Brady violation in Ohio

2026In Brady v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable 16 to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (

2026In Brady v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable 16 to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (

2026This question goes to the heart of Brady’s third prong, which requires [a petitioner] to show that “‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles [Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)], quoting [United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).] The Brady standard does not require Bethel to show that disclosure of the . . . information would have resulted in his acquittal.

2026This question goes to the heart of Brady’s third prong, which requires [a petitioner] to show that “‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles [Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)], quoting [United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).] The Brady standard does not require Bethel to show that disclosure of the . . . information would have resulted in his acquittal.

2026In addition, “Brady applies to the ‘the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “‘Strictly speaking, Brady is not violated when disclosure occurs during trial, even when disclosure surprises the defendant with previously undisclosed evidence.’” Id., quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001); see also State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 (1990) (finding there is no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory records were presented during trial).

2026In addition, “Brady applies to the ‘the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “‘Strictly speaking, Brady is not violated when disclosure occurs during trial, even when disclosure surprises the defendant with previously undisclosed evidence.’” Id., quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001); see also State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 (1990) (finding there is no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory records were presented during trial).

2026In Brady v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable 16 to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (

2026In Brady v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable 16 to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (

2026In addition, “Brady applies to the ‘the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “‘Strictly speaking, Brady is not violated when disclosure occurs during trial, even when disclosure surprises the defendant with previously undisclosed evidence.’” Id., quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001); see also State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 (1990) (finding there is no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory records were presented during trial).

2026We note that in State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 (1990), the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a claim that the state's failure to provide exculpatory information to the defendant before trial was a reversible Brady violation because the alleged exculpatory records were presented during trial.

2026In addition, “Brady applies to the ‘the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “‘Strictly speaking, Brady is not violated when disclosure occurs during trial, even when disclosure surprises the defendant with previously undisclosed evidence.’” Id., quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 (2001); see also State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 (1990) (finding there is no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory records were presented during trial).

2025See State v. Hanna, 2002-Ohio-2221 , ¶ 82 (“the state did not violate Brady v. Maryland by withholding exculpatory evidence” because the evidence “was presented during the trial (and not after the trial as in Brady), and no violation exists” [emphasis in original]); State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 , 116 -15- Case No. 9-24-37 (1990) (“[a]s the alleged exculpatory records were presented during the trial, there exists no Brady violation requiring a new trial” [emphasis in original]). {¶26} In Brown, the Court pointed out an earlier decision where three justices in the lead opinion explained

2026A Brady violation is established when a defendant shows that “‘the favorable [but suppressed] evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”’ (Brackets in original.) State v. Addison, 2024-Ohio-5805 at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

2026A Brady violation is established when a defendant shows that “‘the favorable [but suppressed] evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”’ (Brackets in original.) State v. Addison, 2024-Ohio-5805 at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

2025However, the Brady test “is stringent” and “‘[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish “materiality” in the constitutional sense.’” State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 33 (1991), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976).

2025However, the Brady test “is stringent” and “‘[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish “materiality” in the constitutional sense.’” State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 33 (1991), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976).

2026Vinson at ¶ 18 , citing State v. Trimble, 2015-Ohio-942 , ¶ 16 (11th Dist.). {¶19} “A defendant seeking to assert a Brady claim . . . is not required to show that he could not have discovered suppressed evidence by exercising reasonable diligence.” State v. Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 25 .

2026Vinson at ¶ 18 , citing State v. Trimble, 2015-Ohio-942 , ¶ 16 (11th Dist.). {¶19} “A defendant seeking to assert a Brady claim . . . is not required to show that he could not have discovered suppressed evidence by exercising reasonable diligence.” State v. Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 25 .

