117 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 46 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2026A court must consider three essential elements when determining "whether a Brady violation has occurred: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019). 2026A court must consider three essential elements when determining "whether a Brady violation has occurred: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019). | 24 | 26 |
State v. Martinigreen2 sentences2026"In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268 (1999). 2026"In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268 (1999). | 22 | 29 |
United States v. Bagleygreen2 sentences2026The Brady rule applies to “[i]mpeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Brown, 236 N.J. at 518 . 2. 2026The Brady rule applies to “[i]mpeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Brown, 236 N.J. at 518 . 2. | 20 | 25 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019) (emphasis added) (A Brady violation evidencing the deprivation of a defendant's right to a fair trial is present when "(1) the evidence at issue [is] favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State [has] suppressed the evidence, either purposefully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence [is] material to the defendant's case." (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963))). 2025See State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019) (emphasis added) (A Brady violation evidencing the deprivation of a defendant's right to a fair trial is present when "(1) the evidence at issue [is] favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State [has] suppressed the evidence, either purposefully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence [is] material to the defendant's case." (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963))). | 15 | 34 |
Moore v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2024In order to make a Brady claim, a defendant must show three criteria: "(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268-69 (1999) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972)). 2024In order to make a Brady claim, a defendant must show three criteria: "(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 268-69 (1999) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972)). | 14 | 18 |
United States v. Agursgreen2 sentences2025The Brady rule is invoked when information is discovered after trial "which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 2025The Brady rule is invoked when information is discovered after trial "which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). | 13 | 15 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2025The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that three elements must be established to prove a Brady violation: "(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019) (citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 497 (1998)). 2025The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that three elements must be established to prove a Brady violation: "(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019) (citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 497 (1998)). | 11 | 14 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2025Cf. Carter, 91 N.J. at 121 ("For the reasons outlined in our discussion of the Brady violation, we hold that [as to the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence] the evidence . . . is neither material nor of the sort that would lead to a change in the jury's verdict."). 2025Cf. Carter, 91 N.J. at 121 ("For the reasons outlined in our discussion of the Brady violation, we hold that [as to the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence] the evidence . . . is neither material nor of the sort that would lead to a change in the jury's verdict."). | 9 | 13 |
Giglio v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. [Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 .] "Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule." Id. at 676 (referencing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). 2024Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. [Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 .] "Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule." Id. at 676 (referencing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). | 8 | 15 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2025Rather, we assume if only for the sake of argument that the first two prongs of the Brady test have been satisfied, mindful that "[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 , 361 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)); see also State v. Nelson, 330 N.J. 2025Rather, we assume if only for the sake of argument that the first two prongs of the Brady test have been satisfied, mindful that "[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." State v. Higgs, 253 N.J. 333 , 361 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)); see also State v. Nelson, 330 N.J. | 8 | 9 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2025In Carter, our Supreme Court commented that "[w]hereas the test of materiality for the granting of a new trial under a Brady analysis is simply whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial, . . . the test to be satisfied under a newly discovered evidence approach is more stringent." 85 N.J. at 314 ; see also Henries, 306 N.J. 2025In Carter, our Supreme Court commented that "[w]hereas the test of materiality for the granting of a new trial under a Brady analysis is simply whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial, . . . the test to be satisfied under a newly discovered evidence approach is more stringent." 85 N.J. at 314 ; see also Henries, 306 N.J. | 7 | 15 |
State v. Knightgreen2 sentences1997But see State v. Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A.2d 642 (criticizing Marshall’s reference to two separate standards in a Brady analysis dependent upon whether the suppressed evidence was or was not specifically requested.). 1997But see State v. Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A.2d 642 (criticizing Marshall’s reference to two separate standards in a Brady analysis dependent upon whether the suppressed evidence was or was not specifically requested.). | 4 | 8 |
