Brady violation in California

2026In contrast, a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of the witness is “corroborated by other testimony[.]” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1050 (Salazar).) “Favorable evidence is material when ‘ “it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” ’ [Citations.] Put another way, the question is whether, deprived of the information withheld by the prosecution, the defendant received ‘a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (In re Bacigalupo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312, 333 ; see Salaz

2026In contrast, a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of the witness is “corroborated by other testimony[.]” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1050 (Salazar).) “Favorable evidence is material when ‘ “it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” ’ [Citations.] Put another way, the question is whether, deprived of the information withheld by the prosecution, the defendant received ‘a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (In re Bacigalupo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312, 333 ; see Salaz

2026(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280 (Strickler).) 7 A Brady violation occurs when evidence is not disclosed to the defendant that is: (1) “favorable to the [defendant], either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching,” (2) “suppressed” by the government “either willfully or inadvertently,” and (3) material.

2026(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280 (Strickler).) 7 A Brady violation occurs when evidence is not disclosed to the defendant that is: (1) “favorable to the [defendant], either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching,” (2) “suppressed” by the government “either willfully or inadvertently,” and (3) material.

2026(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176 (Letner and Tobin); Strickler, supra, at pp. 281–282.) “Evidence is ‘favorable’ if it either helps the defendant or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching one of its witnesses. [¶] Evidence is ‘material’ ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been different.’ [Citations.] The requisite ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome’ on the part of the reviewing court.” (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .)

2026(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176 (Letner and Tobin); Strickler, supra, at pp. 281–282.) “Evidence is ‘favorable’ if it either helps the defendant or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching one of its witnesses. [¶] Evidence is ‘material’ ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been different.’ [Citations.] The requisite ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome’ on the part of the reviewing court.” (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .)

2026In contrast, a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of the witness is “corroborated by other testimony[.]” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1050 (Salazar).) “Favorable evidence is material when ‘ “it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” ’ [Citations.] Put another way, the question is whether, deprived of the information withheld by the prosecution, the defendant received ‘a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” (In re Bacigalupo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312, 333 ; see Salaz

2025A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. [Citation.] In determining whether evidence is material under this standard, we consider the effect of the nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial strategies.” 42 (Deleoz, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 656, internal quotations omitted; see Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 434 ; People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 256 ; People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1043 .) “On appeal, we independently review whether

2025(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682 ; People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1108 .) Davenport asserts his trial counsel’s failure to present Therrien’s testimony was prejudicial “for all of the same reasons discussed in regard to materiality for the Brady claim.” We have already concluded Davenport did not make a prima facie showing of materiality for his Brady claim, and we reach the same conclusion as to the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2025(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682 ; People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1108 .) Davenport asserts his trial counsel’s failure to present Therrien’s testimony was prejudicial “for all of the same reasons discussed in regard to materiality for the Brady claim.” We have already concluded Davenport did not make a prima facie showing of materiality for his Brady claim, and we reach the same conclusion as to the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2025A true Brady violation “involves the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 103 , italics added.) Any evidence presented at trial “‘is not considered suppressed, 24. regardless of whether or not it had previously been disclosed during discovery.’” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 281 , quoting People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715 ; see U.S. v. Gray (7th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 562, 567 [“The Brady rule is not a rule of pretrial discovery”].) Defendant relies on People

2025A true Brady violation “involves the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 103 , italics added.) Any evidence presented at trial “‘is not considered suppressed, 24. regardless of whether or not it had previously been disclosed during discovery.’” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 281 , quoting People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 715 ; see U.S. v. Gray (7th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 562, 567 [“The Brady rule is not a rule of pretrial discovery”].) Defendant relies on People

2026Under Brady, “a criminal defendant has a federal due process right to pretrial discovery of material information favorable to his defense.” (People v. Deleoz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 642 , 655–656 (Deleoz).) “The government’s duty of disclosure encompasses both ‘exculpatory evidence that casts doubt on the defendant’s guilt and impeaching evidence that calls into question the credibility of government witnesses.’ [Citations.] Evidence is material within the definition ascribed by the Supreme Court ‘“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the res

2026Under Brady, “a criminal defendant has a federal due process right to pretrial discovery of material information favorable to his defense.” (People v. Deleoz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 642 , 655–656 (Deleoz).) “The government’s duty of disclosure encompasses both ‘exculpatory evidence that casts doubt on the defendant’s guilt and impeaching evidence that calls into question the credibility of government witnesses.’ [Citations.] Evidence is material within the definition ascribed by the Supreme Court ‘“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the res

