Brady violation in Illinois

2026To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that “(1) the undisclosed - 25 - No. 1-23-1497 evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State either wilfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73-74 (2008).

2026Id. ¶ 43 Here, we agree with the State that no Brady violation occurred here when the evidence in question was already known to the defense.

2026First, as defendant recognizes, that matter addressed a Brady violation (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) and not specifically the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence.

2026First, as defendant recognizes, that matter addressed a Brady violation (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) and not specifically the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence.

2026“Therefore, in order to succeed in a Brady claim, the defendant must show that: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was either wilfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice ensued to the defendant.” Id.

2026“Therefore, in order to succeed in a Brady claim, the defendant must show that: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was either wilfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice ensued to the defendant.” Id.

2025See People v. Burt, 205 Ill. 2d 28, 47 (2001) (the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s Brady claim because the defendant did not satisfy the first element of the test since the suppressed evidence was not exculpatory).

2025See People v. Burt, 205 Ill. 2d 28, 47 (2001) (the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s Brady claim because the defendant did not satisfy the first element of the test since the suppressed evidence was not exculpatory).

2026Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995). ¶ 67 However, our supreme court has held that the Brady rule does not require the State to disclose evidence of abusive practices based on the fact that the detectives themselves were aware of those practices.

2026Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995). ¶ 67 However, our supreme court has held that the Brady rule does not require the State to disclose evidence of abusive practices based on the fact that the detectives themselves were aware of those practices.

2025“Therefore, in order to succeed in a Brady claim, the defendant must show that: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was either wilfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice ensued to the defendant.” Id. (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).

2025“Therefore, in order to succeed in a Brady claim, the defendant must show that: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was either wilfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice ensued to the defendant.” Id. (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).

2023See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 443-44 (defendant’s newly discovered fingerprint evidence, as well as evidence that officers engaged in a pattern and practice of torture, failed to support a free-standing claim of actual innocence as such evidence also was used to supplement his assertions of other constitutional violations); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶ 30 (defendant’s actual innocence claim based on evidence that the detective had a pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses in other cases failed, where the same evidence was used to supplement his assertion of a Brady viol

2023See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 443-44 (defendant’s newly discovered fingerprint evidence, as well as evidence that officers engaged in a pattern and practice of torture, failed to support a free-standing claim of actual innocence as such evidence also was used to supplement his assertions of other constitutional violations); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶ 30 (defendant’s actual innocence claim based on evidence that the detective had a pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses in other cases failed, where the same evidence was used to supplement his assertion of a Brady viol

2022While we take Hemphill’s affidavit as true at this stage, we cannot add to it information that simply is not there. ¶ 35 Defendant also relies on People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998), but that case undermines his argument in support of his Brady claim.

2022Id. (citing Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 393 , quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 ). ¶ 185 In this case, the defendant claims that the State committed a Brady violation because the State failed to disclose or provide a recording of Dawn’s second threatening voicemail message left on his cell phone answering system.

2025Prejudice is established where “there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . ¶ 38 In his postconviction petition, defendant contended that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the following issues on direct appeal: (1) constructive amendment of the indictment; (2) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning transferred intent; (3) trial counsel’s failure to tender a lesser-included jury instr

2025Prejudice is established where “there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . ¶ 38 In his postconviction petition, defendant contended that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the following issues on direct appeal: (1) constructive amendment of the indictment; (2) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning transferred intent; (3) trial counsel’s failure to tender a lesser-included jury instr

2022See People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 174 (2000) (“defendant cannot properly claim that the State violated the Brady rule by failing to disclose information that was unavailable at the time”) (overruled on other grounds by People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860 ).

2021Therefore, defendant cannot properly claim that the State violated the Brady rule by failing to disclose information that was unavailable at the time of the suppression proceedings.” Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d at 174 .

2022Id. ¶ 16 In this case, the State concedes that the defendant’s petition established cause and prejudice as to his Brady violation claim and that his petition should be remanded to the trial court for further postconviction proceedings on that basis.

