Brady violation in Georgia

2024We affirmed the grant of a new trial on the grounds that the State had committed a Brady violation, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LEd2d 215) (1963), by failing to disclose a deal with a witness.

2024We affirmed the grant of a new trial on the grounds that the State had committed a Brady violation, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LEd2d 215) (1963), by failing to disclose a deal with a witness.

2018Impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule, and includes evidence of "any deals or agreements between the State and [a] witness." *172 Id. at 852 (2), 621 S.E.2d 726 .

2018Impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule, and includes evidence of "any deals or agreements between the State and [a] witness." *172 Id. at 852 (2), 621 S.E.2d 726 .

1988The U. S. Supreme Court noted, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103 (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342), that the Brady rule “argua *799 bly applies in three quite different situations.

1988The U. S. Supreme Court noted, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103 (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342), that the Brady rule “argua *799 bly applies in three quite different situations.

2000The burden is on defendant to establish a Brady violation, Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 396 , 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974), by showing that: (1) the State possessed information favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it with due diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.

2000The burden is on defendant to establish a Brady violation, Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 396 , 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974), by showing that: (1) the State possessed information favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it with due diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.

2026See also James, 292 Ga. at 442 (no Brady violation where co-defendants received two pages of a medical examiner’s report and not the third page when the report was clearly paginated, putting them on notice that a page was missing, and where third co- defendant obtained the missing page). (b) Murphy also argues that, as a result of the alleged Brady violation, the trial court should have granted his motion for a continuance so that he could investigate Shelley’s statements and produce him as a witness at trial.

2026See also James, 292 Ga. at 442 (no Brady violation where co-defendants received two pages of a medical examiner’s report and not the third page when the report was clearly paginated, putting them on notice that a page was missing, and where third co- defendant obtained the missing page). (b) Murphy also argues that, as a result of the alleged Brady violation, the trial court should have granted his motion for a continuance so that he could investigate Shelley’s statements and produce him as a witness at trial.

2015Then, in conjunction with the officer’s testimony, the State introduced the officer’s certification, the Department of Public Safety’s 28 Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 622 (5) ( 680 SE2d 850 ) (2009). 29 See Swindle v. State, 274 Ga. 668, 670 (4) ( 558 SE2d 385 ) (2002) (holding that State’s failure to provide defendant with a witness’s address, which the defendant could have discovered by exercising reasonable diligence, did not constitute a Brady violation). 14 certification, and several other documents related to the laser-speed-detection- device’s calibration.

2015Then, in conjunction with the officer’s testimony, the State introduced the officer’s certification, the Department of Public Safety’s 28 Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 622 (5) ( 680 SE2d 850 ) (2009). 29 See Swindle v. State, 274 Ga. 668, 670 (4) ( 558 SE2d 385 ) (2002) (holding that State’s failure to provide defendant with a witness’s address, which the defendant could have discovered by exercising reasonable diligence, did not constitute a Brady violation). 14 certification, and several other documents related to the laser-speed-detection- device’s calibration.

1992Under the Supreme Court's holding in Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274 ( 280 SE2d 352 ) (1981), after the State had made its response to the Brady motion the trial court was obliged to conduct an in-camera inspection once appellant so requested.

1992Under the Supreme Court's holding in Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274 ( 280 SE2d 352 ) (1981), after the State had made its response to the Brady motion the trial court was obliged to conduct an in-camera inspection once appellant so requested.

2007There is no Brady violation where, as here, “the information sought becomes available to the accused at trial. [Cit.]” Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 104 (2) ( 475 SE2d 580 ) (1996).

2007There is no Brady violation where, as here, “the information sought becomes available to the accused at trial. [Cit.]” Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 104 (2) ( 475 SE2d 580 ) (1996).

2007Pretermitting whether the defendant has proven the other elements of a Brady violation, he has failed to show that he was prejudiced such that “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.” Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 583 (4) ( 581 SE2d 23 ) (2003).

2007Pretermitting whether the defendant has proven the other elements of a Brady violation, he has failed to show that he was prejudiced such that “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.” Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 583 (4) ( 581 SE2d 23 ) (2003).

2022We agree with the trial court that Downer has satisfied the first three prongs of a Brady violation. 14 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (92 SCt 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972) (the suppression of impeachment evidence that may be used to challenge the credibility of a witness may constitute a Brady violation).

2022We agree with the trial court that Downer has satisfied the first three prongs of a Brady violation. 14 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (92 SCt 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972) (the suppression of impeachment evidence that may be used to challenge the credibility of a witness may constitute a Brady violation).

2012(Citation omitted.) Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 622 (5) ( 680 SE2d 850 ) (2009); see also Belins v. State, 210 Ga. App. 259, 261 (2) ( 435 SE2d 675 ) (1993) (“Impeachment evidence showing bias or interest on the part of a key prosecution witness falls within the Brady rule.”) (citations and emphasis omitted).

