Brady violation in Michigan

2026To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that: “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150 ; 845 NW2d 731 (2014).

2026To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that: “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150 ; 845 NW2d 731 (2014).

2023To establish a Brady violation, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282 , 119 S Ct 1936 , 144 L Ed 2d 286 (1999).

2023To establish a Brady violation, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282 , 119 S Ct 1936 , 144 L Ed 2d 286 (1999).

2021Because there is no indication in the record that evidence of Blue’s apparent conviction of a crime involving dishonesty was known to the prosecution or “others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police,” Kyles, 514 US at 437 (emphasis added), defendant has failed to show the first element of a Brady violation: that the prosecution suppressed evidence, Abcumby-Blair, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.

2021Because there is no indication in the record that evidence of Blue’s apparent conviction of a crime involving dishonesty was known to the prosecution or “others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police,” Kyles, 514 US at 437 (emphasis added), defendant has failed to show the first element of a Brady violation: that the prosecution suppressed evidence, Abcumby-Blair, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.

2026See People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 177 ; 740 NW2d 534 (2007) (noting that the defendant bears the burden of showing a Brady violation).

2026See People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 177 ; 740 NW2d 534 (2007) (noting that the defendant bears the burden of showing a Brady violation).

2024In People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281 ; 591 NW2d 267 (1998), this Court adopted a four-factor test for Brady violations, which added a due-diligence requirement on behalf of the defendant, which required that, for a defendant to succeed on a Brady violation claim, he must show that he “did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any -2- reasonable diligence.” In 2014, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled this four-factor test, holding that the due-diligence requirement articulated in Lester was contrary to the Brady doctrine, which “aimed at defining an importan

2024In People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281 ; 591 NW2d 267 (1998), this Court adopted a four-factor test for Brady violations, which added a due-diligence requirement on behalf of the defendant, which required that, for a defendant to succeed on a Brady violation claim, he must show that he “did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any -2- reasonable diligence.” In 2014, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled this four-factor test, holding that the due-diligence requirement articulated in Lester was contrary to the Brady doctrine, which “aimed at defining an importan

2020In Chanault, our Supreme Court explained these elements in further detail: The government is held responsible for evidence within its control, even evidence unknown to the prosecution, Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437 ; 115 S Ct 1555 ; 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995), without regard to the prosecution’s good or bad faith, United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 100 ; 96 S Ct 2392 ; 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976) (“If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.”).

2020In Chanault, our Supreme Court explained these elements in further detail: The government is held responsible for evidence within its control, even evidence unknown to the prosecution, Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437 ; 115 S Ct 1555 ; 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995), without regard to the prosecution’s good or bad faith, United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 100 ; 96 S Ct 2392 ; 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976) (“If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.”).

2016The Brady rule “only applies to evidence that was known to the prosecution, but unknown to the defense, at the time of trial.” Apanovitch v Houk, 466 F3d 460, 474 (CA 6, 2006).

2016The Brady rule “only applies to evidence that was known to the prosecution, but unknown to the defense, at the time of trial.” Apanovitch v Houk, 466 F3d 460, 474 (CA 6, 2006).

2025See Carines, 460 Mich at 763 ; Burwick, 450 Mich at 287, 289 .6 5 Defendant filed a supplemental Standard 4 brief pursuant to Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, 471 Mich c, cii (2004). 6 Defendant also states in a conclusory manner that the prosecution’s noncompliance with the statute constituted a Brady violation.

2017Thus, defendant Bush has failed to establish a Brady violation, Chenault, 495 Mich at 155 , or a plain error affecting her substantial rights, see Carines, 460 Mich at 763 .

2020See Wood v Bartholomew, 516 US 1, 6 ; 116 SCt 7 ; 133 L Ed 2d 1 (1995) (stating that “mere speculation” is inconsistent with the applicable standards for determining if a due-process Brady violation has occurred).

2020See Wood v Bartholomew, 516 US 1, 6 ; 116 SCt 7 ; 133 L Ed 2d 1 (1995) (stating that “mere speculation” is inconsistent with the applicable standards for determining if a due-process Brady violation has occurred).

2023This Court, therefore, concluded that defendant had “failed to establish a Brady violation and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this ground,” id., because without knowledge of the investigation, there was no inference that the witness had an interest in testifying, see id.

2023This Court, therefore, concluded that defendant had “failed to establish a Brady violation and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this ground,” id., because without knowledge of the investigation, there was no inference that the witness had an interest in testifying, see id.

2026“A trial court’s decision on a Brady claim is reviewed de novo.” Id. “[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 US at 87 .

2026“A trial court’s decision on a Brady claim is reviewed de novo.” Id. “[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 US at 87 .

2018A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Constitutional questions are generally reviewed de novo, including claims that a defendant was denied his right to present a defense, People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 327 ; 654 NW2d 651 (2002), as well as due process claims, such as allegations of a Brady violation, People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 189 ; 877 NW2d 752 (2015).

2018A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Constitutional questions are generally reviewed de novo, including claims that a defendant was denied his right to present a defense, People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 327 ; 654 NW2d 651 (2002), as well as due process claims, such as allegations of a Brady violation, People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 189 ; 877 NW2d 752 (2015).

2025See People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 475 ; 870 NW2d 299 (2015).

2025See People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 475 ; 870 NW2d 299 (2015).

2024To establish a Brady violation, however, a defendant must show: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could the defendant have obtained it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448 ; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).] Defendant does not argue the elements of a Brady violation, and it is

2024To establish a Brady violation, however, a defendant must show: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could the defendant have obtained it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448 ; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).] Defendant does not argue the elements of a Brady violation, and it is

2017“The -6- prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory or material evidence in its possession constitutes a due process violation regardless of whether a defendant requested the evidence.” People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 157 ; 854 NW2d 114 (2014), citing Brady, 373 US at 87 .

2016See id. (holding that no Brady violation occurred where the defendant did not “articulate how calling the informant at trial would have affected the outcome of the proceedings”).

2016Under those circumstances, bad faith is not required for a Brady violation.” Bosca, 310 Mich App at 28 (citations omitted).

2016Under those circumstances, bad faith is not required for a Brady violation.” Bosca, 310 Mich App at 28 (citations omitted).

2017See also Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 290-294 (1999) (petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result for purposes of materiality in light of other evidence); accord Thomas v Westbrooks, 849 F3d 659, 663 (CA 6, 2017) (“Evidence is ‘material’ for Brady purposes when, in view of all relevant evidence, its absence deprives the defendant of a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added); Henness v Bagley, 644 F3d 308, 325 (CA 6, 2011) (“The evidence supporting the defendan

2017See also Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 290-294 (1999) (petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result for purposes of materiality in light of other evidence); accord Thomas v Westbrooks, 849 F3d 659, 663 (CA 6, 2017) (“Evidence is ‘material’ for Brady purposes when, in view of all relevant evidence, its absence deprives the defendant of a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added); Henness v Bagley, 644 F3d 308, 325 (CA 6, 2011) (“The evidence supporting the defendan

2015To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [Fox (After Remand), 232 Mich App at 549 .] Under Brady, 373 US at 87 , suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates a defendant’s due pr

2015To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [Fox (After Remand), 232 Mich App at 549 .] Under Brady, 373 US at 87 , suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates a defendant’s due pr