Brady violation in Louisiana

2024United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 682 (1985); State v. Knapper, 579 So.2d 956, 959 (La. 1991).

2024United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 682 (1985); State v. Knapper, 579 So.2d 956, 959 (La. 1991).

2013In State v. Harper, 10-356, pp. 8-12 (La.11/30/10), 53 So.3d 1263, 1269-71 , the supreme court discussed the Brady principle, as follows: In accordance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must disclose evidence which is favorable to the defense when “the evidence is Immaterial either to guilt or to punishment” or impeaches the testimony of a witness where “the ‘reliability [or credibility] of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.’ ” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97 ; Giglio v. United States,

2013In State v. Harper, 10-356, pp. 8-12 (La.11/30/10), 53 So.3d 1263, 1269-71 (alterations in original) (second omission in original), the supreme court discussed the Brady principle, as follows: In accordance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must disclose evidence which is favorable to the defense when “the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment” or impeaches the testimony of a witness where “the ‘reliability [or credibility] of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.’ ” Brady, 373 U.S. at

2026It follows, therefore, “ ‘[t]here is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.’ ” State v. Hobley, 98–2460, p. 25 n. 10 (La.12/15/99), 752 So.2d 771, 786 (quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 , 121 S.Ct. 102 , 148 L.Ed.2d 61 (2000).

2023It follows, therefore, “[t]here is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.” State v. Hobley, 98-2460 (La. 12/15/99), 752 So. 2d 771, 786 , quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F. 3d 320, 344 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 , 121 S. Ct. 102 , 148 L.

2026It follows, therefore, “ ‘[t]here is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.’ ” State v. Hobley, 98–2460, p. 25 n. 10 (La.12/15/99), 752 So.2d 771, 786 (quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 , 121 S.Ct. 102 , 148 L.Ed.2d 61 (2000).

2023It follows, therefore, “[t]here is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.” State v. Hobley, 98-2460 (La. 12/15/99), 752 So. 2d 771, 786 , quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F. 3d 320, 344 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 , 121 S. Ct. 102 , 148 L.

2025See also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 , 15 S.Ct. at 1567, holding that the Brady rule includes evidence known only to police investigators and an “individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in this case, including the police.” “[W]hen the undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence, no Brady violation occurs.” Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1012 , 117 S.Ct. 519 , 136 L.Ed.2d 407 (1996) (and cases cited).

2025See also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 , 15 S.Ct. at 1567, holding that the Brady rule includes evidence known only to police investigators and an “individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in this case, including the police.” “[W]hen the undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence, no Brady violation occurs.” Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1012 , 117 S.Ct. 519 , 136 L.Ed.2d 407 (1996) (and cases cited).

2025See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 i• I I 11' 11 1 that not every violation of the broad duty of disclosure constitutes a Brady violation.

2025See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 i• I I 11' 11 1 that not every violation of the broad duty of disclosure constitutes a Brady violation.

2025See Bright, 875 So. 2d at 43–44 (“When the State’s case hinges on the testimony of one eyewitness, the Brady violation looms larger.”).

2025See Bright, 875 So. 2d at 43–44 (“When the State’s case hinges on the testimony of one eyewitness, the Brady violation looms larger.”).

2024Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); thatthe State failed to correct false or misleading testimony at trial in violation ofNapue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); thatthe defendant is actuallyinnocent; andthat defendantreceived ineffective assistance of counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of his capital trial." Priorto the evidentiaryhearing, the parties begannegotiating ajoint stipulation regarding the undisclosed evidence forming the basis of defendant's Brady claim.

2024Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); thatthe State failed to correct false or misleading testimony at trial in violation ofNapue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); thatthe defendant is actuallyinnocent; andthat defendantreceived ineffective assistance of counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of his capital trial." Priorto the evidentiaryhearing, the parties begannegotiating ajoint stipulation regarding the undisclosed evidence forming the basis of defendant's Brady claim.

2017See generally United States v. Neuman, 849 F.2d 156, 161 (5th Cir. 1988) (government not obligated to furnish defendant with information he already has or can obtain with reasonable diligence), see also State v. Hobley, 98-2460, p. 25 n.10 (La. 12/15/99), 752 So.2d 771, 786 (“There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.”) (quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d

2017See generally United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 161 (5th Cir. 1988) (government not obligated to furnish defendant with information he already has or can obtain with reasonable diligence); see also State v. Hobley, 99- 3343, p. 25 n.10 (La. 12/8/99), 752 So.2d 771, 786 (“There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where the evidence is available from another source, because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose.”) (quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d

2021State v. Garrick, 03-137 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 990, 993 .

