Brady violation in Idaho

2023In Strickler, in the context of federal habeas relief, the United States Supreme Court held that the “combination” of three factors sufficed to establish “cause” for failure to previously raise a Brady claim in state court where: (1) the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) the petitioner reasonably relied on the prosecution’s open file policy as fulfilling the prosecution’s Brady obligation related to trial; and (3) the state confirmed petitioner’s reliance by asserting during state habeas proceedings that the petitioner had already received “everything known to the government.” 527

2023In Strickler, in the context of federal habeas relief, the United States Supreme Court held that the “combination” of three factors sufficed to establish “cause” for failure to previously raise a Brady claim in state court where: (1) the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) the petitioner reasonably relied on the prosecution’s open file policy as fulfilling the prosecution’s Brady obligation related to trial; and (3) the state confirmed petitioner’s reliance by asserting during state habeas proceedings that the petitioner had already received “everything known to the government.” 527

2026State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 , 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different”); [Dunlap III], 141 Idaho 50, 64 , 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (an essential element of a Brady violation is that “prejudice must have ensued”).

2026State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 , 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different”); [Dunlap III], 141 Idaho 50, 64 , 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (an essential element of a Brady violation is that “prejudice must have ensued”).

2021Rather, showing a Brady violation requires “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put 24 the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435.

2021Rather, showing a Brady violation requires “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put 24 the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435.

2023For a Brady claim, evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).

2023For a Brady claim, evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).

2024“Proving a Brady violation requires a three-part showing: [1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Thumm v. State, 165 Idaho 405, 422 , 447 P.3d 853, 870 (2019) (quotations marks omitted).

2024“Proving a Brady violation requires a three-part showing: [1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Thumm v. State, 165 Idaho 405, 422 , 447 P.3d 853, 870 (2019) (quotations marks omitted).

2023This Court previously addressed the requirements to establish a Brady violation in State v. Lankford: “In order to establish a Brady violation, there must be evidence that (1) is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) was prejudicial or material in that there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the accused would have led to a different result.” 162 Idaho 477, 503 , 399 P.3d 804, 839 (2017) (citing State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380 , 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strick

2023This Court previously addressed the requirements to establish a Brady violation in State v. Lankford: “In order to establish a Brady violation, there must be evidence that (1) is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) was prejudicial or material in that there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the accused would have led to a different result.” 162 Idaho 477, 503 , 399 P.3d 804, 839 (2017) (citing State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380 , 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strick

2023State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 422 , 313 P.3d 732, 750 (Ct. App. 2013). 6 Following the denial of Warden’s motion for new trial, he filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, reiterating his claim that the failure to disclose the jail logs was a “structural discovery error” that violated Brady and asserting that the denial of his motion for new trial was an abuse of discretion and “excused” the sheriff’s office “of any duty to disclose the evidence [the district court] ruled was ‘material.’” Despite acknowledging “procedural deficiencies” in Warden’s motion for reconsideration, the district

2023State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 422 , 313 P.3d 732, 750 (Ct. App. 2013). 6 Following the denial of Warden’s motion for new trial, he filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, reiterating his claim that the failure to disclose the jail logs was a “structural discovery error” that violated Brady and asserting that the denial of his motion for new trial was an abuse of discretion and “excused” the sheriff’s office “of any duty to disclose the evidence [the district court] ruled was ‘material.’” Despite acknowledging “procedural deficiencies” in Warden’s motion for reconsideration, the district

2025In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904 , 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that, in instances of a Brady2 violation, “there may be a tolling of the one-year statute of limitations until discovery of the Brady violation.” The Court applied the same “reasonable time” standard as in post-conviction petitions in capital cases.

2025In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904 , 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that, in instances of a Brady2 violation, “there may be a tolling of the one-year statute of limitations until discovery of the Brady violation.” The Court applied the same “reasonable time” standard as in post-conviction petitions in capital cases.

2023This Court previously addressed the requirements to establish a Brady violation in State v. Lankford: “In order to establish a Brady violation, there must be evidence that (1) is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) was prejudicial or material in that there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the accused would have led to a different result.” 162 Idaho 477, 503 , 399 P.3d 804, 839 (2017) (citing State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380 , 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strick

2023This Court previously addressed the requirements to establish a Brady violation in State v. Lankford: “In order to establish a Brady violation, there must be evidence that (1) is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) was prejudicial or material in that there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the accused would have led to a different result.” 162 Idaho 477, 503 , 399 P.3d 804, 839 (2017) (citing State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380 , 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strick

2022In this appeal, Dunlap argues that, in violation of Brady, the State suppressed the 2005 opinions of Sombke and Fisher that Dunlap was mentally ill and housed accordingly. “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)).

2022In this appeal, Dunlap argues that, in violation of Brady, the State suppressed the 2005 opinions of Sombke and Fisher that Dunlap was mentally ill and housed accordingly. “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 , 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1129 (2018) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281–82 (1999)).

2023In a 3-2 split 23 decision, this Court, in Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24 , 27–30, 995 P.2d 794 , 797–800 (2000), affirmed the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief after concluding, among other things, that the Brady claim failed on materiality.

2023In a 3-2 split 23 decision, this Court, in Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24 , 27–30, 995 P.2d 794 , 797–800 (2000), affirmed the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief after concluding, among other things, that the Brady claim failed on materiality.

