Brady violation in Virgin Islands

2013Accordingly, “[t]o prevail on a Brady claim, the defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” People v. Ward, 55 V.I. 829, 842 (V.I. 2011) (quoting Bowry v. People, 52 V.I. 264, 274 (V.I. 2009)).

2013Accordingly, “[t]o prevail on a Brady claim, the defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” People v. Ward, 55 V.I. 829, 842 (V.I. 2011) (quoting Bowry v. People, 52 V.I. 264, 274 (V.I. 2009)).

2011In order to prevail on a Brady claim, “a defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” Bowry, 52 V.I. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 301 (3d Cir. 2001)).

2011In order to prevail on a Brady claim, “a defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” Bowry, 52 V.I. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 301 (3d Cir. 2001)).

2013Accordingly, “[t]o prevail on a Brady claim, the defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” People v. Ward, 55 V.I. 829, 842 (V.I. 2011) (quoting Bowry v. People, 52 V.I. 264, 274 (V.I. 2009)).

2013Accordingly, “[t]o prevail on a Brady claim, the defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” People v. Ward, 55 V.I. 829, 842 (V.I. 2011) (quoting Bowry v. People, 52 V.I. 264, 274 (V.I. 2009)).

1995"Evidence is not considered to be suppressed if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." Id. at 973 . "[T]he remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial and ... [it] is available ... only after a defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that had the Brady evidence been disclosed in time for use at trial, the first trial would not have resulted in a conviction." United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1286 (6th Cir. 1988).

1995"Evidence is not considered to be suppressed if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." Id. at 973 . "[T]he remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial and ... [it] is available ... only after a defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that had the Brady evidence been disclosed in time for use at trial, the first trial would not have resulted in a conviction." United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1286 (6th Cir. 1988).

2011A Giglio violation, however, is a type of Brady violation in which “the undisclosed evidence reveals that the prosecution knowingly made false statements or introduced or allowed trial testimony that it knew or should have known was false.” Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2011A Giglio violation, however, is a type of Brady violation in which “the undisclosed evidence reveals that the prosecution knowingly made false statements or introduced or allowed trial testimony that it knew or should have known was false.” Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2015See State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194 , 896 A.2d 973, 988 (2006) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the proposition that “knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of [a] prosecutor”)); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (no Brady violation where allegedly exculpatory information was in the possession of other government agencies that were not a part of the investigation team and that did not participate in prosecution, where prosecution was unaware of existence of the information).

2015See State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194 , 896 A.2d 973, 988 (2006) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the proposition that “knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of [a] prosecutor”)); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (no Brady violation where allegedly exculpatory information was in the possession of other government agencies that were not a part of the investigation team and that did not participate in prosecution, where prosecution was unaware of existence of the information).

2015To prevail on a claim of a Brady violation “the defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed [i.e. the people failed to disclose it], (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” Williams v. People, 59 V.I. 1024, 1039 (V.I. 2013).

2015To prevail on a claim of a Brady violation “the defendant must show that the evidence was (1) suppressed [i.e. the people failed to disclose it], (2) favorable, and (3) material to the defense.” Williams v. People, 59 V.I. 1024, 1039 (V.I. 2013).

2015See State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194 , 896 A.2d 973, 988 (2006) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the proposition that “knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of [a] prosecutor”)); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (no Brady violation where allegedly exculpatory information was in the possession of other government agencies that were not a part of the investigation team and that did not participate in prosecution, where prosecution was unaware of existence of the information).

2015See State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194 , 896 A.2d 973, 988 (2006) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the proposition that “knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of [a] prosecutor”)); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (no Brady violation where allegedly exculpatory information was in the possession of other government agencies that were not a part of the investigation team and that did not participate in prosecution, where prosecution was unaware of existence of the information).

2013Although George argues that Brady was violated because he could not read the terms of the plea agreement in the copy he received, “Brady does not compel the government to furnish a defendant with information which he already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” United States v. Ruth, 413 Fed.

2013Appx. 701, 703 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding no Brady violation where co-conspirator’s plea agreement “was filed in the district court... and [defendant did] not present any reason why he could not have obtained the plea agreement through reasonable diligence”); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no Brady violation where an undisclosed plea agreement “was a matter of public record, fully available to [defendant]” for ten months before trial).

2013See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Without such suppression, there can be no Brady violation, notwithstanding the putative materiality of the subject documents.”).

2013See, e.g., George v. People, 59 V.I. at 368, 378 (V.I. 2013) (citing United States v Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2013See, e.g., George v. People, 59 V.I. at 368, 378 (V.I. 2013) (citing United States v Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2011Cf. Occhicone, 455 F.3d at 1309 (applying Giglio standard to habeas corpus appeal when state appellate court erroneously applied Brady standard). 2.

2011A Giglio violation, however, is a type of Brady violation in which “the undisclosed evidence reveals that the prosecution knowingly made false statements or introduced or allowed trial testimony that it knew or should have known was false.” Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2011A Giglio violation, however, is a type of Brady violation in which “the undisclosed evidence reveals that the prosecution knowingly made false statements or introduced or allowed trial testimony that it knew or should have known was false.” Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 , 96 S. Ct. 2392 , 49 L.

2011Both Scott and Altman testified as defense witnesses in a related trial that predated Copien’s by several months and their testimony was a matter of public record.”); Price v. Thurmer, 514 F.3d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding indictment is a public record readily accessible to defense counsel); United States v. Cook, 170 Fed.

2011Both Scott and Altman testified as defense witnesses in a related trial that predated Copien’s by several months and their testimony was a matter of public record.”); Price v. Thurmer, 514 F.3d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding indictment is a public record readily accessible to defense counsel); United States v. Cook, 170 Fed.

2011See Starusko, 729 F.2d at 261 .

2011See Starusko, 729 F.2d at 261 .

2011Under these particular facts, Infante’s Brady argument is without merit.”); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 479 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding no Brady violation where the government failed to inform defense counsel of details of witness’s plea agreement “because transcripts of [the] plea agreement and sentencing hearing were readily available”).

2011See 453 S.E.2d at 730-31 .

2011Both Scott and Altman testified as defense witnesses in a related trial that predated Copien’s by several months and their testimony was a matter of public record.”); Price v. Thurmer, 514 F.3d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding indictment is a public record readily accessible to defense counsel); United States v. Cook, 170 Fed.

2011Both Scott and Altman testified as defense witnesses in a related trial that predated Copien’s by several months and their testimony was a matter of public record.”); Price v. Thurmer, 514 F.3d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding indictment is a public record readily accessible to defense counsel); United States v. Cook, 170 Fed.

2011See, e.g., United States v. Coplen, 565 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Copien is also unable to establish a Brady violation ....

2011See, e.g., United States v. Coplen, 565 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Copien is also unable to establish a Brady violation ....

2011As this Court has previously explained, a Brady violation occurs when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to a criminal defendant “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Stevens, 2011 V.I.

2011As this Court has previously explained, a Brady violation occurs when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to a criminal defendant “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Stevens, 2011 V.I.

2009Fahie, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 674 .

2009Fahie, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 674 .

2009Fahie, 419 F.3d at 255 (3d Cir. 2005).

2009Id.