2014Moreover, the State admitted its ongoing duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant in its responses to the defendant's request for Brady material. .Consequently, it seems as though "the term ‘Brady violation' is sometimes used in reference to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose favorable evidence [under discovery rules].” State v. Garrick, 03-137, p. 6 (La.4/14/04), 870 So.2d 990, p. 993 (citation omitted).

2024Thus, the district court reasoned, citing State v. Harper, 10-0356 (La. 11/30/10), 53 So.3d 1263 , there was no Brady violation because the State is not obligated to provide a defendant with information he already has or can obtain with reasonable diligence.

2024Thus, the district court reasoned, citing State v. Harper, 10-0356 (La. 11/30/10), 53 So.3d 1263 , there was no Brady violation because the State is not obligated to provide a defendant with information he already has or can obtain with reasonable diligence.

2025Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 2011).

2025Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 2011).

2023The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in U.S. v. Brown, 628 F. 2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980), that: Regardless of whether the request was specific or general, and regardless of whether the evidence was material or even exculpatory, when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.

2021As the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in U.S. v. Brown, 628 F. 2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980): Regardless of whether the request was specific or general, and regardless of whether the evidence was material or even exculpatory, when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.

2024Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); thatthe State failed to correct false or misleading testimony at trial in violation ofNapue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); thatthe defendant is actuallyinnocent; andthat defendantreceived ineffective assistance of counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of his capital trial." Priorto the evidentiaryhearing, the parties begannegotiating ajoint stipulation regarding the undisclosed evidence forming the basis of defendant's Brady claim.

2024Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); thatthe State failed to correct false or misleading testimony at trial in violation ofNapue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); thatthe defendant is actuallyinnocent; andthat defendantreceived ineffective assistance of counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of his capital trial." Priorto the evidentiaryhearing, the parties begannegotiating ajoint stipulation regarding the undisclosed evidence forming the basis of defendant's Brady claim.

2025“The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that ‘[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” State v. Louviere, 2000-2085, p. 12 (La. 9/4/02), 833 So.2d 885, 896 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)).

2025“The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that ‘[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” State v. Louviere, 2000-2085, p. 12 (La. 9/4/02), 833 So.2d 885, 896 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)).

1992As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Roussel, 381 So.2d 796 (La.1980): "The purpose of the Brady rule is to insure that defendants receive their constitutional right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause, a trial in which the trier of fact has before it all available material exculpatory evidence.

1992As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Roussel, 381 So.2d 796 (La.1980): "The purpose of the Brady rule is to insure that defendants receive their constitutional right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause, a trial in which the trier of fact has before it all available material exculpatory evidence.

2017Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 216 (1963), the State is required to disclose to an accused evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused and material to his guilt or punishment; for purposes of Brady rule, “no distinction exists between exculpatory and impeachment evidence.’’ State v. Kemp, 00-2228 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 540, 545 (citing U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct., 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).

2017Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 216 (1963), the State is required to disclose to an accused evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused and material to his guilt or punishment; for purposes of Brady rule, “no distinction exists between exculpatory and impeachment evidence.’’ State v. Kemp, 00-2228 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 540, 545 (citing U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct., 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).

2005Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 , 105 S.Ct. at 3381 ); Strickland, 683 So.2d at 234 (citing State v. Marshall, 94-0461, p. 14 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 819, 825 ). [4] Thus, the reviewing court does not apply an outcome-determinative test; rather, a Brady violation occurs when the court finds that the "evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 , 105 S.Ct. at 3381 ).

2005Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 , 105 S.Ct. at 3381 ); Strickland, 683 So.2d at 234 (citing State v. Marshall, 94-0461, p. 14 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 819, 825 ). [4] Thus, the reviewing court does not apply an outcome-determinative test; rather, a Brady violation occurs when the court finds that the "evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 , 105 S.Ct. at 3381 ).

2025“The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that ‘[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” State v. Louviere, 2000-2085, p. 12 (La. 9/4/02), 833 So.2d 885, 896 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)).

2025“The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that ‘[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” State v. Louviere, 2000-2085, p. 12 (La. 9/4/02), 833 So.2d 885, 896 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)).

2024A Brady violation is proved “by showing that the [withheld] favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 ; State v. Brown, 15-2001, p. 2 (La. 2/19/16), 184 So. 3d 1265, 1266 .

2024A Brady violation is proved “by showing that the [withheld] favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 ; State v. Brown, 15-2001, p. 2 (La. 2/19/16), 184 So. 3d 1265, 1266 .

2023Further, while late disclosure or non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence may deprive the defendant of a fair trial, in both instances the impact on the defense “must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.” Kemp, 00-2228 at 7, 828 So. 2d at 545 .

2017Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 216 (1963), the State is required to disclose to an accused evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused and material to his guilt or punishment; for purposes of Brady rule, “no distinction exists between exculpatory and impeachment evidence.’’ State v. Kemp, 00-2228 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 540, 545 (citing U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct., 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).