Brady violation in Iowa

2025See DeSimone, 803 N.W.2d at 105 (requiring a defendant claiming a Brady violation to prove materiality, meaning a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the challenged evidence been disclosed).

2024For his Brady claim to succeed, Karvel must show by a preponderance of the evidence, “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.” DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011).

2023To succeed in establishing a Brady violation, Tesch “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)).

2023To succeed in establishing a Brady violation, Tesch “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)).

2026What’s more, when a court orders an officer’s removal from the list, it may (as here) be because the court found the underlying evidence neither “material” nor “favorable” under the Brady standard. 373 U.S. at 87 .

2026What’s more, when a court orders an officer’s removal from the list, it may (as here) be because the court found the underlying evidence neither “material” nor “favorable” under the Brady standard. 373 U.S. at 87 .

2011“To establish a Brady violation has occurred, [the defendant] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’ ” Desimone, 803 N.W.2d at 103 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)); see also Cornell, 430 N.W.2d at 385 .

2011“To establish a Brady violation has occurred, [the defendant] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’ ” Desimone, 803 N.W.2d at 103 (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)); see also Cornell, 430 N.W.2d at 385 .

2019“The Brady rule encompasses both impeachment and exculpatory evidence.” Id.

2019“The Brady rule encompasses both impeachment and exculpatory evidence.” Id.

2022See Uranga, 950 N.W.2d at 243 (explaining that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(8) requires that the evidence be “material” and “probably would have changed the result of the trial” (quoting State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Iowa 1997))); Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 145 (Iowa 2018) (explaining that a Brady violation requires a showing that the evidence was “favorable to the defense” and 3The State argues that Cahill failed to preserve error on the alleged Brady violation by not moving for a new trial on that ground, while conce

2022See Uranga, 950 N.W.2d at 243 (explaining that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(8) requires that the evidence be “material” and “probably would have changed the result of the trial” (quoting State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Iowa 1997))); Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 145 (Iowa 2018) (explaining that a Brady violation requires a showing that the evidence was “favorable to the defense” and 3The State argues that Cahill failed to preserve error on the alleged Brady violation by not moving for a new trial on that ground, while conce

2003See State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 551 (Iowa 1996) (conducting a de novo review of due process claim based on a Brady violation).

2003See State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 551 (Iowa 1996) (conducting a de novo review of due process claim based on a Brady violation).

2017“In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant had to prove ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Veal, 564 N.W.2d 797, 810 (Iowa 1997)).

2017“In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant had to prove ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Veal, 564 N.W.2d 797, 810 (Iowa 1997)).

1997The Brady rule applies when the evidence is discovered after trial “which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349 (1976).

1997The Brady rule applies when the evidence is discovered after trial “which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349 (1976).

2018We have stated "[w]ithholding impeachment evidence can [amount to] a Brady violation, but when a witness's testimony has been otherwise impeached with prior inconsistent statements , we are less likely to *150 find the impeaching statements would have impacted the outcome of the trial." Aguilera , 807 N.W.2d at 254 (emphasis added).

2018We have stated "[w]ithholding impeachment evidence can [amount to] a Brady violation, but when a witness's testimony has been otherwise impeached with prior inconsistent statements , we are less likely to *150 find the impeaching statements would have impacted the outcome of the trial." Aguilera , 807 N.W.2d at 254 (emphasis added).

2014To establish a Brady violation has occurred, McGhee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.” DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).

2014To establish a Brady violation has occurred, McGhee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.” DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).

2006See Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989) (holding failure of prosecution- to reveal complete details of star witness’s grant of immunity was not a Brady violation in part because the evidence was not material).

2006See Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989) (holding failure of prosecution- to reveal complete details of star witness’s grant of immunity was not a Brady violation in part because the evidence was not material).

2021See State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 905 (Iowa 2003) (finding no Brady violation when the State failed to timely disclose video crime-scene footage that reinforced defense counsel’s understanding that investigators were unable to obtain fingerprints from the murder victim’s body), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010).

2012In State v. Piper, we considered a Brady claim based on late disclosure of evidence and stated that evidence is not considered suppressed in a constitutional sense “‘if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the evidence.’ ” 663 N.W.2d 894, 905 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Iowa 2003)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa 2010).

2021See State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 905 (Iowa 2003) (finding no Brady violation when the State failed to timely disclose video crime-scene footage that reinforced defense counsel’s understanding that investigators were unable to obtain fingerprints from the murder victim’s body), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010).

2012In State v. Piper, we considered a Brady claim based on late disclosure of evidence and stated that evidence is not considered suppressed in a constitutional sense “‘if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the evidence.’ ” 663 N.W.2d 894, 905 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Iowa 2003)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa 2010).

2013See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 , 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 58 (1987).

2013See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 , 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002 , 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 58 (1987).

2011See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (stating a Brady violation does not exist where the defendant or his attorney knew of the alleged exculpatory information); Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 522 (holding although the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the police reports, the defendant “did not have the ‘essential facts’ of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence [and] ‘only access to the documents themselves would have provided the range and detail of information necessary to fully understand the implications of the

2011See United States v. Griggs, 713 F.2d 672, 674 (11th Cir.1983) (stating a Brady violation does not exist where the defendant or his attorney knew of the alleged exculpatory information); Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 522 (holding although the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the police reports, the defendant “did not have the ‘essential facts’ of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence [and] ‘only access to the documents themselves would have provided the range and detail of information necessary to fully understand the implications of the

1987See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 , 105 S.Ct. at 3380 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 490 ; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972); 2 C.

1987See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 , 105 S.Ct. at 3380 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 490 ; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972); 2 C.