2026State v. Sullivan, 2014-Ohio-1260, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Moore, 2013-Ohio-3365 , ¶ 43 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Hanna, 2002-Ohio-2221, ¶ 60 (“ ‘A Brady violation may not rest upon a claim that is “purely speculative.” ’ ”). {¶ 20} Diallo claims that additional Blink camera recordings must have existed, their absence in discovery necessarily means that the state suppressed or destroyed them, the recordings would have shown Fatoumata putting the children in the crawlspace and Diallo later removing them, and they further would have shown that Diallo retrieved a ladder from the

2026State v. Sullivan, 2014-Ohio-1260, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Moore, 2013-Ohio-3365 , ¶ 43 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Hanna, 2002-Ohio-2221, ¶ 60 (“ ‘A Brady violation may not rest upon a claim that is “purely speculative.” ’ ”). {¶ 20} Diallo claims that additional Blink camera recordings must have existed, their absence in discovery necessarily means that the state suppressed or destroyed them, the recordings would have shown Fatoumata putting the children in the crawlspace and Diallo later removing them, and they further would have shown that Diallo retrieved a ladder from the

2025Importantly, ‘[a] Brady violation may not rest upon a claim that is “purely speculative.”’” Id., quoting Moore at ¶ 43 , quoting State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 296 (2002). “‘“The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped -9- Case No. 7-25-01 the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”’” (Emphasis in original.) Id., quoting State v. Lawson, 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 343 (1992), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976). {¶21} “However, the defendant is not required to

2025Importantly, ‘[a] Brady violation may not rest upon a claim that is “purely speculative.”’” Id., quoting Moore at ¶ 43 , quoting State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 296 (2002). “‘“The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped -9- Case No. 7-25-01 the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”’” (Emphasis in original.) Id., quoting State v. Lawson, 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 343 (1992), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976). {¶21} “However, the defendant is not required to

2021Union No. 14-08-43, 2009-Ohio-2106, ¶ 19 ; State v. Glover, 2016-Ohio-2833 , 64 N.E.3d 442 , ¶ 35 (8th Dist.); United States v. Bullock, 130 Fed.Appx. 706, 722 (6th Cir.2005), citing United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir.1991) (“[t]he standard of review for the materiality of a purported Brady violation is de novo because it presents a mixed question of law and fact”). *** Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either

2021Union No. 14-08-43, 2009-Ohio-2106, ¶ 19 ; State v. Glover, 2016-Ohio-2833 , 64 N.E.3d 442 , ¶ 35 (8th Dist.); United States v. Bullock, 130 Fed.Appx. 706, 722 (6th Cir.2005), citing United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir.1991) (“[t]he standard of review for the materiality of a purported Brady violation is de novo because it presents a mixed question of law and fact”). *** Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either

2026However, “a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial claiming a Brady violation should be reviewed using ‘a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].’” Smith at ¶ 24 , quoting State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988).

2026However, “a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial claiming a Brady violation should be reviewed using ‘a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion test because the issue on review concern[s] [the defendant’s] due process right to a fair trial, namely the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to [the defendant].’” Smith at ¶ 24 , quoting State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988).

2018Greene No. 2017-CA-43, 2018-Ohio- 2115, ¶ 66; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-795 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972). {¶ 27} Because exculpatory and impeachment evidence are favorable to the -11- defendant, both types of evidence may be the subject of a Brady violation, so long as the evidence is material.

2018Greene No. 2017-CA-43, 2018-Ohio- 2115, ¶ 66; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-795 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972). {¶ 27} Because exculpatory and impeachment evidence are favorable to the -11- defendant, both types of evidence may be the subject of a Brady violation, so long as the evidence is material.

