Brady violation in Massachusetts

2025See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 6 To establish a Brady violation, "a defendant must establish (1) that the evidence [was] in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor or a person subject to the prosecutor's control, (2) that the evidence is exculpatory, and (3) prejudice" (quotations and citation omitted).

2025See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 6 To establish a Brady violation, "a defendant must establish (1) that the evidence [was] in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor or a person subject to the prosecutor's control, (2) that the evidence is exculpatory, and (3) prejudice" (quotations and citation omitted).

2017See United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97 , 103 (1976) (violation of Brady rule "involves the discovery, after trial , of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense" [emphasis supplied] ).

2005The Brady rule was later expanded in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), when the Court held that even in the absence of a discovery request from the defendant, the prosecutor must nevertheless turn over to the defendant obviously exculpatory evidence in his possession.

2025The evidence presented at trial established that the still photographs reflected the specific dates and times on which the borrowed key fob was used within the footage obtained from the motion-activated cameras.5 Given the specificity of the relevant timeframes -- that is, the times at which the borrowed fob was used -- we see little, if any, likelihood that the video footage featuring dates and times other than those for which the stills were taken would have shown potentially exculpatory evidence of "other tenants and visitors entering or exiting the apartment complex."6 Where the requiremen

2025The evidence presented at trial established that the still photographs reflected the specific dates and times on which the borrowed key fob was used within the footage obtained from the motion-activated cameras.5 Given the specificity of the relevant timeframes -- that is, the times at which the borrowed fob was used -- we see little, if any, likelihood that the video footage featuring dates and times other than those for which the stills were taken would have shown potentially exculpatory evidence of "other tenants and visitors entering or exiting the apartment complex."6 Where the requiremen

1978To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that evidence actually existed (Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 732 [1978]) tending to exculpate him (Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 595-596 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 [1977]) and that the prosecution failed to disclose it on proper request (Commonwealth v. Gilday, 367 Mass. 474, 487 [1975]).

1978To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that evidence actually existed (Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 732 [1978]) tending to exculpate him (Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 595-596 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 [1977]) and that the prosecution failed to disclose it on proper request (Commonwealth v. Gilday, 367 Mass. 474, 487 [1975]).

2024See, e.g., Matter of Larsen, 2016 UT 26 , ¶ 41 (Brady standard and prosecutor's ethical duty under Utah's rule 3.8 [d] "are distinct" because rule 3.8 "aimed not only at assuring a fair trial . . . but also at establishing an ethical duty that will avoid the problem in the first place").

2020See Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 Mass. 729, 734 (2008) ("the absence of countervailing affidavits from those in a position to know the 15 truth regarding the existence of an agreement supports a determination of a lack of credibility").

2020Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 348 . i. Lack of affidavits.

2020Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 348 . i. Lack of affidavits.

2020See Grace, 397 Mass. at 305-306 .9 Even if we were to assume that Christopher's civil action testimony were newly discovered and credible evidence, the defendant could only prevail on the second motion for a new trial if that newly discovered evidence would have been a "real factor" in the jury deliberations so as to "cast real doubt on the justice of the conviction."10 Grace, 397 Mass. at 305 .

2020See Grace, 397 Mass. at 305-306 .9 Even if we were to assume that Christopher's civil action testimony were newly discovered and credible evidence, the defendant could only prevail on the second motion for a new trial if that newly discovered evidence would have been a "real factor" in the jury deliberations so as to "cast real doubt on the justice of the conviction."10 Grace, 397 Mass. at 305 .

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2019See Commonwealth v. Amirault , 424 Mass. 618 , 649, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). 13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago , 453 Mass. 782 , 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), regarding the standard of admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden , 379 Mass. 472 , 485-486, 399 N.E.2d 482 (1980), was recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore , 480 Mass. 799 , 809 n.9, 109 N.E.3d 484 (2018).

2018See Commonwealth v. Camacho , 472 Mass. 587 , 600 (2015) (Commonwealth's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence only applies to information in possession or subject to control of prosecutor). b.

2018See Commonwealth v. Nelson , 90 Mass. App. Ct. 594 , 596 (2016) (for a Brady violation to occur, "material information [must be] in the possession of the prosecutor").