2025A. Legal Background “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ [Citation.] The high court has extended the prosecutor’s duty to encompass the disclosure of material evidence, even if the defense made no request concerning the evidence. [Citation.] The duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal

2025A. Legal Background “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ [Citation.] The high court has extended the prosecutor’s duty to encompass the disclosure of material evidence, even if the defense made no request concerning the evidence. [Citation.] The duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal

2026The duty extends to evidence known to others acting on the prosecution’s behalf, including the 43 police.” (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 709 (Johnson).) “For Brady purposes, evidence is material if it is reasonably probable its disclosure would alter the outcome of trial.” (Id., at pp. 709–710.) “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: [(1)] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [(2)] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertentl

2026The duty extends to evidence known to others acting on the prosecution’s behalf, including the 43 police.” (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 709 (Johnson).) “For Brady purposes, evidence is material if it is reasonably probable its disclosure would alter the outcome of trial.” (Id., at pp. 709–710.) “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: [(1)] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [(2)] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertentl

2025(People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1284 [defendants forfeited claim “the prosecution withheld impeachment evidence” in violation of Brady “because it was not made below”]; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 714 [Brady claim forfeited where defendant failed to object or request 34 appropriate sanctions]; see People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411 [forfeiture “‘“applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims based on violations of fundamental constitutional rights”’”].)15 Murphy also contends his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel b

2025(People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1284 [defendants forfeited claim “the prosecution withheld impeachment evidence” in violation of Brady “because it was not made below”]; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 714 [Brady claim forfeited where defendant failed to object or request 34 appropriate sanctions]; see People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411 [forfeiture “‘“applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims based on violations of fundamental constitutional rights”’”].)15 Murphy also contends his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel b

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2026(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263 , 281–282.) “ ‘We independently review the question whether a Brady violation has occurred, but give great weight to any trial court findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1067 .) “Section 1054.1 (the reciprocal-discovery statute) ‘independently requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense . . . certain categories of evidence “in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or [known by] the prosecuting attorney . . . to be in the possession of the investigating agencies.” ’ ” (Peo

2026(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176 (Letner and Tobin); Strickler, supra, at pp. 281–282.) “Evidence is ‘favorable’ if it either helps the defendant or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching one of its witnesses. [¶] Evidence is ‘material’ ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been different.’ [Citations.] The requisite ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome’ on the part of the reviewing court.” (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .)

2026(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176 (Letner and Tobin); Strickler, supra, at pp. 281–282.) “Evidence is ‘favorable’ if it either helps the defendant or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching one of its witnesses. [¶] Evidence is ‘material’ ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result . . . would have been different.’ [Citations.] The requisite ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome’ on the part of the reviewing court.” (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .)

2024The duty of disclosure exists regardless of 13 good or bad faith, and regardless of whether the defense has requested the materials.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132 (Zambrano), overruled on another ground as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; see Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) “There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material.” (People v. Lew

2024The duty of disclosure exists regardless of 13 good or bad faith, and regardless of whether the defense has requested the materials.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132 (Zambrano), overruled on another ground as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; see Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) “There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material.” (People v. Lew

2024The duty of disclosure exists regardless of 13 good or bad faith, and regardless of whether the defense has requested the materials.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132 (Zambrano), overruled on another ground as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; see Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) “There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material.” (People v. Lew

2024The duty of disclosure exists regardless of 13 good or bad faith, and regardless of whether the defense has requested the materials.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1132 (Zambrano), overruled on another ground as stated in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; see Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87 .) “There are three elements to a Brady violation: (1) the state withholds evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the evidence is material.” (People v. Lew

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2016(In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .)” [¶] “ ‘[Moreover,] [i]n general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue “supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime,” United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. [150,] 154-155 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 104 , 92 S.Ct. [763,] 766 [(1972)] (Brady violation found where government failed to disclose promise not to prosecute cooperating witness on whom government’s case against defendant “almost entirely” depended), or where the likely impact on t

2015(In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .)” [¶] “ ‘[Moreover,] [i]n general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue “supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime,” United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. [150,] 154-155 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 104 , 92 S.Ct. [763,] 766 [(1972)] (Brady violation found where government failed to disclose promise not to prosecute cooperating witness on whom government’s 10 case against defendant “almost entirely” depended), or where the likely impact o

2022(See United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676 .)” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 714 (Morrison).) In this case, there is no question that, at the time of trial, Buchanan knew, and his counsel either knew or should have known, that Buchanan was in prison on January 9, 2015. ‘“‘[W]hen information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.’ (United States v. Brown (5th Cir. 1980) 628 F.2d 471, 473 ; see also United St

