Brady violation in Arizona

2026See State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 528 (1985) (“When previously undisclosed exculpatory information is revealed at the trial and presented to the jury, there is no Brady violation.”); State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4 (1981) (same).

2024There may be violations of Rule 15.1, although arguably harmless, where there is no Brady violation.” State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4 (1981).

2026“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). ¶163 McCauley claims the State’s “decision to withhold favorable evidence robbed [him] of the opportunity to rebut the State’s penalty phase 56 STATE OF ARIZONA V.

2026“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). ¶163 McCauley claims the State’s “decision to withhold favorable evidence robbed [him] of the opportunity to rebut the State’s penalty phase 56 STATE OF ARIZONA V.

2026See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (construing the federal constitution’s due process provision as requiring the State to disclose all material, exculpatory evidence); Schreiber, 115 Ariz. at 556 (applying the Brady standard to find a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of material evidence deprived the defendant of his right to due process under the State constitution).

2026See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (construing the federal constitution’s due process provision as requiring the State to disclose all material, exculpatory evidence); Schreiber, 115 Ariz. at 556 (applying the Brady standard to find a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of material evidence deprived the defendant of his right to due process under the State constitution).

2018Braxton argues this information was exculpatory, and therefore the State was required to disclose it under Brady. 2 We disagree. ¶12 “A Brady violation occurs only when the prosecutor, without regard to good faith or bad faith, withholds evidence that is material to a defendant’s guilt or punishment.” State v. Arvallo, 232 Ariz. 200, 206, ¶ 36 (App. 2013).

2018Braxton argues this information was exculpatory, and therefore the State was required to disclose it under Brady. 2 We disagree. ¶12 “A Brady violation occurs only when the prosecutor, without regard to good faith or bad faith, withholds evidence that is material to a defendant’s guilt or punishment.” State v. Arvallo, 232 Ariz. 200, 206, ¶ 36 (App. 2013).

2017“The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4 (1981) (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 ).

1981United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 112 , 96 S.Ct. at 2402 ; see Tala-mante v. Romero, supra. When previously undisclosed exculpatory information is revealed at the trial and is presented to the jury, there is no Brady violation.

2022“The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 424, ¶ 52 (2003) (quoting State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 405 (1989)). ¶84 Gomes fails to show the internal affairs report was material or exculpatory.

2003See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 , 100 S.Ct. at 2537 . ¶ 52 “The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 405 , 783 P.2d 1184, 1197 (1989) (citation omitted).

2017Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). ¶19 To establish a “true Brady violation,” a defendant must show: (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, (2) the State suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) the nondisclosure caused the defendant prejudice.

2016Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotation omitted). ¶21 “The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4 (1981).

2022“The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 424, ¶ 52 (2003) (quoting State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 405 (1989)). ¶84 Gomes fails to show the internal affairs report was material or exculpatory.

2018See State v. Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 423-24, ¶¶ 47-53 (2003) (prosecutor avowed there was no Brady material in sealed documents; court concluded defendant’s Brady claim failed, in part, because defendant had not shown the sealed documents were in any way exculpatory).

2013Cf. State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 506 , 844 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1993) (finding no Brady violation when “one could only say that the unpreserved evidence could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have been exculpatory or inculpatory”).

2013Cf. State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 506 , 844 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1993) (finding no Brady violation when “one could only say that the unpreserved evidence could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have been exculpatory or inculpatory”).

2017Exculpatory or impeachment evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “[T]here is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Id. at 281.

2004Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 ; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.”). ¶ 15 Rule 15.1, too, is an expression of due process.

2026See Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (“Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”).

2020Evidence is “material” if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith, 565 U.S. at 75 (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 (2009)). ¶6 Petitioner fails to present a colorable Brady claim for two reasons.

2026See State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 528 (1985) (“When previously undisclosed exculpatory information is revealed at the trial and presented to the jury, there is no Brady violation.”); State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4 (1981) (same).

2024See id. ("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would 9 STATE v. COCKHEARN Decision of the Court convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the . . . court." (quoting Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631 )); cf. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520 , 527–28 (1985) (finding that an untimely disclosure was not a Brady violation as "the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice" because "the evidence was never presented at trial"). ¶30 Further, the detective never testified so Cockhearn did not suffer any prejudice from the court's cross-examination limitatio

2019See United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no Brady violation where the defendant received evidence four weeks before trial and “had almost a month after the government disclosed” it to investigate the material and “put it to effective use at trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2019See United States v. Walters , 351 F.3d 159 , 169 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding no Brady violation where the defendant received evidence four weeks before trial and "had almost a month after the government disclosed" it to investigate the material and "put it to effective use at trial" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 291 (explaining a defendant bears the burden of proving a Brady violation) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 534 (1995)). 7 STATE v. GRIEGO Decision of the Court persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Id. (quoting State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611 (1992), and citing State v. Lee, 608, 616 (1997)).

2017See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 291 (explaining a defendant bears the burden of proving a Brady violation) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 534 (1995)). 7 STATE v. GRIEGO Decision of the Court persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Id. (quoting State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611 (1992), and citing State v. Lee, 608, 616 (1997)).

2003However, “Brady applies only to items of evidence suppressed by the prosecutor which are favorable to an accused.” State v. Smith, 122 Ariz. 58, 62-63 , 593 P.2d 281, 285-86 (1979). ¶ 53 Appellant’s Brady claim fails for three reasons.