2026Rather, a defendant “may satisfy the ‘unavoidably prevented’ requirement contained in Crim.R. 33(B) by establishing that the prosecution suppressed the evidence on which the defendant would rely in seeking a new trial.” State v. McNeal, 2022-Ohio-2703, ¶ 2, 17 , citing Bethel at ¶ 25, 59 . {¶20} “‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or PAGE 6 OF 12 Case No. 2025-L-135 inadvertently; and pr

2026Rather, a defendant “may satisfy the ‘unavoidably prevented’ requirement contained in Crim.R. 33(B) by establishing that the prosecution suppressed the evidence on which the defendant would rely in seeking a new trial.” State v. McNeal, 2022-Ohio-2703, ¶ 2, 17 , citing Bethel at ¶ 25, 59 . {¶20} “‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or PAGE 6 OF 12 Case No. 2025-L-135 inadvertently; and pr

2019See State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 28, fn. 2 (no Brady violation occurs where a defendant knows of essential facts permitting him to take advantage of exculpatory information or where evidence is available from another source), citing United States v. Clark (C.A.6, 1991), 928 F.2d 733, 738 ; see also State v. Iacona (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 100 , 752 N.E.2d 937 , quoting United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc. (C.A.4, 1985), 760 F.2d 527, 532 (“ ‘No due process violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its

2019See, State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2010-Ohio-3831 , 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 36 (“no Brady violation occurs where a defendant knows of essential facts permitting him to take advantage of exculpatory information or where evidence is available from another source.” citing United States v. Clark (C.A.6, 1991), 928 F.2d 733, 738 ).

2001See State v. Brown (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 583 , 595 ; see, also, State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352 , 372 (evidence presented during trial cannot constitute a Brady violation).

2001See State v. Brown (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 583 , 595 ; see, also, State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352 , 372 (evidence presented during trial cannot constitute a Brady violation).

2022If the evidence is materially exculpable, the Brady standard applies and the intention of the state is "irrelevant." Id. at ¶ 9, quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).

2022If the evidence is materially exculpable, the Brady standard applies and the intention of the state is "irrelevant." Id. at ¶ 9, quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).

2025The Brady doctrine stands for the proposition that the government violates a defendant's right to due process when it achieves a conviction through perjured testimony, or by withholding evidence that is "'so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce.'" State v. Widmer, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). {¶ 18} Brady imposes upon the government the obligation to "'turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or -5- Fayette CA2024-0

2025The Brady doctrine stands for the proposition that the government violates a defendant's right to due process when it achieves a conviction through perjured testimony, or by withholding evidence that is "'so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce.'" State v. Widmer, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). {¶ 18} Brady imposes upon the government the obligation to "'turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or -5- Fayette CA2024-0

2024In State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114 , 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990), the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a claim that the state's failure to provide exculpatory information to the defendant before trial was a reversible Brady violation because the alleged exculpatory records were presented during trial.

2023The Ohio Supreme Court “followed suit” in State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 , 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990), which held that where “alleged exculpatory records [are] presented during the trial, there exists no Brady violation requiring a new trial.” (Emphasis in the original.) Id.; compare State v. Aldridge, 120 Ohio App.3d 122, 146 , 697 N.E.2d 228 (2d Dist.1997) (Interpreting Brady and finding that the rule “applies only to material discovered after trial because the defendant, if he chooses to, can generally ensure that material discovered prior to or during trial will be entered into evide

2025Parsons contends that, because the evidence was suppressed by the State, he was unavoidably prevented from discovering it and therefore should be granted leave to file a motion for a new trial based on a Brady violation, regardless of whether he exercised reasonable diligence in trying to find the evidence sooner. {¶18} “Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012).

2025While we agree with Wood that the trial court should not have relied on the prosecutor’s statement, which was not presented in the form of an affidavit, we nevertheless agree with the trial court that there was no Brady violation. {¶ 50} In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it “withholds evidence -24- that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant's guilt or punishment.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (summarizing the Court’s holding in Brady, 373 U.S. 83 ).

2026Evidence is material where “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017), quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-470 (2009). {¶34} To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the undisclosed evidence favored the accused, (2) the State, willfully or inadvertently, suppressed the evidence, and (3) the suppression prejudiced the accused.