2022(See United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676 .)” (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 714 (Morrison).) In this case, there is no question that, at the time of trial, Buchanan knew, and his counsel either knew or should have known, that Buchanan was in prison on January 9, 2015. ‘“‘[W]hen information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.’ (United States v. Brown (5th Cir. 1980) 628 F.2d 471, 473 ; see also United St

2025A. Legal Background “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ [Citation.] The high court has extended the prosecutor’s duty to encompass the disclosure of material evidence, even if the defense made no request concerning the evidence. [Citation.] The duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal

2025A. Legal Background “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ [Citation.] The high court has extended the prosecutor’s duty to encompass the disclosure of material evidence, even if the defense made no request concerning the evidence. [Citation.] The duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2022(See People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314 [“Brady exculpatory evidence is the only substantive discovery mandated by the United States Constitution.”].) We now turn to consider whether a Brady violation occurred in this case.

2022(See People v. Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314 [“Brady exculpatory evidence is the only substantive discovery mandated by the United States Constitution.”].) We now turn to consider whether a Brady violation occurred in this case.

2025(Id. at pp. 950-951.) “[A] true Brady violation occurs when three conditions are met: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ [Citation.] Under this standard[,] prejudice focuses on ‘the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.’ ” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 274 (Lucas), disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53, fn. 19

2025As stated above, “a true Brady violation occurs when three conditions are met: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 274 .) Here, Conerly has failed to establish the evidence was suppressed as a result of a presumed violation.

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2026(See § 1054.5, subd. (c) [“The court shall not dismiss a charge [as a discovery sanction] unless required to do so by the Constitution of the United States.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352 (Gutierrez) [“Section 1054.5, subdivision (c) preserves judicial power to dismiss charges for a Brady violation.”]; People v. Ashraf (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212 (Ashraf) [“If there was no Brady violation, then there was no conceivable basis for concluding the federal Constitution required dismissal.”].) Statutory discovery violations are “subject to the harmless-error standard se

2026Governing Law and Standard of Review In Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 87.) “ ‘ “There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

2026Governing Law and Standard of Review In Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 87.) “ ‘ “There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

2022Brady violations “Although the term ‘Brady violation’ is often broadly used to refer to any failure on the part of the prosecution to disclose favorable information to the defense, a true violation occurs only if three components coexist: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 53 suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” (People v. Uribe (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1474 (Uribe), citing Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282

2022A defendant instead ‘must show a “reasonable probability of a different result.’” [Citation.]” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043 .) To do so, a defendant must “‘show[ ] that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ [Citation.]” (Uribe, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473 , quoting Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 435 [ 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 ].) “We independently review the question whether a Brady violation has occurred, but give great weight to any trial court findin

2026(People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1183 ; see Fultz, supra, at p. 431; see also People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1503, fn. 1 [recognizing that “bad faith Brady errors may warrant dismissal”]; Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 [“A court may dismiss an information in an extreme case to address outrageous governmental conduct”]; Jenkins, supra, at p. 951 [recognizing that “appropriate” sanctions for the prosecution’s suppression of evidence may include dismissal].) Section 1054.5, subdivision (c), which addresses sanctions for discovery violations in a criminal case

2026(People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1183 ; see Fultz, supra, at p. 431; see also People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1503, fn. 1 [recognizing that “bad faith Brady errors may warrant dismissal”]; Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 [“A court may dismiss an information in an extreme case to address outrageous governmental conduct”]; Jenkins, supra, at p. 951 [recognizing that “appropriate” sanctions for the prosecution’s suppression of evidence may include dismissal].) Section 1054.5, subdivision (c), which addresses sanctions for discovery violations in a criminal case

2026(Compare People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 857 (Uribe) [independently reviewing the trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss for outrageous government misconduct on remand after appellate reversal for Brady error] with People v. Velasco- Palacios (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 439, 445 [reviewing motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion] and People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 951 (Jenkins) [recognizing that “courts have broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for discovery abuse”].) “Pursuant to [Brady], and its progeny, the prosecuti

2026(See People v. Fultz (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 395 , 432 (Fultz) [after affirming the trial court’s findings of Brady error and other prosecutorial misconduct, remanding the case to the trial court “because it is in the best position to fashion a remedy adequate to ensure defendant’s fair trial”]; see also Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 951 .) Although a new trial is usually the most serious remedy for a Brady violation, additional or statement or other conduct.