2018See Commonwealth v. Nelson , 90 Mass. App. Ct. 594 , 596 (2016) (for a Brady violation to occur, "material information [must be] in the possession of the prosecutor").

2012In addition, unimpeded by any objection from the Commonwealth, the defendant took the opportunity, in both witnesses’ examination and closing argument, to assert that the Commonwealth’s decision not to use the array demonstrated its doubts about the eyewitnesses’ ability to identify him. 12 Any exculpatory value that the unused array offered was fully exploited. 13 Cf. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 316 Mass. 1, 25 (1978), citing Brown v. United States, 556 F.2d 224, 227-228 (3d Cir. 1977) (indicating that a Brady error does not require reversal where “the defendant has somehow become aware at the t

2012In addition, unimpeded by any objection from the Commonwealth, the defendant took the opportunity, in both witnesses’ examination and closing argument, to assert that the Commonwealth’s decision not to use the array demonstrated its doubts about the eyewitnesses’ ability to identify him. 12 Any exculpatory value that the unused array offered was fully exploited. 13 Cf. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 316 Mass. 1, 25 (1978), citing Brown v. United States, 556 F.2d 224, 227-228 (3d Cir. 1977) (indicating that a Brady error does not require reversal where “the defendant has somehow become aware at the t

2012In addition, unimpeded by any objection from the Commonwealth, the defendant took the opportunity, in both witnesses’ examination and closing argument, to assert that the Commonwealth’s decision not to use the array demonstrated its doubts about the eyewitnesses’ ability to identify him. 12 Any exculpatory value that the unused array offered was fully exploited. 13 Cf. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 316 Mass. 1, 25 (1978), citing Brown v. United States, 556 F.2d 224, 227-228 (3d Cir. 1977) (indicating that a Brady error does not require reversal where “the defendant has somehow become aware at the t

2012In addition, unimpeded by any objection from the Commonwealth, the defendant took the opportunity, in both witnesses’ examination and closing argument, to assert that the Commonwealth’s decision not to use the array demonstrated its doubts about the eyewitnesses’ ability to identify him. 12 Any exculpatory value that the unused array offered was fully exploited. 13 Cf. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 316 Mass. 1, 25 (1978), citing Brown v. United States, 556 F.2d 224, 227-228 (3d Cir. 1977) (indicating that a Brady error does not require reversal where “the defendant has somehow become aware at the t

2009To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or “those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case,” Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992); (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. 11 See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 753 (1978).

2009To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or “those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case,” Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992); (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. 11 See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 753 (1978).

2009To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or “those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case,” Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992); (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. 11 See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 753 (1978).

2009To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or “those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case,” Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992); (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. 11 See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 753 (1978).

2009In order to be entitled to such evidence, a defendant must establish, at a minimum, that the information sought “is relevant and helpful. . . or . . . essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 570 (1990), quoting from Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).

2009To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or “those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case,” Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992); (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. 11 See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 753 (1978).

2009To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) material information was in the possession of the prosecutor or “those police who are participants in the investigation and presentation of the case,” Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992); (2) the information tended to exculpate him; and (3) the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence. 11 See Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 753 (1978).

2009In order to be entitled to such evidence, a defendant must establish, at a minimum, that the information sought “is relevant and helpful. . . or . . . essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 570 (1990), quoting from Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).

2007Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229, 247 (1982), citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).

2007Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229, 247 (1982), citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).

2007Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229, 247 (1982), citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).

2007Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229, 247 (1982), citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).

2005The prosecutor is not required to “investigate all exculpatory evidence that may exist, or to produce exculpatory evidence held by government agencies other than the prosecutor and police, or to give discovery of every aspect of the case.” Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 597 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

2005The prosecutor is not required to “investigate all exculpatory evidence that may exist, or to produce exculpatory evidence held by government agencies other than the prosecutor and police, or to give discovery of every aspect of the case.” Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 597 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

2003Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 405-06 (1992) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).

2003Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 405-06 (1992) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).

1995See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73 (1967) (remanding for new trial despite absence of pretrial request by defendant of suppressed evidence); Barbee v. Warden, Md.

1986Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483, 487 (1983) (Liebman II).

1986Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483, 487 (1983) (Liebman II).