2012(Citation omitted.) Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 622 (5) ( 680 SE2d 850 ) (2009); see also Belins v. State, 210 Ga. App. 259, 261 (2) ( 435 SE2d 675 ) (1993) (“Impeachment evidence showing bias or interest on the part of a key prosecution witness falls within the Brady rule.”) (citations and emphasis omitted).

1994See McNeal v. State, 263 Ga. 397 (4) ( 435 SE2d 47 ) (1993) (case remanded for post-trial Tribble in camera review); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 (2) ( 424 SE2d 626 ) (1993) (case remanded for post-trial Batson hearing); Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321 (1) ( 240 SE2d 824 ) (1977) (case remanded for post-trial hearing on admissibility of confession); Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 (2) ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977) (case remanded for post-trial hearing on merits of Brady motion regarding informant's identity).

1994See McNeal v. State, 263 Ga. 397 (4) ( 435 SE2d 47 ) (1993) (case remanded for post-trial Tribble in camera review); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 (2) ( 424 SE2d 626 ) (1993) (case remanded for post-trial Batson hearing); Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321 (1) ( 240 SE2d 824 ) (1977) (case remanded for post-trial hearing on admissibility of confession); Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 (2) ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977) (case remanded for post-trial hearing on merits of Brady motion regarding informant's identity).

2000See Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 836 (17), 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999); Dennard v. State, 263 Ga. 453, 454 (4), 435 S.E.2d 26 (1993) (no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is available to the accused at trial); Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 385 (8)(b), 405 S.E.2d 648 (1991) (no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is presented to the jury at trial).

2000See Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 836 (17), 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999); Dennard v. State, 263 Ga. 453, 454 (4), 435 S.E.2d 26 (1993) (no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is available to the accused at trial); Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 385 (8)(b), 405 S.E.2d 648 (1991) (no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is presented to the jury at trial).

1982Under circumstances of this sort, the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate that the evidence purportedly withheld from him “so impaired his defense that he was denied a fair trial within the meaning of the Brady rule.” Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650, 652 ( 217 SE2d 244 ).

1982Under circumstances of this sort, the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate that the evidence purportedly withheld from him “so impaired his defense that he was denied a fair trial within the meaning of the Brady rule.” Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650, 652 ( 217 SE2d 244 ).

2026“The burden of proof on these elements lies with the defendant,” and “[w]e review a trial court’s factual findings regarding a Brady claim for clear error but review the court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.” Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 653, 664 (2022).

2026“The burden of proof on these elements lies with the defendant,” and “[w]e review a trial court’s factual findings regarding a Brady claim for clear error but review the court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.” Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 653, 664 (2022).

1982In Barnes v. State, 157 Ga. App. 582, 586 ( 277 SE2d 916 ), we held that on appeal, “inasmuch as Brady violations involve the discovery, after trial (or during trial) of suppressed material... if the appellant, post trial, can point to nothing materially exculpatory which was suppressed, he has no right under the Brady principle.” In Barnes, supra, pp. 587-588 , we established that, according to the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104-112 (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342), an appellant on appeal must show that exculpatory evidence was suppressed w

1982In Barnes v. State, 157 Ga. App. 582, 586 ( 277 SE2d 916 ), we held that on appeal, “inasmuch as Brady violations involve the discovery, after trial (or during trial) of suppressed material... if the appellant, post trial, can point to nothing materially exculpatory which was suppressed, he has no right under the Brady principle.” In Barnes, supra, pp. 587-588 , we established that, according to the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104-112 (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342), an appellant on appeal must show that exculpatory evidence was suppressed w

2013To establish a Brady violation, the defense must show (1) that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defense; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.20 17 See, e.g., Veazey v. Veazey, 246 Ga. 376, 377 ( 271 SE2d 449 ) (1980). 18 See Ferster v. Ferster, 220 Ga. 319, 322 (2) ( 138 SE2d 674 ) (1964) (cus

2013To establish a Brady violation, the defense must show (1) that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defense; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.20 17 See, e.g., Veazey v. Veazey, 246 Ga. 376, 377 ( 271 SE2d 449 ) (1980). 18 See Ferster v. Ferster, 220 Ga. 319, 322 (2) ( 138 SE2d 674 ) (1964) (cus

2026“On appeal, a trial court’s factual findings on a Brady claim are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and its application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.” Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 863 (2021).

2026“On appeal, a trial court’s factual findings on a Brady claim are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and its application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.” Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 863 (2021).

2022Thus, Downer’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Joyce about the nature of her relationship with Brown but chose not to. 15 See Morris v. State, 284 Ga. 1, 3 (2) (662 SE2d 110) (2008) (no Brady violation where undisclosed evidence was consistent with other evidence the State had already presented to the jury and was therefore not outcome determinative).