2009“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show (1) that the evidence was favorable to him, (2) that the prosecutor failed to disclose the evidence in response to a specific request, and (3) that the evidence was material.” People v. Velez, 123 Ill.

2026“In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that ‘the prosecution must disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and “material either to guilt or to punishment.” ’ ” Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 82 (quoting People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 311 (2002), quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2025Brady Claim ¶ 170 Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his Brady claim that the State concealed evidence that Schaefer had enemies and at least one of them had abused her, stalked her, and made multiple threats to kill her. ¶ 171 Under Brady, it is a violation of the right to due process for the State to fail to “disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.’ ” People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 311 (2002) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ).

2022See also Orange, 195 Ill. 2d at 459-60 (affirming the dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence of police brutality, finding that the actual innocence claim was not free-standing because the evidence of police brutality also was being used to supplement his claim that his confession was coerced); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 (affirming the second-stage dismissal of the defendant’s actual innocence claim because the newly discovered evidence of a detective’s pattern and practice of framing suspects also was being use

2021See, e.g., Orange, 195 Ill. 2d at 460 ; Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶¶ 29-30 (finding that the defendant was impermissibly relying on evidence of Detective Guevara’s misconduct in other cases to support both his Brady claim and his actual innocence claim); People v. English, 403 Ill.

2023“A Brady claim requires a showing that: (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” People v. Jarrett, 399 Ill.

2023“A Brady claim requires a showing that: (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” People v. Jarrett, 399 Ill.

2021Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”).

2021Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”).

2011The existing case law demonstrates that there are two primary ways in which to determine whether reversal is warranted: (1) by applying the materiality element of the Brady requirement (see Barrow, 195 Ill.2d at 537 , 255 Ill.Dec. 410 , 749 N.E.2d 892 ) or (2) by examining whether the defendant was prejudiced by the discovery violation (see People v. Blackman, 359 Ill.App.3d 1013, 1018 , 296 Ill.Dec. 686 , 836 N.E.2d 101 (2005)).

2011The existing case law demonstrates that there are two primary ways in which to determine whether reversal is warranted: (1) by applying the materiality element of the Brady requirement (see Barrow, 195 Ill.2d at 537 , 255 Ill.Dec. 410 , 749 N.E.2d 892 ) or (2) by examining whether the defendant was prejudiced by the discovery violation (see People v. Blackman, 359 Ill.App.3d 1013, 1018 , 296 Ill.Dec. 686 , 836 N.E.2d 101 (2005)).

2006App. 3d 1105, 1110 , 802 N.E.2d 826, 831 (2003) (finding denial of third-stage postconviction allegations of a Brady violation to be reviewed for manifest error).

2006App. 3d 1105, 1110 , 802 N.E.2d 826, 831 (2003) (finding denial of third-stage postconviction allegations of a Brady violation to be reviewed for manifest error).

2025People v. Rapp, 343 Ill.

2025People v. Rapp, 343 Ill.

2023See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 443-44 (defendant’s newly discovered fingerprint evidence, as well as evidence that officers engaged in a pattern and practice of torture, failed to support a free-standing claim of actual innocence as such evidence also was used to supplement his assertions of other constitutional violations); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶ 30 (defendant’s actual innocence claim based on evidence that the detective had a pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses in other cases failed, where the same evidence was used to supplement his assertion of a Brady viol

2023See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 443-44 (defendant’s newly discovered fingerprint evidence, as well as evidence that officers engaged in a pattern and practice of torture, failed to support a free-standing claim of actual innocence as such evidence also was used to supplement his assertions of other constitutional violations); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶ 30 (defendant’s actual innocence claim based on evidence that the detective had a pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses in other cases failed, where the same evidence was used to supplement his assertion of a Brady viol

2024Indeed, our supreme court has explained, “The Brady analysis is ill-suited for situations where evidence has been lost or destroyed and its contents are unknown.” People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 307 (1994). ¶ 43 Further, we must decline defendant’s invitation to presume that the purged videos contained exculpatory evidence based on the State’s possession and control of them, citing People v. Carballido, 2015 IL App (2d) 140760, ¶ 71 .