2003However, “Brady applies only to items of evidence suppressed by the prosecutor which are favorable to an accused.” State v. Smith, 122 Ariz. 58, 62-63 , 593 P.2d 281, 285-86 (1979). ¶ 53 Appellant’s Brady claim fails for three reasons.

2003See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 , 100 S.Ct. at 2537 . ¶ 52 “The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 405 , 783 P.2d 1184, 1197 (1989) (citation omitted).

2003See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 , 100 S.Ct. at 2537 . ¶ 52 “The test for a Brady violation is whether the undisclosed material would have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury.” State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 405 , 783 P.2d 1184, 1197 (1989) (citation omitted).

2004“The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Banks , — U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 1272 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). ¶ 20 First, the Brady rule requires disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , both exculpatory and for the purpose of impeachment.

2004“The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Banks , — U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 1272 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). ¶ 20 First, the Brady rule requires disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , both exculpatory and for the purpose of impeachment.

2026See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (construing the federal constitution’s due process provision as requiring the State to disclose all material, exculpatory evidence); Schreiber, 115 Ariz. at 556 (applying the Brady standard to find a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of material evidence deprived the defendant of his right to due process under the State constitution).

2026See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (construing the federal constitution’s due process provision as requiring the State to disclose all material, exculpatory evidence); Schreiber, 115 Ariz. at 556 (applying the Brady standard to find a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of material evidence deprived the defendant of his right to due process under the State constitution).

1985See United States v. Agurs, supra; Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784 , (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 , 101 S.Ct. 223 , 66 L.Ed.2d 99 ; State v. Lukezic, supra. In Agurs , the United States Supreme Court announced three categories of undisclosed evidence requiring three different levels of materiality: first, in those cases in which the prosecution has knowingly used perjured testimony, the conviction must be set aside if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s verdict; second, where a pretrial request has been made for specific

1981United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 112 , 96 S.Ct. at 2402 ; see Tala-mante v. Romero, supra. When previously undisclosed exculpatory information is revealed at the trial and is presented to the jury, there is no Brady violation.

2026Cf. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (discussing due process notions of fundamental fairness and delivery of “exculpatory evidence into the hands of the accused, thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring the integrity of our criminal justice system”). ¶165 But even if we deem the criminal history report favorable to McCauley in some way, his Brady claim fails because the report was not material to his guilt or punishment.

2024See id. ("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would 9 STATE v. COCKHEARN Decision of the Court convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the . . . court." (quoting Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631 )); cf. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520 , 527–28 (1985) (finding that an untimely disclosure was not a Brady violation as "the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice" because "the evidence was never presented at trial"). ¶30 Further, the detective never testified so Cockhearn did not suffer any prejudice from the court's cross-examination limitatio

2024See id. ("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would 9 STATE v. COCKHEARN Decision of the Court convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the . . . court." (quoting Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631 )); cf. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520 , 527–28 (1985) (finding that an untimely disclosure was not a Brady violation as "the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice" because "the evidence was never presented at trial"). ¶30 Further, the detective never testified so Cockhearn did not suffer any prejudice from the court's cross-examination limitatio

2024See id. ("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would 9 STATE v. COCKHEARN Decision of the Court convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the . . . court." (quoting Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631 )); cf. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520 , 527–28 (1985) (finding that an untimely disclosure was not a Brady violation as "the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice" because "the evidence was never presented at trial"). ¶30 Further, the detective never testified so Cockhearn did not suffer any prejudice from the court's cross-examination limitatio

2024See id. ("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would 9 STATE v. COCKHEARN Decision of the Court convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the . . . court." (quoting Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631 )); cf. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520 , 527–28 (1985) (finding that an untimely disclosure was not a Brady violation as "the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice" because "the evidence was never presented at trial"). ¶30 Further, the detective never testified so Cockhearn did not suffer any prejudice from the court's cross-examination limitatio

2023Colo. 1983), aff’d, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984), that “a psychiatrist incurs no duty to any third party unless his patient communicates to the psychiatrist a specific threat against a specific person.” Hamman, 161 Ariz. at 60 . ¶29 This Court rejected the Brady framework, instead applying Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), which concluded that once a therapist determines, or reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious risk to commit violence against others, the therapist bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the fore

2023Colo. 1983), aff’d, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984), that “a psychiatrist incurs no duty to any third party unless his patient communicates to the psychiatrist a specific threat against a specific person.” Hamman, 161 Ariz. at 60 . ¶29 This Court rejected the Brady framework, instead applying Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), which concluded that once a therapist determines, or reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious risk to commit violence against others, the therapist bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the fore

2023See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n.2 (1975) (by removing “the issue of factual guilt from the case,” a guilty plea “renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt”).

2020Evidence is “material” if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith, 565 U.S. at 75 (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 (2009)). ¶6 Petitioner fails to present a colorable Brady claim for two reasons.

2020First, pleading defendants waive all non-jurisdictional defects antedating the plea, Flores, 218 Ariz. at 409-10, ¶ 6 , including any pretrial Brady violations, State v. Reed, 121 Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1979). ¶7 Second, the undisclosed documents were neither exculpatory nor material.

2020First, pleading defendants waive all non-jurisdictional defects antedating the plea, Flores, 218 Ariz. at 409-10, ¶ 6 , including any pretrial Brady violations, State v. Reed, 121 Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1979). ¶7 Second, the undisclosed documents were neither exculpatory nor material.