2022Thus, Downer’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Joyce about the nature of her relationship with Brown but chose not to. 15 See Morris v. State, 284 Ga. 1, 3 (2) (662 SE2d 110) (2008) (no Brady violation where undisclosed evidence was consistent with other evidence the State had already presented to the jury and was therefore not outcome determinative).

2013Jones v. State, 258 Ga. 249, 250 (6) ( 368 SE2d 313 ) (1988).

2013Jones v. State, 258 Ga. 249, 250 (6) ( 368 SE2d 313 ) (1988).

1980As held in Thornton, supra, at p. 163 , "an absolute privilege against disclosure in every case involving an informer is impermissible where a Brady motion is made.” (Emphasis supplied.) We also note that Brady does not establish an inflexible principle that requires the disclosure of informants’ identities or of all evidence, but only that which is "favorable to a defendant if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” Thornton, supra; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 794 (92 SC 2562, 33 LE2d 706).

1975In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786 (92 SC 2562, 33 LE2d 706), decided in 1972 by a still divided bench, the Supreme Court declared its adherence to Brady but found that five unproduced evidentiary items were not material to the defense under the Brady standard, and that the appellant there had failed to show that the sixth such item made it impossible for a witness to see the commission of the crime and identify appellant as its perpetrator.

2006“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Floyd, 263 Ga. App. at 43 .

2006“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Floyd, 263 Ga. App. at 43 .

2007See Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29 (1) ( 279 SE2d 687 ) (1981) (no Brady violation where evidence in question made available to defendant at trial unless delay in disclosure impaired defense or deprived defendant of fair trial).

2007See Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29 (1) ( 279 SE2d 687 ) (1981) (no Brady violation where evidence in question made available to defendant at trial unless delay in disclosure impaired defense or deprived defendant of fair trial).

1982“Defendant . . . has the burden of showing that the evidence withheld from him ‘so impaired his defense that he was denied a fair trial within the meaning of the Brady rule. [Cits.]’ ” Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67 (5), 74 ( 243 SE2d 510 ). “[W]e do not retreat from the rule that ‘a defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice to his case resulting from the prosecution’s refusal to turn over documents or evidence.’ [Cits.]” Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274, 275 , supra. In the instant case the defense was insanity and defendant wanted anything in the victim’s pretrial statements which would suppo

1982“Defendant . . . has the burden of showing that the evidence withheld from him ‘so impaired his defense that he was denied a fair trial within the meaning of the Brady rule. [Cits.]’ ” Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67 (5), 74 ( 243 SE2d 510 ). “[W]e do not retreat from the rule that ‘a defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice to his case resulting from the prosecution’s refusal to turn over documents or evidence.’ [Cits.]” Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274, 275 , supra. In the instant case the defense was insanity and defendant wanted anything in the victim’s pretrial statements which would suppo

2024See Thomas, 311 Ga. at 417-419 (concluding that the appellant established the materiality prong of the Brady test, because the State failed to disclose a deal with a witness whose testimony “‘could be viewed as the most significant piece of corroborating evidence offered by the State in a case where the corroborating evidence was both slight and wholly circumstantial’”).

2024See Thomas, 311 Ga. at 417-419 (concluding that the appellant established the materiality prong of the Brady test, because the State failed to disclose a deal with a witness whose testimony “‘could be viewed as the most significant piece of corroborating evidence offered by the State in a case where the corroborating evidence was both slight and wholly circumstantial’”).

2020See Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 554 (V) ( 807 SE2d 891 ) (2017) (appellant preserved issue of ineffective assistance of post-trial counsel where his current appellate counsel did not represent him prior to appeal and thus appeal was “the earliest practicable opportunity of post-conviction review.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). we can determine from the record that Harris cannot establish that motion counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise a Brady claim.

2020See Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 554 (V) ( 807 SE2d 891 ) (2017) (appellant preserved issue of ineffective assistance of post-trial counsel where his current appellate counsel did not represent him prior to appeal and thus appeal was “the earliest practicable opportunity of post-conviction review.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). we can determine from the record that Harris cannot establish that motion counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise a Brady claim.

1998Id.; Parks, supra. 19.

1989See generally Rogers v. State, 257 Ga. 590, 592 ( 361 SE2d 814 ); see also Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 407 ( 330 SE2d 686 ).

1999See Dennard v. State, 263 Ga. 453 (4), 435 S.E.2d 26 (1993) (there is no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is available to the accused at trial); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776 (2)(b), 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983).

1999See Dennard v. State, 263 Ga. 453 (4), 435 S.E.2d 26 (1993) (there is no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is available to the accused at trial); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776 (2)(b), 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983).