2024Indeed, our supreme court has explained, “The Brady analysis is ill-suited for situations where evidence has been lost or destroyed and its contents are unknown.” People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 307 (1994). ¶ 43 Further, we must decline defendant’s invitation to presume that the purged videos contained exculpatory evidence based on the State’s possession and control of them, citing People v. Carballido, 2015 IL App (2d) 140760, ¶ 71 .

2020Additionally, the Supreme Court has “observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). ¶ 47 Finally, a Brady claim “requires applying established law to the facts, including those elicited at the evidentiary hearing.” Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 73 .

2020Additionally, the Supreme Court has “observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). ¶ 47 Finally, a Brady claim “requires applying established law to the facts, including those elicited at the evidentiary hearing.” Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 73 .

1995The majority, however, would require a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the State only when the lost or destroyed evidence was not "potentially useful” to the defense and the evidence was not a component of the State’s case in chief. (166 Ill. 2d at 315.) The majority’s contention, however, "runs directly counter to the Court’s rationale for the bad faith rule and its rejection, in destruction cases, of the Brady rule which ’makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant.’ (Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 , 102 L.

1995The majority, however, would require a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the State only when the lost or destroyed evidence was not "potentially useful” to the defense and the evidence was not a component of the State’s case in chief. (166 Ill. 2d at 315.) The majority’s contention, however, "runs directly counter to the Court’s rationale for the bad faith rule and its rejection, in destruction cases, of the Brady rule which ’makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant.’ (Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 , 102 L.

2024XIV. ¶ 68 “To succeed on a Brady violation claim, a defendant must establish (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the 32 No. 1-20-0456 evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 82 .

2024XIV. ¶ 68 “To succeed on a Brady violation claim, a defendant must establish (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the 32 No. 1-20-0456 evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 82 .

2021App. 3d at 728 (defendant failed to establish prejudice required to raise a Brady claim where “the evidence demonstrate[d] that defendant and codefendant were the initial aggressors and defendant did not act in self defense”); see also People v. Green, 2012 IL App (4th) 101034, ¶ 40 (noting that “even if defendant attempted to impeach [the witness] *** the additional evidence of defendant’s guilt demonstrates that the result of his trial would not have been different”).

2021App. 3d at 728 (defendant failed to establish prejudice required to raise a Brady claim where “the evidence demonstrate[d] that defendant and codefendant were the initial aggressors and defendant did not act in self defense”); see also People v. Green, 2012 IL App (4th) 101034, ¶ 40 (noting that “even if defendant attempted to impeach [the witness] *** the additional evidence of defendant’s guilt demonstrates that the result of his trial would not have been different”).

2024Indeed, our supreme court has explained, “The Brady analysis is ill-suited for situations where evidence has been lost or destroyed and its contents are unknown.” People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 307 (1994). ¶ 43 Further, we must decline defendant’s invitation to presume that the purged videos contained exculpatory evidence based on the State’s possession and control of them, citing People v. Carballido, 2015 IL App (2d) 140760, ¶ 71 .

2024Indeed, our supreme court has explained, “The Brady analysis is ill-suited for situations where evidence has been lost or destroyed and its contents are unknown.” People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 307 (1994). ¶ 43 Further, we must decline defendant’s invitation to presume that the purged videos contained exculpatory evidence based on the State’s possession and control of them, citing People v. Carballido, 2015 IL App (2d) 140760, ¶ 71 .

2026Leave of court to file a successive petition should be denied “when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the [defendant], that the claims alleged by the [defendant] fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 . ¶ 17 Here, the defendant claimed a Brady violation.

2023See Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 (the cause and prejudice test for a successive petition involves a higher standard than the first-stage frivolous or patently without merit standard that is set forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Postconviction Act). ¶ 91 In the appeal below, the appellate court correctly applied this fundamental principle and rejected defendant’s Brady claim based on the entire CPD file because that claim was raised for the first time on appeal.