann, 724 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Colo.1986).

1986It is sufficient that the material "`might' be `favorable' to the accused." Garcia v. District Court at 46 , 589 P.2d at 929 (citations omitted).

1986It is sufficient that the material "`might' be `favorable' to the accused." Garcia v. District Court at 46 , 589 P.2d at 929 (citations omitted).