2026Evidence is material where “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017), quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-470 (2009). {¶34} To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the undisclosed evidence favored the accused, (2) the State, willfully or inadvertently, suppressed the evidence, and (3) the suppression prejudiced the accused.

2013See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972). {¶ 30} The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that, -9- Warren CA2012-02-008 [t]he Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.

2013See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972). {¶ 30} The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that, -9- Warren CA2012-02-008 [t]he Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.

2026“When asserting a Brady violation, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his or her due process rights were violated.” State v. Gillis, 2024-Ohio-726, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Glover, 2016-Ohio-2833, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).

2026“When asserting a Brady violation, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his or her due process rights were violated.” State v. Gillis, 2024-Ohio-726, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Glover, 2016-Ohio-2833, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).

2026Evidence is material where “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017), quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-470 (2009). {¶34} To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the undisclosed evidence favored the accused, (2) the State, willfully or inadvertently, suppressed the evidence, and (3) the suppression prejudiced the accused.

2026Evidence is material where “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017), quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-470 (2009). {¶34} To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the undisclosed evidence favored the accused, (2) the State, willfully or inadvertently, suppressed the evidence, and (3) the suppression prejudiced the accused.

2026State v. Azali, 2023-Ohio-4643, ¶ 60 (8th Dist.). “‘Under a de novo standard of review, we give no deference to a trial court’s decision.’” State v. Buehner, 2021-Ohio-4435, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.), quoting Brownlee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2012-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.).

2024See, e.g., State v. Buehner, 2021-Ohio-4435, ¶ 58, 61 (8th Dist.) (highlighting significance of prosecutor’s representation during the discovery process that no exculpatory material was available in granting defendant’s Brady claim based on undisclosed witness statements). {¶29} Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if the State’s January 25, 2023 discovery response did not negate the CPD incident report’s reference to a recorded statement, the summary of the coworker’s interview contained in the report surely did.

2026In Brady v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable 16 to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (

2026In Brady v. Maryland, “the United States Supreme Court held that a state violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by suppressing evidence favorable 16 to the accused where the evidence is material to guilt.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-749, ¶ 30, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). {¶45} “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (

2023The Ohio Supreme Court “followed suit” in State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 , 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990), which held that where “alleged exculpatory records [are] presented during the trial, there exists no Brady violation requiring a new trial.” (Emphasis in the original.) Id.; compare State v. Aldridge, 120 Ohio App.3d 122, 146 , 697 N.E.2d 228 (2d Dist.1997) (Interpreting Brady and finding that the rule “applies only to material discovered after trial because the defendant, if he chooses to, can generally ensure that material discovered prior to or during trial will be entered into evide

2023The Ohio Supreme Court “followed suit” in State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116 , 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990), which held that where “alleged exculpatory records [are] presented during the trial, there exists no Brady violation requiring a new trial.” (Emphasis in the original.) Id.; compare State v. Aldridge, 120 Ohio App.3d 122, 146 , 697 N.E.2d 228 (2d Dist.1997) (Interpreting Brady and finding that the rule “applies only to material discovered after trial because the defendant, if he chooses to, can generally ensure that material discovered prior to or during trial will be entered into evide

2024No. 113247, 2024-Ohio-2636, ¶ 36 (no Brady violation where state failed to disclose social media posts from a witness because the social media posts are publicly available information and therefore “neither in the State’s sole possession nor suppressed by the State,”), citing United States v. Delgado, 350 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.2003) (“Brady does not apply to materials that are not ‘wholly within the control of the prosecution’ ”), quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998); State v. McGuire, 8th Dist.

2008Coe v. Bell (6th Cir. 1998), 161 F.3d 320 , 344 (There is no Brady violation where information is available to the defense "because in such cases there is really nothing for the government to disclose."). {¶ 57} A Brady violation did not occur in the case at bar because the records concerning Hummel's charges and probation violation were publicly available and appellant could have obtained access to them. {¶ 58} Appellant's third ground for relief is denied.