State v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2026"Whether evidence is material and thus subject to disclosure under the Brady rule is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 , A-1603-25 6 185 (1997); see also State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. 2026"Whether evidence is material and thus subject to disclosure under the Brady rule is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 , A-1603-25 6 185 (1997); see also State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. | 4 | 6 |
State v. Russogreen2 sentences2025"In order to establish a Brady violation, [a] defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Russo, 333 N.J. 2025"In order to establish a Brady violation, [a] defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material." State v. Russo, 333 N.J. | 4 | 6 |
State v. Hyppolitegreen2 sentences2026Moreover, our Court has determined that "[i]mpeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, is governed by the Brady rule." State v. Hyppolite, 236 N.J. 154, 165 (2018). 2026Moreover, our Court has determined that "[i]mpeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, is governed by the Brady rule." State v. Hyppolite, 236 N.J. 154, 165 (2018). | 4 | 4 |
Kyles v. Whitleygreen2 sentences2024One does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. [Id. at 435.] A-3365-22 20 Third, if the reviewing court finds constitutional error under Bagley, "there is no need for further harmless-error review." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 . 2024One does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. [Id. at 435.] A-3365-22 20 Third, if the reviewing court finds constitutional error under Bagley, "there is no need for further harmless-error review." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 . | 3 | 7 |
State v. Nashgreen2 sentences2026The Brady rule also includes "[t]he obligation" to share "impeachment evidence within the prosecution's possession." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 544 (2013) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)). 2026The Brady rule also includes "[t]he obligation" to share "impeachment evidence within the prosecution's possession." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 544 (2013) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)). | 3 | 3 |
Strickler v. Greenegreen2 sentences2026The Brady rule also includes "[t]he obligation" to share "impeachment evidence within the prosecution's possession." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 544 (2013) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)). 2026The Brady rule also includes "[t]he obligation" to share "impeachment evidence within the prosecution's possession." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 544 (2013) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)). | 3 | 3 |
State of New Jersey v. Scott Robertsongreen2 sentences2026"Whether evidence is material and thus subject to disclosure under the Brady rule is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 , A-1603-25 6 185 (1997); see also State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. 2026"Whether evidence is material and thus subject to disclosure under the Brady rule is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 , A-1603-25 6 185 (1997); see also State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Parsonsgreen2 sentences2009In Parsons , this court articulated that standard for evaluating materiality when the defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea on a claimed Brady violation. 341 N.J.Super. at 454-56 , 775 A. 2d 576 . 2009In Parsons , this court articulated that standard for evaluating materiality when the defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea on a claimed Brady violation. 341 N.J.Super. at 454-56 , 775 A. 2d 576 . | 2 | 7 |
State v. Henriesgreen2 sentences2025In Carter, our Supreme Court commented that "[w]hereas the test of materiality for the granting of a new trial under a Brady analysis is simply whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial, . . . the test to be satisfied under a newly discovered evidence approach is more stringent." 85 N.J. at 314 ; see also Henries, 306 N.J. 2025In Carter, our Supreme Court commented that "[w]hereas the test of materiality for the granting of a new trial under a Brady analysis is simply whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial, . . . the test to be satisfied under a newly discovered evidence approach is more stringent." 85 N.J. at 314 ; see also Henries, 306 N.J. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Viglianogreen2 sentences2018As this Court explained a half century ago *960 when it discussed the Brady rule, its "purpose ... is not to punish society for a prosecutor's conduct, but to avoid an unfair trial of an accused." State v. Vigliano , 50 N.J. 51 , 61, 232 A.2d 129 (1967). 2018As this Court explained a half century ago *960 when it discussed the Brady rule, its "purpose ... is not to punish society for a prosecutor's conduct, but to avoid an unfair trial of an accused." State v. Vigliano , 50 N.J. 51 , 61, 232 A.2d 129 (1967). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Russellgreen2 sentences2024Accordingly, "in the context of a Brady violation, the remedy of dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is utilized when 'the conduct A-0806-21 17 of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.'" Brown, 236 N.J. at 528 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)). 2024Accordingly, "in the context of a Brady violation, the remedy of dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is utilized when 'the conduct A-0806-21 17 of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.'" Brown, 236 N.J. at 528 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Mustarogreen2 sentences2021Super. 495, 516 (App. Div. 2012) (citing State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. 2021Super. 495, 516 (App. Div. 2012) (citing State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2000Although not decided in the context of a Brady violation, in State v. Taylor, 49 N.J. 440 , 231 A. 2d 212 (1967), our Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for post-conviction relief when defendant learned, after trial, that his co-defendant, who testified against him, had had conversations with the trial prosecutor who agreed to recommend leniency to the judge if he testified against defendant in accordance with his statement. 2000Although not decided in the context of a Brady violation, in State v. Taylor, 49 N.J. 440 , 231 A. 2d 212 (1967), our Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for post-conviction relief when defendant learned, after trial, that his co-defendant, who testified against him, had had conversations with the trial prosecutor who agreed to recommend leniency to the judge if he testified against defendant in accordance with his statement. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026As to the second element, the "disclosure rule applies only to information of which the prosecution is actually or constructively aware." State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 498 (1998); see also State v. Washington, 453 N.J. 2026As to the second element, the "disclosure rule applies only to information of which the prosecution is actually or constructively aware." State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 498 (1998); see also State v. Washington, 453 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Leonard A. Pelullogreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Laganellagreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Reynoldsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Graham v. Wilsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Anthony Antone, Manuel Gispert, Larry Neil Miller, Frank Diecidue, A/K/A \The Under Bossgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Buitrago v. Scullygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Taylor v. Maggiogreen | 2 | 2 |
| Larry Mills v. Charles Scully, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondentgreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Ruizgreen | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments: THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR POST- CONVICTION RELIEF AND FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INVESTIGATE ALIBI AND OTHER EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). [DEFENDANT]'S MOTIONS ALSO A-0831-23 5 SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED PURSUANT TO STATE v. CARTER, 85 N.J. 300 (1981), BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, AND DUE TO THE STATE'S VIOLATION OF BRADY v. MARYLAND, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 2025See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth a two-prong test requiring showings that (1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel is not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Waysgreen2 sentences2021Simply put, “[w]e would not require a person who is probably innocent to languish in prison because the exculpatory evidence was discoverable and overlooked,” Ways, 180 N.J. at 192 , but a post-conviction request for even purported Brady materials must make a threshold showing that the requested materials are, in fact, Brady materials, see Martini, 160 N.J. at 268 (“In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material.”); see also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68-70 2021Simply put, “[w]e would not require a person who is probably innocent to languish in prison because the exculpatory evidence was discoverable and overlooked,” Ways, 180 N.J. at 192 , but a post-conviction request for even purported Brady materials must make a threshold showing that the requested materials are, in fact, Brady materials, see Martini, 160 N.J. at 268 (“In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material.”); see also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68-70 | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Hollandergreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Duquene Pierre(072859)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Knightgreen2 sentences1997But see State v. Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A.2d 642 (criticizing Marshall’s reference to two separate standards in a Brady analysis dependent upon whether the suppressed evidence was or was not specifically requested.). 1997But see State v. Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 247 , 678 A.2d 642 (criticizing Marshall’s reference to two separate standards in a Brady analysis dependent upon whether the suppressed evidence was or was not specifically requested.). | 1 | 8 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Landano
green
2 sentences1997See R. 3:13-3(c)(6), (7); Landano, supra, 271 N.J.Super. 1 , 637 A.2d 1270 (finding Brady violation where State withheld evidence linking others to crime). 1997See R. 3:13-3(c)(6), (7); Landano, supra, 271 N.J.Super. 1 , 637 A.2d 1270 (finding Brady violation where State withheld evidence linking others to crime). | 6 | 1995–2024 |
State v. Harrington
red
2 sentences1995Super. 1, 32 , 637 A. 2d 1270 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 164 , 644 A. 2d 612 (1994), discussing that distinction in the context of a Brady violation and its consequences. 1995Super. 1, 32 , 637 A. 2d 1270 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 164 , 644 A. 2d 612 (1994), discussing that distinction in the context of a Brady violation and its consequences. | 3 | 1995–1997 |
| State v. Blue green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Napue v. Illinois green | 2 | 1994–2001 |
| Otto Graham v. William Wilson, Superintendent of the Centennial Correctional Facility, and Duane L. Woodard, Attorney General of the State of Colorado green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| United States v. Israel Ruiz, Jr. green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| Saleem v. Evans green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| Slater v. Delaware Trust Co. green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| Everett v. United States green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| State v. Harris green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Muldrow v. Conway green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Allen green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Lixandra Hernandez and Jose Sanchez(075444) green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Elders green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Webster green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Oregon v. Kennedy green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| United States v. Mel Lambert Velarde green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Illinois v. Fisher green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Rhodes v. Stewart green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Dickerson green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Dreher green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Greeley neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Colasurdo green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Hollander green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Greeley green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.