2016The court determined that the standard for whether evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching is the Brady standard: whether the evidence “impeaches a witness where the issue of the witness’ reliability and credibility is crucial.” Id. at 344–45.

2016The court determined that the standard for whether evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching is the Brady standard: whether the evidence “impeaches a witness where the issue of the witness’ reliability and credibility is crucial.” Id. at 344–45.

2026To prove a Brady violation in a disciplinary proceeding, Cramer would have to show that “(1) the board suppressed the requested evidence, (2) the evidence 11 was favorable to [Cramer], and (3) the evidence was material to whether he was guilty of the ethical charges.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 2006).

2026To prove a Brady violation in a disciplinary proceeding, Cramer would have to show that “(1) the board suppressed the requested evidence, (2) the evidence 11 was favorable to [Cramer], and (3) the evidence was material to whether he was guilty of the ethical charges.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 2006).

2026See id.

2026See id.

2025See, e.g., State v. Cornelius, 293 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Iowa 1980) (determining the defendant failed to preserve error when he moved for mistrial after the State rested its case-in-chief because the “defendant should have asked for a mistrial when the allegedly prejudicial question was asked”); Gibb, 303 N.W.2d at 678 (finding error unpreserved on the defendant’s 8 argument that witness testimony violated a constitutional right when the defendant did not assert that argument until his posttrial motion in arrest of judgment and request for new trial).

2025See, e.g., State v. Cornelius, 293 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Iowa 1980) (determining the defendant failed to preserve error when he moved for mistrial after the State rested its case-in-chief because the “defendant should have asked for a mistrial when the allegedly prejudicial question was asked”); Gibb, 303 N.W.2d at 678 (finding error unpreserved on the defendant’s 8 argument that witness testimony violated a constitutional right when the defendant did not assert that argument until his posttrial motion in arrest of judgment and request for new trial).

2025See, e.g., State v. Cornelius, 293 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Iowa 1980) (determining the defendant failed to preserve error when he moved for mistrial after the State rested its case-in-chief because the “defendant should have asked for a mistrial when the allegedly prejudicial question was asked”); Gibb, 303 N.W.2d at 678 (finding error unpreserved on the defendant’s 8 argument that witness testimony violated a constitutional right when the defendant did not assert that argument until his posttrial motion in arrest of judgment and request for new trial).

2025See, e.g., State v. Cornelius, 293 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Iowa 1980) (determining the defendant failed to preserve error when he moved for mistrial after the State rested its case-in-chief because the “defendant should have asked for a mistrial when the allegedly prejudicial question was asked”); Gibb, 303 N.W.2d at 678 (finding error unpreserved on the defendant’s 8 argument that witness testimony violated a constitutional right when the defendant did not assert that argument until his posttrial motion in arrest of judgment and request for new trial).

2025See, e.g., State v. Miller, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 4469195 , at *6 (Iowa Oct. 11, 2024) (“We review [defendant]’s constitutional challenges to his sentence de novo.”); State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d 617 , 620 (Iowa 2023) (“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on deprivation of a constitutional right de novo.”); State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406 , 417 (Iowa 2022) (“Ordinarily, when constitutional issues are involved, we have repeatedly stated over decades of cases that our review is de novo.”); State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19 , 27 (Iowa 12 2022) (“Due process cl

2025See, e.g., State v. Miller, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 4469195 , at *6 (Iowa Oct. 11, 2024) (“We review [defendant]’s constitutional challenges to his sentence de novo.”); State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d 617 , 620 (Iowa 2023) (“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on deprivation of a constitutional right de novo.”); State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406 , 417 (Iowa 2022) (“Ordinarily, when constitutional issues are involved, we have repeatedly stated over decades of cases that our review is de novo.”); State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19 , 27 (Iowa 12 2022) (“Due process cl

2025See, e.g., State v. Miller, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 4469195 , at *6 (Iowa Oct. 11, 2024) (“We review [defendant]’s constitutional challenges to his sentence de novo.”); State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d 617 , 620 (Iowa 2023) (“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on deprivation of a constitutional right de novo.”); State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406 , 417 (Iowa 2022) (“Ordinarily, when constitutional issues are involved, we have repeatedly stated over decades of cases that our review is de novo.”); State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19 , 27 (Iowa 12 2022) (“Due process cl

2025See, e.g., State v. Miller, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 4469195 , at *6 (Iowa Oct. 11, 2024) (“We review [defendant]’s constitutional challenges to his sentence de novo.”); State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d 617 , 620 (Iowa 2023) (“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on deprivation of a constitutional right de novo.”); State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406 , 417 (Iowa 2022) (“Ordinarily, when constitutional issues are involved, we have repeatedly stated over decades of cases that our review is de novo.”); State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19 , 27 (Iowa 12 2022) (“Due process cl

2024See Romeo, 524 N.W.2d at 552; see also Watkins v. Medeiros, 36 F.4th 373 , 390–91 (1st Cir. 2022) (finding no Brady violation in a federal habeas case when State failed to produce a “crime scene diagram” created by police that 14 was “not drawn to scale” and “would have a nominal effect on impeaching” the State’s key witness).

2023“We will not find counsel incompetent for failing to pursue a meritless issue.” State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Iowa 2011), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 2022).

2023“We will not find counsel incompetent for failing to pursue a meritless issue.” State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Iowa 2011), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 2022).

2023In order to establish a Brady violation, a party “must prove (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to his defense, 9 and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.” Mark v. State, 568 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).

2023In order to establish a Brady violation, a party “must prove (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to his defense, 9 and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.” Mark v. State, 568 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).