Brady violation in Maine

2020See id. ¶ 22 (“An allegation that prosecutors have failed to turn over information that they do not actually or constructively possess or control . . . can never serve as the basis for a Brady violation.”);8 see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999). [¶16] We do not depart from those rules here.

2018Because a "true Brady violation" can only occur when the State "either willfully or inadvertently" suppresses this kind of information, Strickler , 527 U.S. at 281 -82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , a prosecutor cannot commit a Brady violation without also violating his or her automatic discovery obligations pursuant to Rule 16. 7 See M.R.U.

2022The State’s obligation to produce such evidence “extend[s] to evidence that the defense could have used to impeach the prosecution’s key witnesses.” United States v. Raymundí-Hernández, 984 F.3d 127 , 159 (1st Cir. 2020). 6 [¶10] Because the newly discovered evidence asserted in Williams’s Rule 33 motion resulted from an alleged Brady violation, his burden required him to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements concerning the disciplinary report: “(1) [it was] favorable to [him] because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) [it was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or

2022The State’s obligation to produce such evidence “extend[s] to evidence that the defense could have used to impeach the prosecution’s key witnesses.” United States v. Raymundí-Hernández, 984 F.3d 127 , 159 (1st Cir. 2020). 6 [¶10] Because the newly discovered evidence asserted in Williams’s Rule 33 motion resulted from an alleged Brady violation, his burden required him to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements concerning the disciplinary report: “(1) [it was] favorable to [him] because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) [it was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or

2018He contends that the 2013 Memorandum “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” because, inter alia, both the court and the parties “prepared for the entire trial, 18 examined all the witnesses and evidence, deliberated and reached a verdict informed by the wrong legal standard.” [¶28] The denial of a motion for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6 Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶ 32 , 72 A.3d 523 (citing United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 211-12, 219 (1st Cir. 2007)). “[A

2018He contends that the 2013 Memorandum “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” because, inter alia, both the court and the parties “prepared for the entire trial, 18 examined all the witnesses and evidence, deliberated and reached a verdict informed by the wrong legal standard.” [¶28] The denial of a motion for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6 Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶ 32 , 72 A.3d 523 (citing United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 211-12, 219 (1st Cir. 2007)). “[A

2018He contends that the 2013 Memorandum “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” because, inter alia, both the court and the parties “prepared for the entire trial, 18 examined all the witnesses and evidence, deliberated and reached a verdict informed by the wrong legal standard.” [¶28] The denial of a motion for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6 Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶ 32 , 72 A.3d 523 (citing United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 211-12, 219 (1st Cir. 2007)). “[A

2018He contends that the 2013 Memorandum “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” because, inter alia, both the court and the parties “prepared for the entire trial, 18 examined all the witnesses and evidence, deliberated and reached a verdict informed by the wrong legal standard.” [¶28] The denial of a motion for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6 Twardus, 2013 ME 74, ¶ 32 , 72 A.3d 523 (citing United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 211-12, 219 (1st Cir. 2007)). “[A

2026See State v. Kelly, 2000 ME 107 , ¶ 26 n.11, 752 A.2d 188 (stating that, in the case of an alleged Brady violation, “[w]hen the defendant is aware, before trial, of the exculpatory evidence alleged to have been withheld, he cannot claim that there has been an unfair trial in violation of due process”).

2026See State v. Kelly, 2000 ME 107 , ¶ 26 n.11, 752 A.2d 188 (stating that, in the case of an alleged Brady violation, “[w]hen the defendant is aware, before trial, of the exculpatory evidence alleged to have been withheld, he cannot claim that there has been an unfair trial in violation of due process”).

2018See State v. Gagne, 2017 ME 63, ¶ 29 , 159 A.3d 316 (“We have held that a defendant who was made aware of potentially exculpatory evidence before trial—even though soon before trial—was not deprived of due process.”). 8 An appellate court reviewing a Brady claim must determine (1) whether there was evidence that was “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;” (2) whether the State suppressed or withheld that evidence; and (3) whether prejudice ensued, meaning that the evidence was “material” and the suppression or withholding of it had an effect o

2018See State v. Gagne, 2017 ME 63, ¶ 29 , 159 A.3d 316 (“We have held that a defendant who was made aware of potentially exculpatory evidence before trial—even though soon before trial—was not deprived of due process.”). 8 An appellate court reviewing a Brady claim must determine (1) whether there was evidence that was “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;” (2) whether the State suppressed or withheld that evidence; and (3) whether prejudice ensued, meaning that the evidence was “material” and the suppression or withholding of it had an effect o

2013Where Brady does not apply, a defendant is “left with an argument that the prosecutor’s nondisclosure amounted to conduct contrary to fundamental notions of fair play and that defendant was thereby deprived of a fair trial.” State v. Whitten, 499 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Me.1985). [¶ 32] The Supreme Court has identified three elements of a Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strick

2013Where Brady does not apply, a defendant is “left with an argument that the prosecutor’s nondisclosure amounted to conduct contrary to fundamental notions of fair play and that defendant was thereby deprived of a fair trial.” State v. Whitten, 499 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Me.1985). [¶ 32] The Supreme Court has identified three elements of a Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strick

2013The element of prejudice is satisfied if the undisclosed evidence is material— that is, “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” See id. (equating prejudice element with materiality inquiry); see also State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 10 , 56 A.3d 1230 (“Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation marks omitted)).

2013The element of prejudice is satisfied if the undisclosed evidence is material— that is, “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” See id. (equating prejudice element with materiality inquiry); see also State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 10 , 56 A.3d 1230 (“Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation marks omitted)).

2012Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 627, 630 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶¶ 31-32 , 699 A.2d 1139 (applying the same standard).

2012Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 627, 630 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶¶ 31-32 , 699 A.2d 1139 (applying the same standard).

2008Petitioner does not set out to prove that a tax on it would violate the Commerce Clause, rather it attacks the majority opinion in Brent Leasing citing the dissent in that case, "[t]hat a use would be permitted by the United States Constitution does not mean that the Legislature imposed such a tax." Id. at 119 , 773 A.2d at 462 (Dana, L dissenting joined by Clifford, J.).

2008Petitioner does not set out to prove that a tax on it would violate the Commerce Clause, rather it attacks the majority opinion in Brent Leasing citing the dissent in that case, "[t]hat a use would be permitted by the United States Constitution does not mean that the Legislature imposed such a tax." Id. at 119 , 773 A.2d at 462 (Dana, L dissenting joined by Clifford, J.).

2000P. 16(a)(1)(C), automatically discoverable information includes only information that “ ‘tends to create reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt,’ not information leading to a witness who might provide exculpatory testimony”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , -, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (“[T]here is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.”); State v. Dechaine, 630 A.2d 234, 236 (Me.1993) (holding that newly discovered evidence mus

1973See, United States v. Valenzuela-Mendoza, 1971, 9 Cir., 452 F.2d 773 ; Guy v. State, 1972, 48 Ala.App. 293 , 264 So.2d 214 .

1973See, United States v. Gonzalez, 1972, 5 Cir., 466 F.2d 1286 .

1973See, United States v. Gonzalez, 1972, 5 Cir., 466 F.2d 1286 .