2023Nondisclosure of 3 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding the State’s duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence). 5 impeachment evidence may constitute a Brady violation when the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 1.

2023Nondisclosure of 3 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding the State’s duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence). 5 impeachment evidence may constitute a Brady violation when the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 1.

2008See Gardner, 126 Idaho at 433 , 885 P.2d at 1149 (finding a Brady violation where a police officer failed to disclose a witness statement to either the prosecutor or the defense).

2008See Gardner, 126 Idaho at 433 , 885 P.2d at 1149 (finding a Brady violation where a police officer failed to disclose a witness statement to either the prosecutor or the defense).

2018"Showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more." Kyles , 514 U.S. at 437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 . "[T]he prosecution need volunteer evidence only when suppression of the evidence would be 'of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.' " State v. Shackelford , 150 Idaho 355 , 380, 247 P.3d 582 , 607 (2010) (quoting United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97 , 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ).

2018"Showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more." Kyles , 514 U.S. at 437 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 . "[T]he prosecution need volunteer evidence only when suppression of the evidence would be 'of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.' " State v. Shackelford , 150 Idaho 355 , 380, 247 P.3d 582 , 607 (2010) (quoting United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97 , 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ).

2026State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 , 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different”); [Dunlap III], 141 Idaho 50, 64 , 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (an essential element of a Brady violation is that “prejudice must have ensued”).

2026State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 , 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different”); [Dunlap III], 141 Idaho 50, 64 , 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (an essential element of a Brady violation is that “prejudice must have ensued”).

2023The district court noted that “[t]here was overwhelming evidence at trial 8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 14 supporting the jury verdict finding Hooley guilty” and ultimately concluded “Hooley [had] not shown evidence so strong that this [c]ourt would not have confidence in the outcome of the trial.” On appeal, Hooley contends the district court erred in dismissing his Brady claim.

2022Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27 , 995 P.2d 794, 797 (2000). “ ‘There are three [essential] components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 65 , 106 P.3d 376, 391 (2004) (quoting Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999)).

2023In analyzing whether Warden satisfied the third prong of the Brady analysis, the district court analogized to Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415 , 162 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2007).

2023In analyzing whether Warden satisfied the third prong of the Brady analysis, the district court analogized to Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415 , 162 P.3d 794 (Ct. App. 2007).

2022The State counters that, “ ‘[o]n a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test for materiality . . . is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the [S]tate’s failure to produce the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 130 , 320 P.3d 1284, 1289 (Ct. App. 2014).

2022The State counters that, “ ‘[o]n a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test for materiality . . . is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the [S]tate’s failure to produce the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 130 , 320 P.3d 1284, 1289 (Ct. App. 2014).

2023Instead, the district court simply noted that the holding was cited with approval by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516 , 975 P.2 1181 (Ct. App. 1999).

2023Instead, the district court simply noted that the holding was cited with approval by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516 , 975 P.2 1181 (Ct. App. 1999).

2019As the court held in Ingraldi , when the Brady issue is one of delayed disclosure, as opposed to nondisclosure, "the test is whether defendant's counsel was prevented by the delay from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant's case." 793 F.2d at 411 -12 .

2019In Ingraldi, the court determined that when the Brady issue is one of delayed disclosure, as opposed to nondisclosure, “the test is whether defendant’s counsel was prevented by the delay from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant’s case.” 793 F.2d at 411–12.

2011To the extent that Charboneau was unclear in its application, in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250-51 , 220 P.3d 1066, 1069-70 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court resolved any ambiguity, holding that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitation if a Brady violation is asserted, but that such a claim must be filed within a reasonable time after discovery.

2011To the extent that Charboneau was unclear in its application, in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250-51 , 220 P.3d 1066, 1069-70 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court resolved any ambiguity, holding that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitation if a Brady violation is asserted, but that such a claim must be filed within a reasonable time after discovery.

1994See, e.g., White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029 , 109 S.Ct. 1163 , 103 L.Ed.2d 221 (1989) (collateral attack based on Brady claim not precluded, but habeas relief would be the rare exception); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 , 106 S.Ct. 1268 , 89 L.Ed.2d 576 (1986) (same); United States v. Ayala, 690 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.Florida, 1988) (alleged Brady violation did not undermine validity of plea and was nonjurisdictional challenge waived by guilty plea); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F.Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565

1994See, e.g., White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029 , 109 S.Ct. 1163 , 103 L.Ed.2d 221 (1989) (collateral attack based on Brady claim not precluded, but habeas relief would be the rare exception); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 , 106 S.Ct. 1268 , 89 L.Ed.2d 576 (1986) (same); United States v. Ayala, 690 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.Florida, 1988) (alleged Brady violation did not undermine validity of plea and was nonjurisdictional challenge waived by guilty plea); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F.Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565

2023Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 906 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding an ineffective assistance claim for failure to investigate and discover the same impeachment information underlying Gentry’s Brady claims failed for lack of prejudice when the same information was not material under Brady); Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 53 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The standard for materiality [under Brady] is the same as that iterated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).”).

2023Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 906 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding an ineffective assistance claim for failure to investigate and discover the same impeachment information underlying Gentry’s Brady claims failed for lack of prejudice when the same information was not material under Brady); Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 53 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The standard for materiality [under Brady] is the same as that iterated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).”).